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 1.  Introduction  
 
Agriculture continues to be the major engine for the livelihood of smallholders in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, smallholders face multiple challenges in gaining access to 
agricultural markets (Holloway et al., 2008; Staal et al., 1997). One of the main challenges 
negatively affecting commercialization in sub-Saharan Africa is lack of well-functioning 
agrifood value chains (Poulton et al., 2006). In the absence of such value chains, it is difficult 
to comply with the strict quality and safety requirements of high value markets, which is 
increasingly leading to the exclusion of smallholders from participating in these markets 
(Henson et al., 2005). Thus, enhancing smallholder commercialization1 calls for developing 
sustainable agrifood value chains catering to national, regional, and international markets. 
Both the theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that  access to improved technologies, 
institutional innovations (e.g., farmer organizations), and interlinked contracts with 
agribusiness firms (e.g., contract farming arrangements) are needed to induce smallholder 
commercialization in high value agricultural markets (Barrett, 2008; Poulton et al., 2010).  
 
Smallholder commercialization also presupposes the availability of cash crops (Poulton et al., 
1998). In this regard, potato has increasingly become an important cash crop for rural 
households in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the international potato center (CIP), potato 
is the third most consumed crop worldwide, after rice and wheat 
(http://cipotato.org/potato/facts). Also, future per capita consumption of potato is likely to 
increase because of the increasing demand for fast foods and consumers’ awareness of potato 
as a healthy food. Potato contains high calorie, dry matter, protein, essential vitamins, 
minerals, and dietary fiber content among major food crops (Storey and Davies, 1992). 
Because of its high nutritional content and its high yield, potato is considered one of the key 
crops for food security in the densely populated regions of sub-Saharan Africa. This means 
that there are potentially good prospects for potato growers to enhance their 
commercialization.
1 Commercialization in this thesis is used to refer to making use of market opportunities by smallholders, e.g., 
by growing market-oriented crops rather than growing only for own consumption.  
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However, improving smallholder commercialization requires coordinated action between 
several value chain actors in order to align the quality produced by smallholder farmers with 
the quality demanded in the national, regional, and international market. Nowadays, high-
value markets for domestic consumption are the fastest-growing agricultural markets in many 
developing countries (World Bank, 2008). The welfare impacts of this growth, however, 
depend on the extent to which smallholders participate in these markets, the availability of 
market infrastructure, and institutional innovations (e.g., collective action through producer 
organizations, contract farming arrangements). The increasingly stringent sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards required in the national and global markets have brought a significant 
change in the organization of agrifood chains (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005).  
 
Firstly, from the supply side, quality has become the key variable in the marketing strategies 
of agrifood value chain actors. Thus, when smallholders want to participate in these chains, 
they have to make specific investments and coordinate their activities with other actors in the 
downstream parts of the value chain.  Indeed, this is a big challenge for the majority of 
smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa. Addressing smallholders’ challenges requires joint 
public and private efforts in policy (e.g., food safety legislation), research, and value chain 
development around smallholders. The presence (or development) of efficient value chains is 
one of the key requirements for ‘agriculture-for-development’ indicated in the 2008 World 
Development Report (World Bank, 2008). This report further highlights that the private 
sector can improve smallholder commercialization through driving the organization of value 
chains involving smallholders and commercial farms. Likewise, the public sector can 
promote smallholder commercialization through enhancing capacity and correcting market 
failures (e.g., by supplying agricultural technologies, inputs, etc.). Commercialization also 
opens new opportunities for smallholders to foster innovation. Thus, enhancing smallholders’ 
participation in integrated value chains is dependent on the availability of technical support, 
capacity building through knowledge sharing mechanisms, farmer-to-research interaction, 
farmer-to-farmer interaction, and farmer-to-buyer interaction (World Bank, 2008).  
 
Secondly, on the demand side, there has been an increasing dominance of large retailers in 
setting the quality requirements that suppliers of food products have to comply with, 
including suppliers from developing countries. These retailers are increasingly dominating 
national, regional, and international markets by setting standards for food quality and safety 
(Reardon and Swinnen, 2004). These standards are major challenges for smallholders, which 
14 
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means they have a high chance that they will be left out from high value markets unless they 
get support. Nonetheless, given the right supports (e.g., inputs, credit, extension services, 
technology adoption) and contract incentives, smallholders can participate successfully even 
in highly competitive global value chains (Minten et al., 2009). 
 
In sum, the modern market has brought both challenges and opportunities for smallholders. In 
view of these challenges for smallholder commercialization, the present study aims to gain 
insights into the factors affecting smallholders to improve quality and market access by 
analyzing their relationship with upstream (and downstream) actors and thus to generate 
information relevant for the development of sustainable value chains in the potato sector. 
More specifically the thesis aims to explore: 
 
• product or technology related quality alignment2 problems by analyzing the 
interactions between smallholder farmers and their upstream actors; and 
• value chain related quality alignment problems by analyzing interactions between 
farmers and downstream actors (seller-buyer relationships). 
 
The remainder of this introduction chapter is organized as follows. An overview of the potato 
crop in Ethiopia is presented in section 1.1. Section 1.2 provides the theoretical framework of 
the study, followed by contributions of the thesis to the literature in section 1.3. Section 1.4 
highlights the main research questions to be addressed. The data and methods and the outline 
of the thesis sections are presented in sections 1.5 and 1.6.  
 
1.1 Overview of the Ethiopian potato value chain   
 
The current economic policy of Ethiopia, Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to 
End Poverty (PASDEP), is aiming at shifting of farmers from traditional (semi-subsistence) 
farming practices to market-oriented production systems (Jaleta and Gardebroek, 2007). As a 
result, potato is considered one of the spearheads of agricultural policy by the Ethiopian 
policymakers because of its potential for food security, export, and income generation.  
 
2 In this study, quality alignment refers the matching of quality preferences between two or more actors in the potato supply 
chain 
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Potato ranks first among the vegetable crops, and is a rapidly expanding crop in Ethiopia. 
However, despite favorable government policies, weather conditions, and good strategic 
location to trade with the Middle East and neighboring countries, the productivity and market 
performance3 of the potato crop continues to be low. Over the last two decades, the increased 
in potato production has been realized from area expansion (Gildemacher et al., 2009) 
(Figure 1.1). This means that modern varieties that could have enhanced smallholder 
productivity and commercialization have not been used or these varieties have not been 
available for or, if available, have not been used by smallholders. As a result, the large 
majority of potato production has been sold in the national market.  
 
Recently, however, smallholders have recognized the importance of the potato crop to 
improve commercialization. Furthermore, the export of potato has shown substantial growth 
since 2006 (Figure 1.2).  Overall, if efficient value chains there availability, there is a good 
chance that the potato crop will become one of the main crops enhancing smallholder 
commercialization in the country, in addition to the traditional crops like coffee and oil seeds.  
 
There have been, however, efforts by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) 
to improve the performance of the potato sector. As a result, EIAR (with the help of 
international research organizations) released around 18 potato varieties in the last two 
decades. Nonetheless, the adoption rate and area cultivated to grow these varieties (by ware 
potato growers) have been low. Instead, smallholders continue growing the ‘local’ 4 varieties 
(Gebremedhin et al., 2008).  The often explanation for the low performance of the Ethiopian 
potato sector has been poor seed supply systems. However, this claim has not been 
empirically substantiated from the perspective of ware (consumption) potato farmers.   
3 In this thesis low performance refers to smallholders’ limited access to high value markets such as to 
supermarkets, processors, or export markets. 
4 Generally, Ethiopia does not have indigenous potato varieties. Potato was introduced in Ethiopia around 1858. 
However, there is no document showing how and when these ‘local’ varieties currently used were introduced.  
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Figure 1.1 Potato area expansion and production in Ethiopia between 1993 and 2010 
(FAOSTAT, 2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Potato exports in Ethiopia between 1993 and 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2013) 
 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
 
To analyze smallholders’ upstream and downstream interactions, the concept of institutions is 
important for this thesis.  
 
North (1994) defines institutions as ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their 
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enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and 
specifically economies’ (p. 360). The concept of institution has become a popular domain of 
research with the advent of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 2000). NIE is a multidisciplinary field of research that has emerged in response 
to the shortcomings of the neoclassical economics approach in which economic agents were 
assumed to operate in a frictionless market environment (such as perfect information, zero 
transaction costs, and full rationality). The NIE approach to economic development provides 
the framework both to explain the determinants of institutions and their evolution over time, 
and to evaluate their impact on economic performance, efficiency, and distribution (Nabli and 
Nugent, 1989).  
 
However, by influencing transaction costs and coordination possibilities, institutions can have 
the effect of either facilitating or retarding economic exchanges (Kherallah and Kirsten, 
2002). The NIE framework operates at two levels of analysis: macro and micro levels 
(Williamson, 2000). At the macro level of analysis, NIE deals with the institutional 
environment affecting the behavior and performance of economic actors. At the micro level 
of analysis, NIE deals with the institutional arrangement (or governance structure) in which 
individual transactions are embedded.  
 
Although NIE has several perspectives, one of the popular theories is transaction cost 
economics, which hypothesizes institutions as transaction cost-minimizing arrangements. 
Following Coase (1937), Williamson (1979), and North (1990), the concept of transaction 
costs in the economic analysis of institutions has become a rapidly expanding domain of 
research, particularly with respect to the analysis of interactions between institutions and the 
organization of economic activities. Transaction costs serve as the unifying concept in 
analyzing the efficiency of alternative institutional arrangements. Therefore, transaction cost 
economics has advanced the explanation of contractual relations from ex ante incentive 
alignment to ex post safeguarding and adapting of contracts. The major advancement of the 
transaction cost economics theory relates to the identification of principal dimensions in 
which transactions differ, principal attributes for describing institutional arrangements 
(governance structures), and a discriminating match in aligning transactions with governance 
structures (Williamson, 2000). According to the transaction cost economics theory, the 
behavior of the trading partners and the nature of transactions determine the appropriate 
institutional arrangements. Transaction costs are caused by behavioral factors (bounded 
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rationality and opportunism) and characteristics of the transaction (asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency) (Williamson, 1979). Thus, efficient value chain organization 
presumes an alignment between the transaction (with its specific characteristics) and the 
institutional arrangement (with its specific attributes). 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effect of different institutions (institutional 
environment as well as institutional arrangements) on quality alignment and the implications 
for smallholder commercialization.  
 
1.2.1 Institutional environment  
 
Parts of the institutional environment are research, extension, credit, public quality standards, 
and the functioning of the legal system protecting investments. Also, the institutional 
environment includes informal institutions such as social networks. Thus, the first order of 
economizing transaction costs is to get the institutional environment right (Williamson, 
2000). In this thesis, two important institutions are considered at the level of the institutional 
environment – the agricultural knowledge and innovation system (AKIS) and the institution 
of middleman. 
 
Regarding the AKIS, the thesis focuses on the role of research, extension, credit, farmer 
organizations, farmer training centers, NGOs, and downstream actors in technology adoption. 
There are generally two views regarding AKIS in the literature. One view assumes farmers as 
passive recipients of new technologies; thus, technology adoption process follows a top-down 
(unidirectional) approach. The other view (participatory innovation approach) considers 
farmers as active innovators. The underlying notion of the participatory innovation approach 
is that farmers have an intimate knowledge of their local environment, conditions, problems, 
priorities and criteria for evaluation as part of their farming routine (Sumberg et al., 2003). 
The participatory innovation approach also acknowledges that agricultural research and 
technology adoption contain divergent objectives of several actors (Biggs, 1990). Thus, 
analysis of the role of AKIS is particularly important in Ethiopia in which smallholder 
commercialization depends on the availability of new technologies (such as modern varieties) 
that are acceptable by the national, regional, and international customers. The main 
hypothesis of the AKIS perspective is that a participatory innovation approach can lead to 
improved relationship between research institutes and farmers, thereby including farmer 
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knowledge and preferences in setting research priorities, and thus enhances the uptake of 
newly developed varieties. 
 
Another aspect of the thesis regarding the institutional environment is the role informal 
institutions in trade relations and smallholder commercialization. In general, informal 
institutions refer to self-governing social networks available to participants in their 
economic/social interactions (Dixit, 2009). Informal institutions can facilitate search and 
information. Informal institutions rely on a set of shared norms that regulate how transactions 
are carried out in a repeated manner and what sanctions need to be imposed against non-
compliance. The embeddedness of transactions in a social context can reduce transaction 
costs by restraining agents from opportunistic behavior, thus increasing the likelihood of 
contract compliance (Fafchamps, 2006), and by facilitating information exchange (Platteau, 
2000). The thesis focuses on one particular institution, that of the middleman, and examines 
the role of social ties in trading relations.  Most transactions that involve middlemen in the 
potato value chain appear to be highly embedded in the social context. Thus, the thesis opted 
to analyze the role of middlemen at a higher level rather than merely considering them as 
economic agents and thus analyzing their role at the level of institutional arrangements.  
 
1.2.2 Institutional arrangements  
 
The type of institutional arrangements is important in a world of incomplete contracts in 
order to make contractual relations stable, to create specific mechanisms for coordinating 
activities, to organize transactions, and to solve disputes in agrifood chains (Ménard, 2004). 
Institutional arrangements (governance structures) can infuse order in a relationship where 
potential conflict threatens to undo opportunities to realize mutual gains (Williamson, 1999). 
Fundamental to the choice of institutional arrangements is the presence of transaction costs, 
which are caused by the attributes of transactions and the characteristics of human behavior. 
The incompleteness of contracts ex ante due to bounded rationality can lead to costly 
renegotiations ex post and can provide room for opportunistic behavior. According to 
Williamson (1999), the type of institutional arrangements required to guard against 
contractual hazards vary by incentive intensity, administrative controls, and contract law 
regime. Generally, institutional arrangements can take different forms – spot market, hybrid, 
or hierarchy. More integrated institutional arrangements are associated with transactions that 
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are characterized by high uncertainty (e.g. quality uncertainty), frequent exchanges, and 
transaction specificity of investments.  
 
Agricultural transactions display a broad range of institutional arrangements because of the 
location-specific nature of the investments and the perishability of agricultural products 
(Masten, 2000). Thus, the search for appropriate institutional arrangements in agricultural 
transactions to shape and monitor economic activities will continue to generate a flow of 
theoretical models and empirical studies (Ménard, 2004). In this thesis, four types of 
institutions (spot market, farmgate 5transactions, trust-based transactions, and contract 
farming arrangement) are explored in the relationship between farmers and downstream 
actors. 
 
1.2.3 Relationship between institutional environment and institutional arrangements 
 
The institutional environment, which consists of formal and informal institutions, can affect 
quality improvement activities and thus quality alignment on a number of aspects: on the type 
of organizational arrangement chosen, on the way specialization in agriculture can be 
developed, on the type of contracts that connect parties in the value chain, or on the resulting 
contractual hazards and contractual costs (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005).  
 
In the Ethiopian potato value chain, the institutional environment can have a significant 
influence on the type of institutional arrangements between farmers and downstream actors. 
The presence (or enforcement) of quality standards or quality control mechanisms can 
facilitate information exchange in the seller-buyer relationship. When there is a formal 
quality control system, contractual hazards related to quality can be solved through public 
certification of the final product. This economizes on both the amount of private ‘reputational 
capital’ necessary to guarantee quality to the buyers (or consumers) and the extent of quality 
controls along the value chain (Raynaud et al., 2005). However, when formal mechanisms are 
not present (or enforced), value chain actors may have to invest on reputational capital (trust) 
or on other type of arrangements to control quality. Likewise, informal institutions, such as 
the institution of middleman, can affect contractual relations between sellers and buyers, for 
instance, by excluding new entrants from participating in the market, by applying price 
5 Farmgate in this thesis is used to refer to a type of arrangement between ware potato farmers and traders in 
which transaction takes place at the farmers’ field mostly when potatoes are still in the field. 
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collusion (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999), or by changing the relative bargaining powers of 
buyers and sellers (Fafchamps, 2000). Relationships between the concepts are presented 
below (Figure 1.3).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Conceptual framework 
 
1.3 Contributions to the literature 
 
The present study offers several contributions to the literature.  
 
Firstly, this study has conceptualized quality alignment (and smallholder commercialization)  
as a factor of institutional environment (formal as well as informal institutions) and 
institutional arrangements and their interactions. In doing so, it shows the multidimensional 
nature of smallholders’ problems related to quality improvement and market access in the 
context of less-developed agrifood chains. Secondly, the thesis provides specific insights and 
identifies the main factors affecting quality alignment by paying due attention to the 
upstream-related (e.g., variety choice) and downstream-related relationships (choice of 
institutional arrangement) of ware (consumption) potato farmers. Previous studies related to 
potato in Ethiopia and other East African countries largely focused on the problems related to 
the supply side of seed potatoes (Gildemacher et al., 2009; Hirpa et al., 2010; Ortiz et al., 
Smallholder commercialization  
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2013; Schulte-Geldermann et al., 2012). Thirdly, the thesis expands the understating 
regarding the factors influencing smallholders’ adoption decision by focusing on a broader 
set of determinants than is usually done in adoption studies. The present study demonstrates 
that farmers’ assessment of production- and market-related attributes of existing (local) 
varieties can influence farmers’ decision to adopt new varieties. Furthermore, the thesis 
provides further arguments for the need to include farmers and downstream value chain 
actors in the innovation process. Fourthly, the thesis offers empirical analysis on how 
interpersonal relationships and social networks can affect the efficiency of economic 
exchanges in the context of less-developed agrifood chains. Most work to date emphasis the 
role of middlemen from the perspective of search criteria. But in this era of modern economy 
where smallholders are increasingly getting access to a mobile phone, evaluating the role of 
middlemen from only information and search criteria appears to be limited. This thesis 
provides arguments by analyzing the role of middlemen in enhancing or hindering 
smallholder commercialization and thus contributes to the general discussion in the literature 
regarding the impact of social networks on the welfare of smallholders. Lastly, the thesis 
provides insights into the effectiveness of contract farming schemes by analyzing the 
attractiveness of different contract design attributes from the perspective of smallholders. In 
doing so, the thesis provides managerial implications on designing sustainable contract 
farming schemes. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
 
This thesis is part of the research programme “Co-Innovation for Quality in African Food 
Chains” (CoQA), which is a collaboration of Wageningen University with Hawassa 
University and Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia, University of Abomey-Calavi (Benin) 
and the University of Fort Hare (South Africa). The CoQA programme studies quality 
improvement options in three African food chains: pineapple in Benin, deciduous fruit in 
South Africa and potato in Ethiopia. The main objective is to analyse and design co-
innovations for quality improvement in order to support smallholder producers in tailoring 
the quality of their products to the demands of their national and international supply chain 
customers, thus strengthening smallholder market access and competitiveness. The CoQA 
program has been funded by the INREF fund of Wageningen UR. (For further information, 
see www.coqa.nl). Within the CoQA framework, the present study focuses on analyzing the 
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role of institutions on quality improvement and market access in the context of Ethiopian 
potato value chains. 
 
Potato is an inherently bulky, costly (due to large amount of inputs required), and perishable 
crop that can easily lose its quality during the process of harvesting, storage, distribution and 
marketing (e.g., due to physical damage, physiological decay, and/or poor storage 
conditions). Coordination is therefore necessary to maintain the quality required by national, 
regional, and international customers, and to minimize transaction costs arising from 
information asymmetries, high transportation costs, and high market risks.   
 
In addition to its bulkiness and perishability, potato is also a multi-attribute crop in which the 
decision to grow is dependent on several factors. For instance, farmers can choose between 
multiple varieties. In this situation, the role of research and extension, in terms of developing 
and disseminating, the right varieties is important. Likewise, the manner in which 
transactions are coordinated between farmers (sellers) and downstream actors (buyers) can 
influence quality alignment because of differences in individual incentives to improve 
product quality. Thus, Chapter two explores the main factors influencing quality alignment in 
the Ethiopian potato value chain by addressing the following research question.  
 
Research question 1 (RQ1): How do farmer and trader preferences for specific quality 
attributes and coordination mechanisms in farmer-trader relationships affect the alignment 
of quality in the Ethiopian potato value chain? 
 
Relatedly, supporting the adoption of new technologies is one of the most popular policy 
strategies in developing countries to improve quality of agricultural products and smallholder 
commercialization. Though improved quality attributes related to production (e.g., yield, 
disease resistance, etc.) might be a reason for smallholders to adopt new technologies, they 
are usually reluctant to do so. An often mentioned reason is that farmers are risk averse; 
therefore, they are less open to technological change and innovation. This type of reasoning 
seems to be dominating the debate around the adoption of improved potato varieties in 
Ethiopia. Thus, Chapter three goes further to understand the specific factors leading to low 
adoption by analyzing the relationships between adoption decision and the role of the 
agricultural knowledge and innovation systems and potato farmers’ perceptions toward the 
local varieties. 
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Research Question 2 (RQ2): How do the agricultural knowledge and innovation system and 
farmers’ perception of local varieties affect the adoption of improved potato varieties? 
 
The institutional environment can affect downstream relationships in many ways. The 
institution of middleman is one of the main informal institutions that has long presence in 
many countries, particularly in trading relationships between smallholders and traders. 
Several studies regarding middlemen have argued that middlemen can facilitate smallholders’ 
commercialization by solving information access problems (e.g., about price, market outlets, 
etc.). However, in the modern economy in which most smallholders living in remote areas are 
increasingly having access to information through mobile phones, the function of middlemen 
needs to be re-examined. Thus, Chapter four questions the role of middlemen as an 
appropriate institution in resolving potato farmers’ marketing problems by addressing the 
following research question.  
 
Research question 3 (RQ3): Which factors do influence farmers’ decision to use middlemen 
in their trading relations, and what is the economic impact of such relationship? 
 
Chapter five entirely focuses on one institution (contract farming), and studies detailed 
contractual relations enhancing smallholder commercialization. Contract farming refers to an 
agreement between a farmer and an agribusiness firm where the farmer produces a particular 
quantity and quantity of an agricultural product and the firm has a commitment to buy it.  
Such interlinked contracts can increase smallholders’ income because it allows farmers to 
grow high value crops. Likewise, this arrangement benefits agribusiness firms as they receive 
high quality products and timely supply. Although these contractual arrangements can be 
mutually beneficial, in practice they often encounter multiple commitment problems. Thus, 
improving insights into the details of contractual arrangements can help build better 
contractual relations between smallholders and agribusiness firms. Previous studies have 
provided a wide range of analysis regarding the (positive) welfare impact of contract farming 
and its potential to enhance smallholder commercialization. At the same time, there have 
been many reports of contract non-compliance and free-riding by either parties. Thus, 
Chapter five aims to analyze the attractiveness of different contract design attributes in 
smallholders’ decision to participate in a contract farming arrangement.   
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Research question 4 (RQ4): Which contract attributes do motivate smallholders to 
participate in a contract farming scheme? 
 
1.5 Data and methods 
 
To answer the research questions outlined above, the study used data collected through 
surveys and secondary data sets (the details are presented in each of the chapters). The study 
was carried out in Ethiopia in three areas:  West Arsi zone (in the Rift Valley region), West 
Shewa zone, and Addis Ababa (Figure. 4). West Shewa zone in which part of this study was 
conducted is located 125 km West of Addis Ababa. This region was chosen due to seed 
potato farmers experience working under a contract farming arrangement. Thus, data used in 
Chapter five were collected from this region. The major part of the study took place in the 
West Arsi zone (located some 250 km to 300 km) south of Addis Ababa. This area is located 
in the Rift valley region, and is the main ware (consumption) potato producing region in the 
country. Based on data from this study (Chapter two), more than 65% of the potato in the 
Addis Ababa (the capital) wet market were supplied from this region. Data collected from 
this region and that of Addis Ababa were used to answer RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 (Chapters two, 
three, and four). Chapter two is also partly based on a price data set, which was collected 
from one of the main potato spot markets in Ethiopia, Shashemene. The data were analyzed 
using several techniques (details are discussed in each of the chapters).  
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Figure 1.4 Study areas in Ethiopia 
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis  
 
Chapter two empirically explores the main factors influencing quality alignment in the potato 
value chain. Chapter two uses survey data collected from 346 (ware) potato farmers, 34 
downstream actors, and two years weekly price data.  Chapter three goes further to explain 
the underlying causes of low adoption for improved potato varieties. More specifically, 
Chapter three provides answers to causes of low adoption by analyzing the relationship of 
West Arsi  
West Shewa 
 
Addis Ababa  
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adoption decision and the role of agricultural knowledge and innovation systems (AKIS) and 
smallholder farmers’ quality assessment of local varieties. To do so, Chapter three uses the 
data collected from 346 (ware) potato farmers. Chapter four identifies the main factors that 
affect farmers’ decision to trade through middlemen and the economic impact of such 
relationship. Chapter four also uses the same data set as Chapter three. Chapter five analyzes 
the attractiveness of different contract design attributes that affect smallholders’ motivation to 
participate in a contract farming scheme. Chapter five uses data collected (based on 
experimentally generated questionnaire) from 144 seed potato farmers and analyzes 
smallholders’ preferences for contract design attributes (contract terms and conditions). 
Chapter six discusses the main results, provides the main conclusions, highlights the main 
contributions to the literature and the implications for practices, and outlines directions for 
further research. 
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Factors influencing the alignment of quality 
preferences in the Ethiopian potato value chain 
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 2. Factors influencing the alignment of quality preferences in the Ethiopian potato 
value chain 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
Vertical coordination in agrifood chains has become increasingly important in recent days 
due to consumer demand for higher quality product, and because the competition in national 
and global markets has shifted from price-based to quality-based (Henson and Jaffee, 2008; 
Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). Retailers in the international agrifood chains have taken up the 
coordination role in aligning quality, for instance, by imposing their own food quality and 
safety protocols (Narrod et al., 2009). For domestic markets in developing countries, aligning 
quality is more difficult as value chain actors tend to operate independently. With the rise of 
an urban middle income class in developing countries, there is an increasing demand for high 
quality foods (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). Coordinated action (in a value chain) is 
needed, not only for operational efficiency (Lee et al., 1997; Stank et al., 1999) but also for 
quality improvement and quality alignment. We define quality alignment as the matching of 
preferences among value chain actors. 
 
Potato is increasingly demanded in developing countries because of the growth in fast food 
restaurants (Stewart et al., 2004) and population (Pretty et al., 2003), and because consumers 
perceive potato as a healthy food (Jemison et al., 2008). In the context of Ethiopia, aligning 
quality is more difficult in the potato value chain at least for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the production of potatoes is more complex than the production of other crops because of the 
two stage production processes and agro-ecological factors. While for most crops the 
production of starting material, such as seeds and plantlets, is concentrated on a few, usually 
large farms, the production of seed potatoes is highly dispersed and often agro-ecological 
specific. Secondly, producers of seed potatoes are often disconnected from producers of ware 
potatoes, because ware potato growers use either their own (farmer-saved) seed or seed 
sourced from other ware potato growers, not from the specialized seed potato growers. The 
potato sector in Ethiopia is thus a clear example of the disconnection between (specialized) 
seed potato growers and ware potato growers. Thirdly, the lack of common quality grades 
(standards) or other formal mechanisms make the alignment of quality a challenge. 
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The Ethiopian potato sector consists of four main actors, namely research institutes, seed 
potato growers, ware potato growers, and traders. However, despite the availability of several 
improved varieties (IVs) released by the research institutes, the traditional or local varieties 
(LVs) remain the dominant commercial variety in the Ethiopian wet potato market. This 
implies a misalignment between the (potato) quality supplied by research institutes (variety 
development) and quality preferred by farmers and traders (variety choice). Diverging 
objectives and preferences (regarding specific quality attributes) among different actors make 
the alignment of quality a complex and challenging task. 
 
The objective of this study is to provide insights into the factors that influence the alignment 
of quality in the Ethiopian potato value chain. Using a value chain perspective, the study 
specifically focus on (1) farmer and trader preferences for specific quality attributes in their 
variety choice; and (2) the coordination mechanisms currently used in farmer-buyer 
relationships. The study seeks to know whether and how differences in preferences among 
value chain actors affect quality alignment or misalignment. In addition, the study seeks to 
understand whether and how different types of coordination mechanisms in the farmer-buyer 
relationship affect quality alignment.   
 
Using an interdisciplinary research approach (combing economics and marketing concepts 
and farmer knowledge), this study attempts to broaden the understanding of the factors that 
influence the alignment of quality preferences in food value chains in developing countries, 
such as the Ethiopian potato value chain. There have been many studies on the Ethiopia 
potato sector but they mainly focused on seed potato supply systems (Gildemacher et al., 
2009a; Gildemacher et al., 2009b; Hirpa et al., 2010; Hirpa et al., 2012; Ortiz et al., 2013; 
Schulte-Geldermann et al., 2012). This study focuses on the ware potato value chain by 
analyzing the effect of ware potato farmers’ and traders’ preferences for specific quality 
attributes and the effect of different types of coordination mechanisms on ware potato 
farmers’ incentive to improve quality.  The study addresses the following research question: 
 
RQ1: How do farmer and trader preferences for specific quality attributes and coordination 
mechanisms in farmer-trader relationships affect the alignment of quality in the Ethiopian 
potato supply chain?  
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In exploring potential quality alignment problems related to variety choice, the study first 
identifies currently used local and improved potato varieties and characterize them into 
production-related and market-related quality characteristics. The study then assesses farmer 
and trader preferences, assuming these preferences influence their variety choice. To explore 
potential solutions for quality alignment problems in the farmer-trader relationship, the study 
identifies the type of coordination mechanisms and analyzes their effect on smallholder 
farmers’  incentive  to improve quality. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the conceptual 
framework, followed by data and methods in section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides the results and 
discussion. Section 2.5 presents the conclusions. 
 
2.2 Conceptual framework: quality alignment 
    
Quality alignment and misalignment can be influenced by several factors. First, compatibility 
of objectives of value chain actors is needed for quality alignment (Spinelli and Birley, 2002). 
Whether the objectives of actors involved in the relationship are similar or different, the 
attainment of one’s objectives should not conflict with the attainment of others’ objectives 
(Wong, 1999). However, compatibility of objectives is not enough to obtain quality 
alignment. Second, quality alignment requires coordination in the value chain. Coordination 
is a combination of information exchange and specific decision-making processes (Bijman 
and Wollni, 2009; Gagalyuk et al., 2010). Without information exchange, actors cannot know 
each other’s preferences, and without a proper decision-making process, the preferences of 
difference value chain actors cannot be aligned. Third, quality alignment can be influenced 
by the diversity of specific quality attributes. Finally, quality alignment can be influenced by 
the type of institutional arrangements used in governing transactions between value chain 
actors.   
 
2.2.1 Variety development and quality preferences  
 
One area of potential misalignment considered in this study relates to specific quality 
attributes used in variety development and quality attributes that are preferred by farmers and 
buyers. When IVs released by research institutes do not have both the production-related and 
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market-related quality attributes as preferred by farmers and buyers, quality misalignment is 
present. The question then is which quality attributes do influence farmers and traders variety 
choice?  
 
As a product consists of multiple attributes (Lancaster, 1966), quality can be decomposed 
into intrinsic and extrinsic attributes (Steenkamp, 1989). Intrinsic quality attributes relate to 
the characteristics of the physical product, which cannot be changed without altering the 
product, while extrinsic quality attributes relate to the intangible characteristics of the 
product, such as price, brand name, and place of origin. Defining quality in a value chain is 
problematic as different chain actors may perceive quality differently based on what they 
demand from and like about a particular product (Ruben et al., 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Coordination mechanisms 
  
Another potential area of misalignment considered in this study relates to the type of 
coordination mechanisms in farmer-buyer relationships. Coordination is defined by Malone 
and Crowston (1994) as ‘the process of managing dependencies between activities’ (p.90). 
Coordination problems could arise from conflicting objectives, disagreements over domain of 
decisions and actions, and differences in perceptions in joint decision-making between chain 
actors (Kanda and Deshmukh, 2008). Thus, the decision making process and the extent of 
information exchange is expected to affect the alignment of quality along the value chain.  
 
In reducing information asymmetry (and thus to improve coordination), value chain actors 
may use different quality signaling and screening techniques. One crucial decision problem 
for the seller is to decide on how to provide information on quality to uninformed buyers. The 
literature provides different signaling techniques such as third-party protocols and procedures 
(standards) and product differentiation through branding and reputation (Raynaud et al., 
2005; Sporleder and Goldsmith, 2001). Quality standards can facilitate coordination between 
farmers and downstream actors by carrying information on quality attributes and minimizing 
buyers’ search costs (Digal, 2005; Raynaud et al., 2005). However, quality standards are 
absent in many developing countries since the liberalization of domestic markets and the 
abolishment of state marketing institutions (Beynon et al., 1992). Furthermore, it can be 
costly for the private actors to implement formal quality assurance systems, as such systems 
heavily rely on documentation of production processes and practices and third-party auditing 
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and certification (Holleran et al., 1999). In the absence of quality signaling techniques, buyers 
may use different quality screening mechanisms to lower search costs for quality (Diehl et al., 
2003). It is interesting to know how information about potato quality is transmitted among 
value chain actors. Thus, this study addresses the question ‘What type of quality signaling 
and screening mechanisms are used in the potato value chain to optimize information 
exchange and thus to improve the alignment of quality?’ 
 
Different institutional arrangements can be used to economize on transaction costs and 
facilitate economic exchanges between farmers and downstream actors and between 
downstream actors (e.g., between collecting wholesalers and stationed wholesalers). 
Transaction cost economics focuses on three types of institutional arrangements – spot 
market, hybrid and hierarchy (Williamson, 1985). While under a spot market arrangement 
price is the sole coordination mechanism, the hierarchy form puts all the production and 
marketing stages of a value chain under the control of one entity (Hobbs, 1996). In between is 
a hybrid mode, which may take different forms, such as written contracts and relational 
contracts.  
 
When coordination is handled in a spot market arrangement, buyers may face high quality 
uncertainty due to the difficulty of measuring the performance of sellers (e.g., due to 
unobservable quality characteristics such as residuals). Quality uncertainty is a major source 
of risk in agricultural transactions (Wolf et al., 2001) and increases the buyers’ willingness to 
engage in a more integrated form of coordination (Goodhue, 2011). When quality uncertainty 
is high and a formal quality control mechanism (e.g., third party certification) is present, it 
could be more economical for value chain actors to use a (spot) market type of institutional 
arrangement (Raynaud et al., 2005). A spot market is defined as the absence of a seller-buyer 
relationship. When quality uncertainty is high and third party certification is not present, 
value chain actors may choose non-spot market type of institutional arrangements, such as 
formal contracts and trust-based relationships. A trust-based relationship implies that the 
other party is benevolent and that contracting parties will not be victims of any type of 
contractual hazards. The sources of trust may relate to institutional factors such as the ability 
of the formal structures to impose sanctions when trust is breached (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998), to characteristics or reputation of the transacting parties (Masuku and Kirsten, 2004), 
or to knowledge obtained through repeated interactions (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). In a 
formal contract, coordination is achieved by specifying detailed roles and responsibilities, 
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procedures for monitoring, and penalties for performance noncompliance of contracting 
parties (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Coordination through a trust-based relationship or a formal 
contract thus enhances the incentive to improve quality, because this type of arrangement 
introduces predictability into production systems and allows participants to allocate resources 
and share risks with greater confidence (Hueth et al. 1999). 
 
In general, a non-spot market type of institutional arrangement, often combining formal and 
informal mechanisms, has been claimed to be superior for obtaining consistent quality (Jang 
and Olson, 2010), for providing incentives for higher quality (Goodhue, 2011), for inducing 
investment in specific assets leading to improved quality (Raynaud et al., 2005; Reardon et 
al., 2009), for facilitating risk sharing (Sykuta and Parcell, 2003), and for preventing the 
problems of asymmetric information regarding specific product attributes (Hueth et al., 1999; 
King et al., 2007). 
 
2.3 Data and Methods  
 
Because different value chain actors define quality differently, the study systematically 
analyzes quality using two categories of quality attributes (of ware potatoes): production-
related and market-related. Attributes like yield, disease tolerance, maturity period, drought 
resistance, and crop management intensity are production-related because they determine 
production practices. Tuber size, stew quality, cooking quality, color, shape, and shelf life are 
market-related attributes because they determine sales options. For potatoes, variety type 
largely determines intrinsic quality attributes (Howard, 1974; Jemison et al., 2008; Long et 
al., 2004).  However, objective information on the quality attributes of local varieties is 
lacking. In situations where no objective quality information is available, farmer knowledge 
can be used to describe the quality of different varieties (Cavatassi et al., 2011). Thus, the 
study first addresses the question ‘How do ware potato farmers characterize currently used 
potato varieties (both LVs and IVs) in terms of production- and market-related quality 
attributes?’ 
 
The extent of quality alignment in the potato value chain is measured by the extent to which 
IVs released by research institutes are being adopted by ware potato farmers, and the extent 
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to which these varieties are liked by buyers at the different stages of the chain. To do so, the 
preferences of research institutes are measured by their research priorities; the preferences of 
farmers are measured by their production decisions; and the preferences of traders are 
measured by their preferences for specific quality attributes. 
 
2.3.1 Survey  
 
Farmers’ survey  
 
The study was carried out in the spring of 2011 among 350 ware potato farmers in the Rift 
valley region of Ethiopia. Although potatoes can be produced in different parts of the 
country, this study focuses on the Rift Valley region for two main reasons. Firstly, ware 
potato farmers in the Rift Valley region are the main suppliers of ware potatoes to the major 
cities of Ethiopia. For instance, the Shashemene spot market, in the center of the study 
region, is the main trade hub of ware potatoes in Ethiopia (Emana and Nigussie, 2011; Tefera 
et al., 2011). Secondly, to characterize the different potato varieties, it is necessary that the 
farmers in the survey have the same understanding of the existing varieties. In Ethiopia, 
variety names lack standardization and are often attached to local languages (Cavatassi et al., 
2011). Thus, focusing on one region avoids problems arising from confusion of variety 
names. 
 
The ware potato farmers were randomly selected from the land ownership register obtained 
from the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development from Shashemene, Shala, and Shiraro 
districts. This study used the data of 346 farmers in the analysis as data from four respondents 
were dropped later in the analysis. The main objective of this part of the study was to 
characterize the different potato varieties, both the IVs and the LVs. Characterization of the 
different potato varieties was carried out as follows.  
 
Firstly, the study identified seven potato varieties, LVs and IVs, and the classification was 
done by farmers, triangulated with information from agricultural agents. The varieties were: 
Agazer (AZ), Nech Abeba (NA), Key Dinch (KD), Key Abeba (KA), Gudane (GD), Jalene 
(JL), and Bule (BL). GD, JL, and BL are IVs that were released by the Ethiopian Institute of 
Agricultural Research (EIAR) while the others are LVs in which no documentation was 
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found on how and when these varieties were first introduced in the region. Secondly, to 
understand important characteristics of the varieties, quality attributes were classified into 
two dimensions: production- and market-related.   
 
To understand the factors influencing ware potato farmers’ decision to grow a particular 
variety, they were asked the following question (for each of the varieties): ‘What was the 
main reason that led you to grow this variety in the previous season?’ 
 
Downstream actors’ survey 
 
The main objective of this part of the survey was to understand the quality preferences of 
buyers in the potato value chain. We carried out this survey in the summer of 2011 among 10 
stationed wholesalers, 13 retailers, and 11 big hotels located in Addis Ababa. Because 
collecting wholesalers largely supply potatoes to the central market, Addis Ababa, we 
purposely selected the buyers at the central market.  The question for buyers was stated as 
follows: “Please distribute 100 points over the different quality attributes that you may take 
into account when you are buying ware (consumption) potatoes. Give the highest value to the 
most important quality attribute, the second highest value to the second most important 
quality attribute, etc.” 
 
2.3.2 Secondary data 
 
The objective of using this data was to understand the extent of quality uncertainty a potato 
farmer could face when selling potato in the spot market. As a potato trader has to negotiate 
with a number of sellers in each market day and judge quality on the spot, the likelihood of 
incorrectly measuring quality might be high; this can have an effect on smallholders’ 
incentive to improve quality.  
 
Thus, to understand the extent of this problem, the study used a database of two years weekly 
ware potato prices collected between 16 June 2009 and 21 June 2011 from Shashemene local 
market. Shashemene spot market is the main trade hub of ware potato in Ethiopia (Tesfaye et 
al., 2008). The data contained information about the price received by farmers and buyers for 
both a ‘high’ and ‘low’ quality delivery. The price data were based on the common 
commercial (local) variety, NA. Thus, any difference in quality was attributed to tuber size, 
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physical damages, and other quality criteria in which a specific buyer considers important on 
the spot. The data were collected on 108 market days by the Office of Shashemene District 
Agriculture and Rural Development.  
2.4 Results and discussion  
 
2.4.1 Characteristics of the sample  
 
Description of potato farmers in the sample 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the sample characteristics related to potato farmers.  
 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of sampled potato farmers (n=346) 
Variables  Total 
Male headed households (% yes) 96 
Marital status(% yes) 
 Unmarried 3.5 
Widow 0.3 
Married (only one wife) 63 
Married (>=2 wives) 33.2 
Other demographic characteristics  
 
Age (years) 36.8 
Family size 9.6 
Education of the respondent (years in school) 5.7 
Highest education in the family (years in school) 8.3 
Dependency ratioa 1.3 
Wealth (as approximated by) 
 land (owned) in ha 1.5 
Total livestock units TLUb 8.1 
Access to information  
presence of a mobile phone (% yes) 66.8 
presence a radio (% yes) 65 
presence a TV (% yes) 9.5 
Income from potato sales (2009/2010) 
 
Mean value (in birr)c 9,905 
% of potato income from total income 49 
a  measures the ratio between dependents and labor force within the family. b Tropical livestock units (TLU=250kg), used as a common unit 
to describe livestock numbers of various species as a single figure: oxen/cow=1TLU; Calf=0.25TLU; Heifer=0.75TLU; 
sheep/goat=0.13TLU;  young sheep/goat=0.06TLU; donkey=0.7TLU. c 1US$  was approximately equals to 12.60 birr. 
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The average age (year), education (school years), land (ha) and animal holdings in number of 
livestock units (TLU) were 37, 6, 1.5, and 8, respectively. The average family size was 10, 
with a dependency ratio of 1.3, implying a higher number of economically inactive members 
in a household. Over 33% of the respondents had two or more wives. Farmers who practiced 
polygamy were older (42 years) and less educated (4 school years), and had larger family size 
(14). In terms of access to information technology, 67% and 65% of the ware potato farmers 
had a mobile phone and radio, respectively. Potato contributed about 50% of the total 
household income in the 2009/2010 production cycle. 
 
Description of downstream actors in the sample 
 
Table 2.2 presents the description of buyers at the central market, Addis Ababa. In the 
2009/2010 transaction season, mean purchased volume was 957 tons on average for a 
stationed wholesaler, 42 tons for a retailer, and 7 tons for a hotel. Although stationed 
wholesalers did not have a direct transaction with potato farmers, they all knew the 
production region of potatoes; they stated that 65% of the potatoes were purchased from 
Shashemene area, our study region. However, the hotel managers did not exactly know the 
production region, as they would normally buy directly from stationed wholesalers with 
whom they have had contractual relationship in the past.   
 
Table 2.2 Description of potato buyers at the central market place (Addis Ababa) 
Mean values 
Total 
(N=34) 
Hotels 
(N=11) 
Stationed 
wholesalers (N=10) 
Retailers 
(N=13) 
Amount purchased previous year (in tons) 299.5 6.8 956.8 42.1 
Place Purchased (%) 
    Addis Ababa (central market) 91.2 72.7 100 100 
Addis Ababa (Supermarket) 8.8 27.3 0 0 
Knew production region of potato purchased  (% yes) 35.3 0 100 15.4 
If yes, potato purchased originated from (in %) 
    West Arsi Zone (the study area) 65.8 0 65 70 
East Arsi zone (South East) 25.3 0 28 26.5 
Holeta area (West) 7.2 0 11.7 7 
Gojam (North West) 1.7 0 5.3 0 
 
2.4.2 Farmer-based characterization of the IVs and LVs  
 
Characterizing the quality attributes of LVs and IVs using farmers’ knowledge can provide 
better insights into the quality difference among the existing varieties in general and between 
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the main IVs and LVs in particular. Such analysis can help to understand the underlying 
problem of quality misalignment in the potato value chain. The specific question addressed in 
this part is ‘How do ware potato farmers characterize currently used varieties (LVs and IVs) 
in terms of production- and market-related quality attributes?’ 
Production-related quality attributes 
 
Farmers’ assessment of the production-related quality attributes (PRQAs) is reported in Table 
2.3. The IVs, with the exception of BL, scored higher than the LVs as to yield. Likewise, the 
IVs scored the highest in terms of disease tolerance. Regarding drought tolerance, the most 
common LVs were assessed similar to IVs. However, differences exist concerning maturity 
period. While GD and JL take on average 123 days to mature, NA, the dominant LV, matures 
on average in 101 days. As to intensity of crop management, the LVs NA and AZ scored 
higher than the IVs GD and JL, implying that the LVs take more time for land preparation, 
planting, weed control, etc. than the IVs. New varieties tend to be more demanding in terms 
of crop management than local ones, which is not the case in our results. However, this might 
be because the farmers in the survey only grew the IVs on a small scale; thus they may not 
recognize the intensity of crop management as they would do for LVs, which were grown 
relatively at a larger scale.   
 
Table 2.3 PRQAs as evaluated by farmers (mean scores) 
 
Variety 
Yield  
(100kg per 
Timad) 
Maturity period 
(No. of days) 
Tolerance to 
disease Scale  
(1-5) 
Tolerance to 
drought 
Scale (1-5) 
Management 
intensity 
Scale (1-5) 
AZ 26.5 (10.5) 88 (10) 3.7 (1.2) 3.8 (1.1) 3.7 (1.0) 
NA 31.2 (11.8) 101 (15) 3.5 (1.2) 3.9 (1.2) 4.3 (0.9) 
KD 21.7 (8.3) 70 (11) 2.6 (1.2) 2.8 (1.2) 2.9 (1.1) 
KA 21.5 (7.8) 82 (15) 1.8 (0.9) 2.2 (1.1) 3.1 (1.2) 
GDa 43.8 (18.3) 122 (16) 4.1 (1.0) 3.8 (1.2) 3.7 (1.3) 
JLb 45.7 (20.1) 123 (18) 4.2 (1.2) 3.7 (1.3) 3.7 (1.3) 
BLc 24.4 (11.9) 112 (20) 3.8 (1.1) 3.5 (1.4) 2.8 (1.3) 
a, b, c IVs; standard deviations are given in brackets. 
  
The difference in PRQAs among the varieties was statistically tested using Friedman Test. 
However, the study only focused on NA and AZ, from the LVs, and GD and JL, from the 
IVs, as these varieties were the commonly grown ones by ware potato farmers. Among the 
four varieties, the Friedman Test result suggests (see Appendix 1) the presence of an overall 
significant differences related to the mean ranks of yield, maturity period, and disease 
tolerance but no significant differences regarding drought tolerance and crop management 
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intensity. That is, farmers do not perceive that these varieties vary as to drought tolerance and 
intensity of crop management, while they differ in yield, maturity period, and disease 
tolerance. 
 
Market-related quality attributes  
 
Table 2.4 presents farmers’ assessment of market-related quality attributes (MRQAs). 
Scanning through the results, the mean scores for cooking quality and taste appear to be 
similar; AZ, BL, and JL scored the highest in terms of cooking quality and taste. All the IVs 
scored the highest in storability while the LV NA scored the highest in stew quality. 
Nonetheless, although the IVs could be stored for longer periods than the LVs, ware potato 
farmers generally do not keep potatoes after harvest because of lack of modern storage 
facilities and the susceptibility of the traditional storage practices for high quality losses. In 
terms of tuber size, JL and GD, followed by NA, scored the highest. However, there is no 
major variability regarding color among the four main varieties. Except BL and KD, which 
are red, the others generally are white/yellowish. Likewise, except AZ and KD, which have 
an oval shape, the others generally have a round or semi-round shape. 
 
Because the scores for taste and cooking quality were similar, and storability was not 
considered important, taste and storability were dropped from further analysis. The Friedman 
Test result also shows (see Appendix 2) that there is an overall significant difference between 
the mean ranks of tuber size, stew quality, and cooking quality. 
 
Table 2.4 MRQAs as evaluated by farmers (mean scores) 
Variety Tuber size 
Scale(1-5) 
Stew quality 
Scale (1-5) 
Cooking quality 
Scale  (1-5) 
Keeping 
ability(week) 
Taste 
Scale(1-5) 
Color  
AZ 3.4 (0.7) 3.8 (1.0) 4.6 (0.8) 11.5 (5.5) 4.7 (0.6) White  
NA 3.9 (0.3) 4.8 (0.6) 3.9 (0.9) 8.7 (5.3) 3.9 (0.9) White  
KD 2.3 (0.9) 2.5 (1.1) 3.1 (1.1) 11.1 (5.6) 3.2 (1.1) Red  
KA 2.2 (1.1) 2.6 (1.1) 2.2 (1.0) 8.5 (4.5) 2.0 (1.0) White  
GD 4.4 (0.6) 3.3 (1.0) 3.5 (1.1) 13 (7.6) 3.3 (1.0) White  
JL 4.8 (0.4) 3.4 (1.1) 3.9 (1.1) 11.9 (6.6) 4.0 (0.9) White  
BL 3.0(1.0) 2.2 (1.3) 3.8 (1.4) 15.6 (7.6) 4.2 (1.1) Red  
 
The results in Appendix 2.1 and 2.2 show an overall significant difference in the mean ranks 
of PRQAs and MRQAs. As the Friedman Test result does not tell which varieties differ, the 
study is also interested to understand the quality difference between each of the varieties. 
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Thus, a post-hoc test is required to determine whether significant differences exist between 
pairs of the different varieties (Sheldon et al., 1996). Subsequently, a multiple comparison 
was run using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test. Accordingly, the paired results between ‘AZ 
& NA’, ‘AZ & JL’, and ‘NA & GD’ are not significantly different regarding disease 
tolerance, stew quality, and cooking quality, respectively. Furthermore, the two IVs, ‘GD & 
JL’, do not significantly differ in terms of yield and maturity period. In all the remaining 
combinations, the results are highly significant (Table 2.4). The results show that, with the 
exception of cooking quality related to ‘NA & GD’, the IVs and LVs are significantly 
different in terms of the main PRQAs and MRQAs. 
 
In sum, the results of Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 confirmed that ware potato farmers indeed see 
quality differences between varieties, particularly between the IVs and the LVs. 
Subsequently, it would be interesting to know which quality attributes may be more preferred 
by ware potato farmers/buyers. 
 
Table 2.5 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for MRQAs and PRQAs 
 Tuber Size  Stew Quality 
Cooking 
Quality  Yield 
Days to 
Mature 
Disease 
Tolerance 
 Variety  Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. 
AZ & NA -9.26 .000 -8.81 .000 -9.82 .000 -5.56 .000 -11.48 .000 -.75 .451 
AZ & GDa -7.94 .000 -2.66 .008 -4.90 .000 -4.29 .000 -7.46 .000 -4.77 .000 
AZ & JLb -11.38 .000 -2.55 .011 -3.93 .000 -5.84 .000 -9.75 .000 -4.41 .000 
NA & GDc -6.71 .000 -5.64 .000 -1.05 .293 -4.25 .000 -6.27 .000 -3.40 .001 
NA & JLd -11.37 .000 -7.80 .000 -2.85 .004 -6.22 .000 -8.71 .000 -4.35 .000 
GD & JL -4.74 .000 -2.75 .006 -2.93 .003 -.51 .609 -.86 .389 -2.70 .007 
a, b, c, d  comparisons between LVs and RVs.  
 
2.4.3 Factors influencing farmers’ production decision and traders’ procurement decision 
 
Having described the characteristics of the different varieties, this section addresses the 
following specific question: ‘Which quality attributes do influence farmers’ and traders’ 
variety choice?’ 
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Factors influencing farmers’ variety choice   
 
As can be observed in Table 2.6, 80% of farmers grew the LV NA. It appears that farmers’ 
who grew NA were largely motivated by the high market demand, which accounted for 57%. 
This means that farmers’ production decision is influenced by the market demand more than 
the price. This makes sense because price is largely determined by the supply and demand on 
a specific market day and mostly unpredictable by the time farmers make production decision 
(to grow a specific variety). The second most grown variety was the LV AZ (48%). The main 
reason for growing this variety was its high cooking quality.  
 
It is also interesting to note that production-related quality attributes appear to have received 
low emphasis in farmers’ variety choice. Of the farmers who grew NA, only 20% stated that 
they were motivated by its high yield. Likewise, 14% of farmers who grew AZ claimed early 
maturity was the main reason in growing this variety. Of the LVs, variety KD, which was 
grown by 21% of the respondents, appears to have been chosen for its production-related 
attributes; 73% of them stated that early maturity was the main reason in their decision to 
grow variety KD. It appears that variety KD is used as a ‘hunger breaker’ until the main 
staple crops are ready for consumption, because this crop has a short maturity period 
compared to the other varieties (Table 2.3).  
 
 KA and BL were the least preferred LV and IV, respectively. This confirms the results 
displayed in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.  Farmers assessed that KA is highly susceptible to 
disease and has low stew and cooking quality, while variety BL has long maturity period and 
the lowest stew quality. As expected, the IVs JL and GD were selected because of their yield 
and disease tolerance characteristics. However, not many farmers grew these varieties in the 
2009/2010 production cycle. 
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Table 2.6 Factors influencing farmers’ production decision  
Variety  
% farmers 
grew 
(n=346) 
Reasons in growing a specific variety in the 2009/2010 production cycle (in %) 
High market 
demand 
High 
price 
Good cooking 
quality Storability 
High 
Yield 
Early 
maturity 
Tolerant to 
diseases 
AZ 48.3 20.4 18 34 7.2 5.4 14.4 0.6 
NA 79.5 57.1 17.5 1.7 2.2 20.4 1.1 0 
KD 20.5 9.9 2.8 9.9 0 4.2 73.2 0 
KA 3.8 46.2 20.4 5.3 7.7 7.7 12.7 0 
GDa 9 9.7 6.5 12.9 3.2 51.6 0 16.1 
JLb 19.7 2.9 4.4 1.5 4.4 72.1 0 14.7 
BLc 1.2 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 
a, b, c  IVs released from research institutes. 
 
In general, the results show that farmers’ decision to grow the LVs was mainly motivated by 
the preferred market-related quality attributes, while their decision to grow the IVs was 
largely due to the production-related quality attributes (Table 2.6).  
 
Factors influencing buyers’ variety choice 
 
Table 2.7 provides an overview of buyers’ assigned weights for market-related quality 
attributes. The study only focused on the preferences of the stationed wholesalers in the 
central market, Addis Ababa, because 65% of the ware potatoes available in Addis Ababa 
were supplied by the collecting wholesalers from the study area. Accordingly, stationed 
wholesalers seemed to have high priority for tuber size, followed by color and keeping 
ability. Likewise, retailers preferred most tuber color, followed by tuber size. For hotels, 
color received the highest weight, followed by tuber size and shape. Generally, cooking 
quality, price, stew quality, and keeping ability were assigned low scores by buyers. With 
cooking quality, this was expected because potato variety, such as AZ, is often produced for 
own consumption as cooked (or boiled). However, as to stew quality, the result is surprising 
because most of the urban households consume potatoes in stew. One possible explanation is 
that stew quality characteristics might have been captured in tuber size. 
 
Generally, tuber size and color are the most important quality attributes influencing the 
downstream actors’ procurement decision (variety choice). 
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Table 2.7 Downstream actors’ preferences for MRQCs  (mean scores from 100 points) 
Quality attributes  Total (N=34) Hotel (N=11) Stationed wholesaler (N=10) Retailer (N=13) 
Color 37.3 35.4 30.3 44.2 
Tuber size 32.8 32.6 38.2 28.8 
Keeping ability 7.2 5.0 11.5 5.8 
Tuber shape 6.9 15.8 6.0 0 
Stew quality 6.2 6.8 6.7 5.4 
Price 5.8 2.1 2.0 11.9 
Cooking quality 4.1 2.3 5.3 4.6 
 
It was also observed that while the desired color for commercial purpose is white, red color 
potatoes are used for commercial purpose when wholesalers run out of supply for the white 
potatoes. With regard to tuber size, 80% of wholesalers, 46% of retailers, 36% of hotel 
managers preferred large tubers. Generally, large tuber size potatoes are preferred to small 
(approximately 30mm in diameter), medium, and also to very large tuber size potatoes 
(approximately more than 57mm in diameter).  In terms of color, there is no much difference 
between the most common LVs and IVs. However, with tuber size, the two main IVs appear 
to have very large tuber size compared to the LVs (Table 2.8). 
 
Taking these results together, we can better explain why certain varieties are more preferred 
than others. It appears that the LV NA is popular by both farmers and buyers, particularly 
compared to the IVs. It has the desirable tuber size, is white in color, and has a round shape. 
Variety JL and GD, on the other hand, have a tuber size more than what the average buyers 
require. According to buyers, very large tubers tend to have less quality when used in stew. 
Furthermore, household consumers in general buy in small quantities; thus, very large tubers 
create a measurement problem for retailers. 
 
Table 2.8 Some desired quality characteristics by major participants of the potato value chain 
Desired characteristics 
 
Hotel 
(n=11) 
Stationed wholesaler 
(n=10) 
Retailer 
(n=13) 
    
Desired tuber size (mean value)    
very large 27.3 20.0 15.4 
large 36.4 80.0 46.2 
medium 36.4 0 15.4 
small 0 0 23.1 
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2.4.4 Results on variety development institutes   
 
One of the main problems of the Ethiopian potato value chain is the misalignment of quality 
produced with quality demanded. For the research institutes, food security is the main criteria 
in developing new potato variety (Gebremedhin et al., 2008). Researchers have focused on 
developing varieties that are high yielding, disease tolerant, and adaptable to wider agro-
ecological zones. Although these are important quality attributes for potato farmers, varieties 
with such attributes may not be good in other attributes. The results show that while the IVs 
have better production-related quality attributes, ware potato farmers have responded to the 
demands of buyers by growing the preferred LVs, such as NA. That means that seed potato 
farmers who are specialized and agro-ecologically suited to grow IVs will not have a market 
for their produce, and the efforts of research institutes to improve the uptake of improved 
varieties will not be effective. This case represents a misalignment of quality, due to lack of 
joint decision-making (or incompatibility of objectives), between research institutes and ware 
potato farmers and buyers. 
 
2.4.5 Seller-buyer relationships and quality misalignment 
 
The relationship between several actors in the potato value chain can influence the alignment 
of quality, because the incentives to improve quality can differ between these actors. This 
study has analyzed the relationship between farmers and collecting wholesalers, between 
collecting wholesalers and stationed wholesalers, and the quality alignment problem in a spot 
market arrangement. The main question addressed in this section is ‘How different 
coordination mechanisms affect the incentive to improve quality?’   
 
The use of quality signals 
 
There are no quality standards or quality grading to signal quality in the Ethiopian potato 
value chain. In the absence of third party quality standards, value chain actors use different 
mechanisms to signal quality. The most common ones are the production region and variety 
name. These signaling mechanisms are often used to optimize early information exchanges 
between sellers and buyers who are found at the different stages of the chain. When visiting 
the wet potato market in Addis Ababa, it was noted that geographical indication (production 
region) was the most important quality signal in the relationship between collecting 
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wholesalers and stationed wholesalers. In the relationship between collecting wholesalers and 
farmers (in a particular region), variety name is a first stage quality signal. Once agreement is 
reached on the type of variety that collecting wholesalers could buy, the next step is to get 
specific quality information. In all these cases, transacting parties do not have to meet in 
person (they can exchange this information by phone or through other means). Not 
surprisingly, unobservable quality attributes, such as residuals, were not considered important 
to signal quality (Table 2.9); more likely because of a lack of information and the lack of 
regulation on this issue. 
 
Table 2.9 Main quality signals between farmers and collecting wholesalers (N=346) 
Type of information  % yes 
Variety name 94.4 
Tuber size 99 
Inorganic fertilizer  (amount and time of application) 10.9 
Pesticides (amount and time of application) 5.6 
 
Quality alignment problem and buyers’ response   
 
Even though sellers try to improve the alignment of quality using geographic indication and 
variety name, such signals cannot reduce buyers’ quality uncertainty arising from, for 
instance, poor crop management, storage condition, and transportation. Buyers reported a 
number of problems, such as premature tubers, spoilage losses, blackening of tubers, and 
physical damage. These quality problems were also observed during the study period at the 
wet potato market in Addis Ababa.  
 
Buyers have responded to these problems by using different mechanisms. For instance, 
collecting wholesalers have started monitoring the quality of potatoes by visiting specific 
ware potato farms and by involving in the harvesting and transporting of ware potatoes. For 
the 2009/2010 production cycle, 56% of the farmers reported that harvesting was carried out 
by collecting wholesalers using their own (hired) labor force. The dyadic relationship 
between collecting wholesalers and stationed wholesalers appear to be carried out based on 
trust, where close personal ties and repetitive interactions play an important role rather than 
trading anonymously (Table 2.10). As a result, 60% of the stationed wholesalers had their 
own preferred suppliers (collecting wholesalers). Also, 82% of the hotels and 92% of the 
retailers in the central market, Addis Ababa, had their own preferred suppliers (stationed 
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wholesalers). Written contract was only observed in the relationship between big hotels and 
stationed wholesalers (Table 2.10). Generally, most transactions take place in a non-spot 
market type of institutional arrangement, which provides higher incentive to transacting 
parties to improve quality and align quality produced with quality demanded. 
 
Table 2.10 Dyadic relationships between downstream actors  
Type of coordination  
Total 
(N=34) 
Hotel 
(N=11) 
Stationed 
wholesalers (N=10) 
Retailers 
(N=13) 
     Preferred supplier (% yes) 79.4 81.8 60 92.3 
Written contract (% yes) 11.1 33.3 0 0 
 
Smallholders’ disincentive to improve quality in a spot market type of arrangement  
 
Smallholder farmers also bear high transactional risks when investing in quality, particularly 
if they deliver potatoes in the nearest spot market. The most common problem is the risk of 
receiving low price because of quality measurement problem in the spot market. This often 
happens to smallholder farmers who produce at small-scale level (less than one full truck, 
approximately 6 to 7 tons of potatoes). Subsequently, small-scale farmers may not directly 
sell to collecting wholesalers at farmgate. For large-scale farmers (who can meet the 
minimum delivery condition), the price risk due to quality measurement problem is low 
because the quality of potatoes is assessed in several occasions such as during pre-harvest, 
harvesting, and loading. Furthermore, since the delivery is at farmgate and the transaction is 
likely to be repeated in every production cycle, there will be less chance for an opportunistic 
behavior to prevail. In contrast, small-scale farmers are often excluded from selling at 
farmgate because collecting wholesalers may have to incur additional costs to collect potatoes 
from small farms. 
 
When small-scale farmers sell their potatoes in the nearest market, they are subjected to high 
price risks due to the presence of a quality measurement problem in this market. This can 
happen due to one or more of the following causes: (1) traders in the spot market transact 
with several farmers at a time on a specific market day; they do not take much time to inspect 
the quality of the whole sack they buy; therefore they tend to pay a price for an average 
quality (even if the quality of potatoes is higher than the average); (2) farmers deliver 
potatoes in a sack in which only the top part is visible for inspection by traders; traders often 
expect that farmers put lower quality potatoes at the  bottom of the sack; therefore, they tend 
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to pay a price that is lower than the true quality of the potatoes would justify; (3) there is 
large difference  between the price for low quality potatoes compared to high quality 
potatoes; thus, the price risk of incorrect measuring of quality is high; and (4) given the 
perishability of the product and the high transport cost for farmer bringing potatoes to the 
market, farmers have few alternatives than to sell at the market day. Thus, the conditions in 
the spot market make small-scale farmers to be more vulnerable to a quality measurement 
problem because when a given delivery is incorrectly judged as low quality by traders a 
significant portion of smallholders’ income can be wiped out.  
 
Measuring product quality in a spot market type of arrangement is also an imperfect indicator 
of a farmer’s effort (Hueth et al., 1999) because  (1) when  deliveries are made in large 
volumes, measuring the quality of each item in a given delivery would be costly for the 
trader, and measuring a sample of the delivery would not provide a perfect measure of 
quality; and (2) certain type of quality may not become apparent until the commodity has 
traveled further downstream thus may put traders for another quality uncertainty. For 
instance, due to poor storage conditions, potatoes may develop internal sprouting (Sawyer 
and Dallyn, 1964) that may physically look good at the time of sale, but this could lead to fast 
external sprouting and spoilage losses for traders. Consequently, traders buying from the 
nearest spot market may have to either invest much time to verify quality (which is costly), 
choose not to monitor quality at all, or use a relatively crude set of grades to measure quality. 
The findings from this study suggest that traders buying in the spot market use a crude 
measure of quality, which has a negative effect on the prices farmers receive in this market. 
Thus, selling potatoes in a spot market arrangement provides lower incentives to improve 
quality compared to a farmgate type of arrangement.  
 
Indeed, the risk of incorrect measurement of quality may apply to both traders and farmers. 
However, based on two years weekly price data, the study demonstrated that smallholders’ 
incentive to improve quality is significantly affected by the quality measurement problem in a 
spot market type of arrangement. The results (Figure 2.1A) showed that a farmer whose 
delivery is judged as a high quality would get an average quality premium of 32 birr, while a 
trader who sells a delivery graded as a high quality would only get an average quality 
premium of 12 birr per 100 kg. Figure 2.1A implies that farmers have the incentive to deliver 
high quality potatoes, but they are subjected to a high price risk if their delivery (potatoes) is 
wrongly judged as a low quality delivery. Conversely, traders appear to be relatively 
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indifferent about quality. The reason is that traders in rural markets can maintain their gross 
margin more or less similar regardless of how the quality of a given delivery is graded 
(Figure 2.1B), as indicated by the correlation coefficient, 0.76.  Over the two years period, 
the difference in margin for high quality potatoes and low quality potatoes has narrowed 
down. Thus, the increasing incompatible of incentives between traders and farmers in a spot 
market arrangement can lead to quality misalignment in the Ethiopian potato value chain. 
 
 
Paired samples correlations = -0.75 (N=108; p<0.01, 95 %); 1US$ =14.5 birr (two years average) 
 
Figure 2.1A Quality premium for traders and farmers in the Shashemene spot market  
 
Furthermore, farmers’ price risk from the quality measurement problem seems severe (Figure 
2.1A) in that when a farmer’s delivery is graded as high quality and thus gets a high 
premium, traders quality premium would become very low, and vice-versa, (see the 
correlation coefficient, -0.75). The implication is that this condition would encourage 
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opportunism to occur. Subsequently, traders will have the incentive to deliberately 
misrepresent quality, because doing so will improve their quality premium. 
 
Paired samples correlations = 0.76 (N=108; p<0.01, 95 %); 1US$ =14.5 birr (two years average) 
 
Figure 2.1B Traders gross margin for a high and low quality potatoes  
 
In sum, as predicted by transaction cost economics theory, the potato market seems to be 
moving away from a spot market type of arrangement to improve the alignment of quality 
produced with quality demanded. There is a much closer dyadic relationship between 
collecting wholesalers and ware potato farmers, and between collecting wholesalers and other 
downstream actors. It has become a common practice for wholesalers or their agents to visit 
specific potato farms. Collecting wholesalers are implicitly regarded as chain coordinators. 
Indeed, collecting wholesalers are strategically positioned to deal with both ware potato 
farmers and other downstream actors. At the same time, they have strong trust-based 
relationship with stationed wholesalers and retailers in the central market, Addis Ababa and 
in other distant markets. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
The main objective of the present study was to explore the factors that influence quality 
alignment in the Ethiopian potato value chain. The main research question was: how farmer 
and trader preferences for specific quality attributes and coordination mechanisms in the 
farmer-trader relationships affect the alignment of quality in the Ethiopian potato value 
chain? Because of lack of prior knowledge in relation to the present study, the study has 
addressed this research question systematically. 
 
First, the existing potato varieties were characterized by ware potato farmers to assess 
whether these varieties, local and improved, indeed differ in quality. Distinguishing quality 
into production-related and market-related was important to understand specific quality 
attributes influencing farmers and buyers’ variety choice. Farmers’ assessment of the 
varieties showed that there are significant quality differences among and between the IVs and 
the LVs, particularly with respect to tuber size, stew quality, yield, maturity period, and 
disease tolerance. 
 
Second, once each variety was assessed by farmers, it was important to assess which specific 
quality attributes influence farmers and buyers variety choice. The findings showed that 
farmers’ variety choice is highly influenced by the market demand. Thus, the LVs, such as 
NA, continue to be grown by farmers. Likewise, buyers’ procurement decision is largely 
influenced by the tuber size and color of potatoes.  As a result, a variety with large tuber size 
is more preferred to small, medium, or very larger tuber size potatoes. In terms of tuber color, 
white /yellowish potatoes are more preferred than other tuber colors. Based on these findings, 
the IVs are more preferred for production-related quality attributes while the LVs are more 
preferred for market-related quality attributes.  
 
Third, the study has analyzed the sources of misalignment for variety choice in the Ethiopian 
potato value chain – related to variety development and seller-buyer relationships. Regarding 
variety development, the IVs do not seem to have the desired market-related quality attributes 
despite these varieties were assessed as high yielding and disease tolerant by farmers. When 
there is mismatch, ware potato farmers tend to prefer the LVs that they considered are having 
better market-related quality attributes. This seems the case that 80% the farmers in our 
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sample continued to grow the dominant LV NA, for at least, in the last five years (2006 to 
2010). 
 
Concerning seller-buyer relationships, three factors can affect quality alignment – lack of 
third party quality standards (certification), buyers’ quality uncertainty, and difference in 
incentive to improve quality in a spot market arrangement (due to problems in measuring 
quality). Due to the absence of third party quality grading for the final product, value chain 
actors use production region or variety name to optimize information exchange along the 
value chain. However, these mechanisms do not provide adequate guarantee against buyers’ 
quality uncertainty. Thus, to respond to these problems, buyers are increasingly involved in 
the harvesting and post-harvest handling of potatoes. The findings showed that most of the 
transactions in the study period were carried out at farmgate. This type of arrangement 
appears to have allowed collecting wholesalers to closely monitor potato quality. 
Furthermore, selling at farmgate has several advantages for smallholders: (1) they can able to 
negotiate prices before harvest, and thus can minimize the opportunistic behavior of traders in 
the spot market; (2) they do not have to search for transportation as this will be arranged by 
traders; and (3) it provides smallholders the incentive to improve quality. 
 
In sum, the present study has provided further insights into the factors influencing variety 
choice and thus the alignment of quality in the Ethiopian potato value chain. Varity choice, 
from the perspective of ware potato growers, is a multi-faceted decision problem influenced 
by the lack of joint decision-making or information exchange when developing new varieties, 
lack of third party quality grading, and lack of proper incentives for quality improvement. 
Furthermore, although spot market arrangements have been extensively studied, particularly 
from the perspective of transaction cost economics, little research has been done in 
comparing the effect of farmers’ decision to sell in the spot market and at farmgate. 
Compared to selling in the spot market, selling at farmgate has often been considered less 
remunerative (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). One question, which seems overlooked, is the 
problem of measuring quality that smallholders encounter when they decide to sell in the spot 
market. This study has provided further insights into the importance of a farmgate type of 
arrangement in enhancing smallholders’ incentive to improve potato quality and market 
access, because farmers’ effort is better rewarded in this type of arrangement than that of the 
spot market. Indeed, the transaction cost economics theory has recognized the problem of the 
spot market arrangement regarding the difficulty of measuring quality. However, such 
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analysis has been largely done from the buyers’ perspective, assuming that buyers are the 
ones to be mostly affected because of the difficulty of measuring the performance of the 
seller (Hueth et al., 1999).This study complements to the findings of Muto and Yamano 
(2009) by showing the importance of a farmgate type of arrangement for smallholders’ 
selling perishable and bulky products such as potatoes. 
 
The findings of this study also provide two policy implications. First, the potato crop has 
increasingly become a source of cash income for farmers in the study area; it contributed 
about 50% of total income in 2009/2010 production cycle. However, too much focus of the 
research institutes on production-related quality attributes has resulted in a low uptake of IVs. 
Thus, research priorities need to be aligned with the quality requirements of buyers to 
enhance the uptake of IVs by (ware) potato farmers. This would offer a better market for the 
seed growers in the highlands by aligning their seed potato production with the demands of 
ware potato growers in the Rift valley region, which controls at least 65% of the ware potato 
supply in the capital, Addis Ababa. Second, even though selling at farmgate provides better 
incentive for ware potato farmers, small-scale farmers who cannot fulfill the minimum 
delivery condition appear to be excluded from the main potato value chain. Thus, establishing 
village collection centers may encourage collecting wholesalers to buy from these farmers at 
farmgate. 
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Appendix 2.1 Mean ranks of production-related quality attributes (Friedman 
Test) 
Variety Yield Disease tolerance 
Drought 
tolerance Maturity 
Management 
practices 
AZ 1.73 1.8 2.29 1.19 2.27 
NA 1.83 2.29 2.58 2.13 2.62 
GD 3.25 2.77 2.61 3.31 2.56 
JL 3.19 3.13 2.53 3.37 2.55 
N 24 63 56 67 56 
χ2 34.5 43.6 2.6 157.6 3 
df 3 3 3 3 3 
Sig 0.00 0.00 0.464 0.00 0.391 
 
 
Appendix 2.2 Mean ranks of market-related quality attributes (Friedman Test) 
Variety Tuber size Stew quality  Cooking quality Keeping ability Taste 
AZ 1.37 2.41 3.18 2.6 3.44 
NA 2.08 3.49 2.26 1.82 2.14 
GD 2.96 1.9 2.02 2.71 2.01 
JL 3.58 2.2 2.54 2.88 2.41 
N 98 58 71 41 75 
χ2 200.7 61.4 38.7 19.6 69.6 
df 3 3 3 3 3 
Sig 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 3. Adoption of improved potato varieties in Ethiopia: the role of agricultural 
knowledge and innovation system and smallholder farmers’ quality assessment 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In addressing concerns about the availability of sufficient food in a growing population 
scenario, genetically improved varieties of staple crops play an important role (Rizvi et al., 
2012; Serageldin, 1999). Potato is considered as one of the main staple crops to ensure food 
security (Knapp, 2008). Potato provides more calories, vitamins, and nutrients per area of 
land than any other staple crop (Sen et al., 2010). Improved potato varieties (IVs) have better 
yield (Chakraborty et al., 2000) and enhanced resistance to late blight (Song et al., 2003) and 
virus and bacterial wilt (Thiele, 1999). Potato can play a significant role in securing food at 
the household level, but also in generating income for smallholders, thereby contributing to 
the economic sustainability of agricultural systems in developing countries (Thompson and 
Scoones, 2009). In Ethiopia, potato has increasingly become a source of cash income for 
farmers, next to its importance for household consumption (Gildemacher et al., 2009; Mulatu 
et al., 2005).  
 
Although Ethiopian farmers may have an incentive to grow IVs because of enhanced 
production-related quality attributes such as yield and disease resistance, they often are 
reluctant to do so. To illustrate, in an effort to improve the performance of the potato sector, 
the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR), with supports from the International 
Potato Center (CIP), distributed 18 IVs in the last two decades (Gebremedhin et al., 2008). 
However, the rate of adoption of IVs by ware potato farmers (farmers that grow potato for 
consumption rather than to be used as seed) has been very low. Data from a national 
representative survey (collected from over 8000 households) revealed that the use of 
improved seed potato was about 0.5% (ESCS, 2005). 
 
Although the problem of low adoption, by ware potato farmers, is acknowledged by the 
EIAR, the potential causes have not been fully investigated. For instance, the EIAR mentions 
shortage of improved seeds and poor supply systems as the main limiting factors 
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(Gebremedhin et al., 2008). In other words, adoption is assumed to be low because not all 
potential adopters have access to improved varieties. However, this claim is not supported by 
empirical evidence. Abebe et al. (2010) found that IVs that were released in recent years were 
widely grown by seed potato farmers in the highlands. However, government agents and 
NGOs remained the main buyers of the IVs. This study conjectures that the problem of low 
adoption of IVs cannot be solely explained by the unavailability of quality certified seed or 
the lack of a formal seed supply system. In this chapter the following research questions is 
addressed: 
 
RQ2: How do the agricultural knowledge and innovation system and farmer’ perception of 
local varieties affect the adoption of improved potato varieties? 
 
The development of IVs by the Ethiopian agricultural knowledge and innovation system 
(AKIS) seems to result in new varieties that lack appropriate attributes. Consequently, 
farmers may prefer local varieties (LVs) if they assess the characteristics of the LVs as 
superior compared to the characteristics of the IVs. The development of varieties that do not 
meet farmer preferences has been attributed to the linear character of AKIS (Thompson and 
Scoones, 2009). In response, a participatory research and development system has been 
proposed, which puts farmers at the center of the innovation process (Bishaw and Turner, 
2008). In a participatory approach, local knowledge is given a high value, allowing farmers to 
work with researchers to design new technologies and to adapt existing ones to local 
circumstances (Ceccarelli and Grando, 2007; Sperling et al., 2001). Even when IVs have 
superior quality attributes compared to LVs, low information exchange between research and 
extension and farmers can also lead to low adoption (Koundouri et al., 2006; Rizvi et al., 
2012; Saha et al.,1994). An effective extension system aims to build the capacity of farmers 
by exposing them to information that can reduce uncertainty about expected outcomes of a 
new technology (Feder et al., 1985). When research, extension, and agricultural education 
operate as stand-alone institutions, farmers may be reluctant to adopt because they have 
difficulties in understanding and appreciating the characteristics of new varieties (Rivera et 
al., 2005). That is, uncertainty about expected outcomes of IVs may induce farmers to 
continue growing LVs, of which they have good knowledge of strengths and weaknesses both 
in production and marketing. 
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Weak receptiveness to technological change and innovation has been explained by specific 
farmer characteristics, such as risk-averseness (Abadi Ghadim et al., 2005; Feder et al., 1985; 
Feder and Umali, 1993; Just and Zilberman, 1983), wealth or household income (Sall et al., 
2000), or socio-cultural resistance (Drechsel et al., 2005; Moser and Barrett, 2003). However, 
implicit in these studies is that the technology to be adopted is suitable (Adesina and Baidu-
Forson, 1995) and concerns a single-attribute type of technology, such as a new harvesting 
machine or irrigation equipment, for which efficiency is the key evaluation criterion. 
However, for a multi-attribute technology, such as new crop varieties, it is much more 
difficult to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages. Lancaster (1966) noted that a product 
possesses multiple attributes, and that utility is provided by individual attributes. New potato 
variety is an example of a multi-attribute technology delivering utility in such diverse 
attributes like disease resistance, yield, cooking quality, stew quality, tuber size, and tuber 
shape. Thus, the decision to adopt IVs is not only determined by the farmer’s risk attitude but 
also by the farmer’s preference for several product attributes. Even though IVs may be 
superior in particular production-related attributes, farmers may prefer to continue growing 
LVs because of their preferred market-related attributes. 
 
The present study makes several contributions to the literature on adoption of improved crop 
varieties. 
 
First, the study focuses on ware potato farmers producing for the market, not on seed potato 
growers or farmers growing for own consumption. Problems related to seed potato supply 
systems have relatively received high attention in recent studies (e.g., Gildemacher et al., 
2009a; Gildemacher et al., 2009b; Gildemacher et al., 2011; Hirpa et al., 2012; Hirpa et al., 
2010) and by the International Potato Center (CIP). For instance, in East Africa, CIP has 
involved farmers in Integrated Pest Management (IPM) experiments and variety selection of 
sweet potatoes (Abidin, 2004; Smit and Odongo, 1997; Thiele et al., 2001). In Ethiopia,  CIP 
used participatory research approaches such as farmer fields schools (FFSs) and farmer 
research groups (FRGs) among seed potato growers in the highland areas (Ortiz et al., 2011). 
However, the link between seed potato growers and ware potato farmers has not received 
much attention. 
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Second, this study applies a system perspective to understand the factors that determine 
adoption, including both AKIS and value chain actors. Recently, Ortiz et al. (2013) studied 
potato innovation systems in Bolivia, Ethiopia, Peru and Uganda, focusing on the roles of 
different institutions involved in the potato innovation system. They found that interactions 
among stakeholders can improve the working of the potato innovation system. However, 
while their study focused on analyzing the processes of innovation, this study analyzes the 
performance of the Ethiopian AKIS based on adoption rates. This study complements to the 
findings of Ortiz et al. (2013) and provides further evidence on the determinants of adoption 
of IVs in Ethiopia. While research, extension, cooperatives, and NGOs could all play an 
important role in the development and diffusion of new varieties (Ortiz et al., 2013), buyers 
preferences are crucial in farmers’ decisions to choose particular varieties (Asfaw et al., 
2012). However, the influence of buyers on variety choice is often not taken into account in 
adoption studies. 
 
Third, there has been little attention for the impact of farmers’ assessment of existing 
varieties on the probability of adopting new ones. This study analyzes the relationship 
between farmers’ assessment of production and market-related attributes of LVs and the 
probability of adopting IVs. This has not been explored before. For instance, Sall et al. (2000) 
and Adesina and Baidu-Forson (1995) studied the effect, on adoption, of farmers’ perception 
about the characteristics of new technologies but did not include the existing ones. This study 
investigates the likelihood of adoption of IVs by looking at farmer preferences for particular 
attributes of LVs. 
 
Fourth, although potato is an increasingly important food crop in developing countries, it has 
received little attention in the adoption literature, particularly compared to other staple crops 
like rice, maize, and sorghum. As there are important differences between potato and cereal 
crops (Ortiz et al., 2013), the findings from traditional adoption literature may not be 
sufficient to understand farmers’ decisions to grow improved potato varieties. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide insights into the determinants of adoption for IVs by 
analyzing farmers’ assessment of (a) the operation of the Ethiopian AKIS and (b) the 
attributes of LVs. Regarding AKIS, the study is particularly interested in how farmers 
experience and assess technical assistance by extension services, research institutes, NGOs, 
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and cooperatives. In addition, the study seeks to know the impact of farmers’ use of their 
main buyer(s) as a source of advice. 
 
Adoption decisions have been analyzed using static or dynamic models. Static models only 
explain adoption decisions at a particular point in time. Dynamic models are considered ideal 
to study adoption decisions over several periods (Koundouri et al., 2006). However, it 
requires panel data, which is difficult to obtain. To partly solve this limitation, this study, 
following Besley and Case (1993), uses a model that measures the persistence of adoption 
over five years (however, this does not necessary reflect the rate of seed renewal in Ethiopia). 
Furthermore, studies have shown that cross-sectional data can be safely used to analyze 
adoption decisions when the adoption process moves toward its completion (Besley and 
Case, 1993; Cameron, 1999). This study benefits from the fact that the IVs were released at 
least five years before conducting this research. Nevertheless, the study pays due attention 
with the interpretation of the results, as the parameter estimates do not necessarily reflect 
causal relationships due to possible omitted variables bias and/or reverse causality (Cameron, 
1999; van Rijn et al., 2012). 
 
The remaining sections of the chapter are as follows. Section 3.2 explains the conceptual 
model. Section 3.3 presents the data and methods, followed by the results and discussion in 
section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides the conclusions. 
 
3.2  Conceptual model: factors influencing adoption  
 
3.2.1 The impact of AKIS on the adoption of IVs 
 
According to Rivera et al. (2005), AKIS encompasses the entire system of agencies and 
institutions that provide rural people with the knowledge and information necessary for 
innovation in their diversified livelihoods. The AKIS literature distinguishes two models for 
the development and diffusion of new technologies – the linear model and systemic model. 
The linear model assumes farmers as passive recipients of new technologies. Hence, 
innovations are seen to arise from international research centers then passed down to national 
research centers, extension agencies, and finally to farmers (Biggs, 1990; Rogers, 1995). 
Publicly-sponsored AKIS often generates generic technologies that do not align with farmers’ 
63 
 
Chapter 3 
needs. Therefore, AKIS organized along the lines of the linear model has little influence on 
farmers’ decisions (Pascucci and de-Magistris, 2011). In contrast, the systemic view on AKIS 
acknowledges that the agricultural research and technology system contains diverse 
objectives expressed by different actors (Rivera et al., 2005), assumes the non-linear and 
context specific nature of innovation processes, and guides interactions among different 
stakeholders (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008; Sumberg, 2005). The systemic model emphasizes 
decentralized decision-making, participation of private actors, institutional pluralism, 
demand-driven research and extension (Pascucci and de-Magistris, 2011; Rivera, 2008; 
Rivera et al., 2005). While the linear model of AKIS assumes that farmers are mere recipients 
of agricultural innovations, the systemic view considers them as part of the innovation 
process, even as originators of agricultural technologies (Rivera et al., 2005). The systemic 
model is assumed to lead to higher adoption rates.  
 
In Ethiopia, AKIS consists of three main components – the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural 
Research (EIAR), the Regional Agricultural Research Institutes (RARIs), and Higher 
Learning Institutes (HLIs). While the EIAR is responsible for the supply of improved 
agricultural technologies, coordination of agricultural research, and capacity building of 
researchers at the national level, the RARIs and HLIs are in charge of research and education 
at regional level. There are about 55 research centers and sites across different agro-
ecological zones of Ethiopia. Although over 2% of GDP is being spent on agricultural 
extension every year (Spielman et al., 2010), technology adoption has been slow, crop yields 
have remained low, and no sustained breakthroughs were seen in regions where research had 
been carried out (Abate et al., 2011).  
 
Several factors have been identified as potential causes for the ineffectiveness of the 
Ethiopian AKIS. First, policies pertaining to research priorities have largely been driven by 
food security issues (Spielman et al., 2011). Hence, production-related attributes, such as 
yield, have been given high priority in developing new varieties (Gebremedhin et al., 2008). 
However, high yielding varieties may not have high market demand. Second, the Ethiopian 
AKIS is characterized by a lack of coordination among the formal institutes engaged in R&D 
activities, as well as weak linkages between these institutes and farmers and private sector 
firms (Spielman et al., 2011). Third, the extension service in Ethiopia often pays little 
attention to farmers’ experiences and knowledge, while extension workers even lack up-to-
date knowledge and skills (Belay and Abebaw, 2004).  
64 
 
Adoption of improved potato varieties in Ethiopia 
 
 
The conceptual model for this study includes several variables like frequency of use of 
technical assistance from extension services, from research institutes, from cooperatives, or 
from NGOs; advice from the main buyer(s); and time spent in a farmer training center (FTC). 
FTCs provide education (certificate and non-certificate training), market information, 
advisory services (such as land and natural resource management), and promotes the use of 
improved technologies (Tefera et al., 2011). FTCs have been introduced in 2009 by the 
Ethiopian government as part of its agricultural-led development strategy. If the innovation 
development and diffusion system works effectively, a positive relationship is expected 
between farmer assessment of the AKIS characteristics and the probability of adoption 
(Rivera et al., 2005). The variable ‘main buyer as a source of advice’ is used as a proxy in 
assessing whether downstream actors in the potato value chain are part of the Ethiopian 
AKIS, as proposed by the systemic model on innovation. To control farmer capital 
constraints, the study includes access to credit in the models. 
   
3.2.2 The impact of farmers’ quality assessment of LVs on the adoption of IVs 
 
Quality is an elusive concept (Luning et al., 2002); it is difficult to measure as it depends on 
many factors such as the nature of the product, the user of the product, and the market 
situation (Sloof et al., 1996). Defining quality from a supply chain perspective is even more 
problematic as different chain actors may assess quality differently based on which attributes 
of the product they find more or less important (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1 Interpretation of quality by various chain actors 
Actor Quality aspects 
Breeder vitality of seed, yield 
Grower yield, uniformity, disease resistance  
Distributor shelf life, availability, sensitivity to damage 
Retailer shelf life, diversity, exterior, little waste 
Consumer taste, healthiness, perishability, convenience, constant quality 
Source (Ruben et al., 2007 p. 30)  
 
Because farmers assess varieties both on their agronomic characteristics and on their 
marketability, the study distinguishes quality between production-related and market-related 
attributes. Quality attributes such as yield, disease tolerance, maturity period, drought 
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resistance, and intensity of crop management are production-related, because they determine 
the attractiveness of a particular variety from a farming perspective.  Quality attributes like 
tuber size, stew quality, cooking quality, and shape are market-related, as these attributes 
determine the attractiveness of a variety from the customer point of view6. If ware potato 
farmers have a positive assessment about important production- and market-related quality 
attributes of the LVs, the probability of adopting IVs is low, ceteris paribus.  
 
It is also expected that household/farm characteristics influence the adoption of IVs; these 
variables are commonly included in adoption studies (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Floyd et 
al., 2003; Mariano et al., 2012; Schipmann and Qaim, 2010; Thangata and Alavalapati, 
2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual model 
 
Fig. 3.1 shows the conceptual model. This study hypothesizes that a farmer’s adoption 
decision is conditioned by farmers’ assessment of the role of AKIS and the quality of LVs 
and by household and farm characteristics. 
 
3.3 Data and Methods 
 
3.3.1 Data  
 
Data have been collected in the context of the Ethiopian potato value chain, with a particular 
emphasis on the Rift Valley region. Although potato can be produced in most parts of the 
6 Stew quality refers to the taste of ware potatoes when they are boiled in a mix (i.e., a stew), such as with 
vegetables. On the other hand, cooking quality refers to the taste of the potato when consumed boiled without 
mixing with vegetables. 
Farmer assessment of 
AKIS 
Adoption 
IVs 
Household and farm 
characteristics 
  Farmer quality 
assessment of LVs  
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country, this study focuses on this region for three main reasons. First, the unit of analysis is 
the farmer producing ware potatoes. Ware potato farmers in the Upper Rift Valley region are 
the main suppliers of ware potatoes to the major cities of Ethiopia. For instance, the 
Shashemene spot market, in the center of the study region, is the main trade hub of ware 
potatoes in Ethiopia (Emana and Nigussie, 2011; Tefera et al., 2011). Second, this study aims 
to analyze how farmers’ perception regarding the quality of LVs influences the adoption of 
IVs. Thus, it is necessary that the farmers in the survey have the same understanding of the 
LVs. In Ethiopia, variety names lack standardization and are often attached to local languages 
(Cavatassi et al., 2011). Focusing on one region does help to avoid problems arising from 
confusion of variety names. Third, there are several studies (related to seed potato supply 
systems) carried out in the highland areas of Ethiopia (Abebe et al., 2013; Gildemacher et al., 
2009a; Gildemacher et al., 2009b; Gildemacher et al., 2011; Hirpa et al., 2012; Hirpa et al., 
2010; Mulatu et al., 2005).  
 
Data were collected from 346 potato farmers, randomly selected from the land ownership 
register obtained from the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development. The survey was 
administered in person by five trained persons. Supervision and quality checks were made by 
the principal investigator. Table 3.2 reports description of the main variables. 
 
Panel A presents summary statistics for the adoption data. The first adoption variable refers 
to the presence of at least one IV on the farm. Thus, the presence of IVs is recorded if the 
farmer had grown at least one IV during 2006 to 2010. Accordingly, on average 27% of 
farmers in the sample had adopted at least one IV during this period. Since this might 
reasonably be a shallow measure of adoption, a second variable, persistence of adoption, is 
introduced; it refers to the number of years a farmer has grown IVs on his farm7. Finally, 
Panel A also introduces variables related to the intensity of adoption. Firstly, the study uses 
the percentage of farm land cultivated with IVs in the production year 2010. In addition, a 
percentage of total area for growing potatoes is used to calculate the intensity of adopting the 
IVs. Accordingly, an adopter allocated on average 8% of the total agricultural land or 20% of 
the land dedicated for potato production to grow the IVs.  
 
 
7 If a farmer would switch from one IV to another, this is recorded in the persistence of adoption model but not 
in the presence of adoption model. 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics  
Variable 
               
Type  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Adoption variables   
Presence of adoption   Dummy  346 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Years of adoption  Continuous  346 0.48 0.86 0 5 
Percentage of land with IVs on total farm 
land  
Percentage  344 2.1 6.3 0 6.3 
Percentage of land with IVs on potato farm 
land 
Percentage 345 5.1 14.2 0 100 
Panel B: Role of AKIS            
Frequency of use of technical assistance from 
extension agents  
Scale; 1=never 4 =very often 346 2.82 0.92 1 4 
Frequency of use of technical assistance from 
research institutes  
Scale; 1=never 4 =very often 
346 2.41 0.70 1 4 
Frequency of use of technical assistance from 
coops/associations  
Scale; 1=never 4 =very often 
346 2.315 0.54 1 4 
Frequency of use of technical assistance from 
NGOs  
Scale; 1=never 4 =very often 
346 2.214 0.48 1 4 
Days spent in  farmer training centers  Continuous(in days) 346 6 11 0 90 
Main buyer as a source of advice  Dummy 346 2.15 0.56 1 4 
Access to credit  Dummy 346 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Panel C: Quality assessment of LVs            
Yield  
Continuous 
((100Kg/0.25ha)) 337 27.82 10.76 5 90 
Disease resistance  
Scale; 1=very low 5 =very 
high 346 3.15 0.82 1 5 
Drought resistance 
Scale; 1=very low 5 =very 
high 346 3.50 0.87 1 5 
Intensity of crop management 
Scale; 1=very low 5 =very 
high 346 3.90 0.75 1 5 
Maturity period   Continuous (in days) 344 89 11 60 140 
Tuber size  
Scale; 1=very small 5 =very 
large 346 3.23 0.57 2 5 
Tuber shape 
Categorical (1 = full round; 
2=semi-oval; 3=oval) 346 1.92 0.32 1 3 
Stew quality 
Scale; 1=very low 5 =very 
high 346 3.87 0.71 1 5 
Panel D: Household and farm controls             
Age of the respondent Continuous(in years) 346 36.80 10.55 20 75 
Farmer being a male  Dummy (1= male) 346 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Farmer years of education Continuous(in years) 346 5.65 3.54 0 15 
Family size Continuous(in members) 346 9.59 5.17 1 39 
Presence of a motorbike, car and/or a 
truck  
Dummy (1= presence) 
346 0.03 0.19 0 2 
Presence of a mobile phone  Dummy (1= presence) 346 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Presence of a radio  Dummy (1= presence) 346 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Presence of a television  Dummy (1= presence) 346 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Percentage own land (of total land used) Percentage 344 73.1 25.6 0 100 
Number of livestock units  Continuous (in TLU)a  346 9.0 17.9 0 274 
a Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is used as a common unit to describe livestock numbers of various species as a single figure 
that expresses the total amount of livestock present. Accordingly oxen/cow=1TLU; calf=0.25TLU; heifer=0.75TLU; 
sheep/goat=0.13TLU; young sheep/goat=0.06TLU; donkey=0.7TLU. 
 
Panel B summarizes the variables related to the role of AKIS, which are defined as follows. 
The variables ‘Frequency of use of technical assistance from extension services’, ‘Frequency 
of use of technical assistance from research institutes’ ‘Frequency of use of technical 
assistance from cooperatives’, ‘Frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs’, and 
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‘Main buyer as a source of advice’ are measured by the perceived frequency of technical 
assistance or advice received by the ware potato farmers over the last two years in a four 
point scale; 1 implies that the respondent had not received any technical assistance or advice 
and 4 implies that the respondent had received technical assistance or advice more often in 
the last two years (at least once every three months). This technical assistance is not related to 
potato production per se, but it refers to general farm management practices. The variable 
‘Number of days spent in farmer training centers’ is measured by the number of times (days) 
the respondent had attended trainings organized in farmer training centers in the last year. 
Also, the variable ‘Access to credit’ is measured as a dummy variable; 1 implies that the 
respondent had received credit at least once in the last two years, and 0 implies otherwise.   
All the variables refer to the year 2010. 
 
Technical assistance variables could potentially be endogenous, particularly due to possible 
reverse causality or simultaneity, meaning the adoption of IVs could increase the frequency 
of use of technical assistance. However, in the case of this study, usage of technical services 
is indeed exogenous for at least two reasons. Firstly, technical assistance refers to general and 
not specialized services. In other words, farmers are exposed to different technical services 
dealing with the farm management in general and not related to specific crops or adopted 
technology. Secondly, technical assistance or extension services are given in a ‘top-down’ 
fashion, and each farmer has equal chance of receiving technical assistance. This means that 
farmers cannot access to services ‘on demand’. Thus, by design, a farmer who has adopted an 
IV is not likely to receive a different treatment to use technical assistance more often than a 
farmer who did not adopt an IV. 
 
Panel C reports variables related to quality assessment for the LVs. Firstly, the study had to 
identify the main potato varieties in the study area. The identification was based on variety 
names and was made by the surveyed farmers, triangulated with information obtained from 
agricultural agents and focus group discussions. Subsequently, the study documented four 
LVs (Agazer (AZ), Nechi Abeba (NA), Key Dinch (KD), and Key Abeba (KA)), and three 
IVs (Gudane (GD), Jalene (JL), and Bule (BL)). Secondly, because different supply chain 
actors define quality differently, the study systematically analyzes quality using two 
categories of quality attributes: production-related and market-related. Attributes like yield, 
disease tolerance, maturity period, drought resistance, and management intensity are 
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production-related because they determine production practices. On the other hand, tuber 
size, stew quality, and shape are market-related attributes because they determine sales 
options.  
 
Because the objective is to analyze the impact of farmers’ attachment toward the quality 
attributes of LVs on the adoption of IVs, the quality assessment variables relate only to the 
LVs. Variables ‘Disease resistance’, ‘Drought resistance’, ‘Intensity of crop management’, 
‘Maturity period’, and ‘Yield’ are used to define the production-related quality attributes of 
LVs. Except variables ‘Maturity period’ (measured in days) and  ‘Yield’ (measured in 
quantity produced per unit (100 kg/ 0.25ha) in the last year), the remaining variables are 
measured using a five-point scale; 1 implies that the LV has a very low desirable quality 
attribute, and 5 implies the LV has very high desirable quality attribute.  Similarly, variables 
‘Tuber size’, ‘Stew quality’, and ‘Tuber shape’ are used to define the market-related quality 
attributes of LVs. ‘Tuber size’ is measured in a five-point scale; 1 implies that the LV has 
very small tuber size (approximately less than 30mm in diameter), and 5 implies that the LV 
has very large tuber size (approximately larger than 57mm in diameter). Stew quality is 
measured in a five-point scale; 1 implies that the LV has very low stew quality, and 5 implies 
that the LV has a very high stew quality. Variable ‘Tuber shape’ is measured using a three-
point scale; 1 implies that the LV is fully round shape, and 3 implies the LV is fully oval 
shape. 
 
Finally, Panel D presents household and farm related variables, which include age; gender; 
farmer education; family size; number of livestock units; land ownership;  presence of a 
motorbike, car, and/or truck; presence of a mobile phone; presence of a radio; and presence 
of a television.  
 
Fig. 3.2 presents an overview of the persistence of adoption for IVs. 73% of ware potato 
farmers did not adopt any of the IVs during 2006 to 2010. Most of the adopters tried the IVs 
only once.   
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Figure 3.2 Persistence of adoption for the IVs  
 
Tables 3.3 to 3.5 summarize the results of the different models. Estimations were computed 
using Stata 12.0 software, and are reported with robust standard errors for a potential problem 
of heteroscedaticity. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical model 
 
Having described the variables and the data, it is important to analyze the determinants of 
ware potato farmers’ decision to adopt, and if yes with what intensity these farmers adopt the 
IVs. In the empirical model, this study considers the correlation between different measures 
of adoption and variables related to the role of AKIS and farmers’ quality assessment. 
 
𝑇𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖 + 𝛿𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,                          
 
where Ti refers to technology adoption variables for farmer i, where i=1, …, 346. Technology 
adoption variables include presence of IVs, total number of years IVs have been used, 
percentage of total farm land cultivated with IVs in 2010, and percentage of land dedicated to 
potato cultivated with IVs in 2010. Ai refers AKIS variables; Qi refers to quality assessment 
variables for LVs; and Ci is a vector of control variables.  
 
Probit or logit models have often been proposed to analyze the presence of adoption (Abadi 
Ghadim et al., 2005; Moser and Barrett, 2006). The Probit model takes a value of 1 for the 
presence of adoption and 0 otherwise. A lack of panel data has always been a problem in 
adoption studies although some studies, such as Cameron (1999) and Conley and Christopher 
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(2001) managed to use panel data. Partly solving this limitation is the use of recall data on 
each farmer’s adoption history (Besley and Case, 1993; Moser and Barrett, 2006). Hence, in 
the persistence of adoption models, the study analyzes the determinants of adoption using a 
recall technique. The Ordered Probit model takes a value of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, depending on 
the number of years a farmer had grown any of the IVs during 2006 to 2010. To measure the 
intensity of adoption, the treatment effect model is used. The treatment effect model, also 
called Heckman sample selection or Heckman correction model, is a statistical method used 
to correct selection biases (e.g., to correct biases from non-randomly selected samples). 
 
3.4 Results and discussion  
 
3.4.1 Results 
 
Presence of adoption  
 
Table 3.3 shows that frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs, use of main buyer 
as a source of advice, and access to credit are significant. With regard to quality assessment 
variables, crop management intensity, drought resistance, and stew quality are significant. 
Also, it is important to note the interpretation of quality assessment variables; they refer to 
farmers’ perception of the quality of LVs. Thus, a negative coefficient for any of these 
variables means ware potato farmers value more the quality attributes of LVs, which implies 
a low probability of adopting the IVs. Farmer years of education, presence of a television or 
radio, number of livestock units, family size, farmer being a male significantly affect the 
probability of adoption. The presence of a radio or television may also indicate the level of 
wealth. Thus, wealthier farmers are more likely to adopt as they can afford to buy IVs. 
 
Frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs is also expected to be significantly 
related, as some NGOs were actively involved to promote the IVs in the region. Controlling 
other variables at mean values, the results show that frequency of use of technical assistance 
from NGOs and access to credit are positively correlated to the likelihood of adoption. 
Perhaps, one interesting result is the relationship between use of main buyer as a source of 
advice and the probability of adoption. Farmers who use main buyer as a source of advice 
have a low chance of adopting the IVs. Furthermore, frequency of use of technical assistance 
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from extension services, research institutes, and farmer cooperatives do not have a significant 
relationship with farmers’ adoption decision. 
 
Table 3.3 Parametric estimation of the presence of adoption for growing at least one IV 
between 2006 and 2010 
  
Probit model 
 
Variables  Coef. Robust Std. Er. 
Frequency of use of technical assistance from extension agents  -0.004 0.110 
 Frequency of use of technical assistance from research institutes  0.064 0.117 
 Frequency of use of technical assistance from coops/associations  0.001 0.169 
 Frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs  0.568 0.272 ** 
Days spent in FTC 0.013 0.008 
 Main buyer as a source of advice -0.563 0.170 *** 
Access to credit 0.842 0.257 *** 
Productivity/yield -0.012 0.009 
 Disease resistance  0.012 0.142 
 Drought resistance  -0.213 0.126 * 
Intensity of crop management -0.369 0.126 *** 
Maturity period   0.005 0.009 
 Tuber size  -0.098 0.181 
 Tuber shape – full round  -0.467 0.489 
 Stew quality -0.250 0.137 * 
Age 0.011 0.010 
 Farmer being a male 0.736 0.442 * 
Farmers years of education 0.079 0.029 *** 
Family size 0.039 0.023 * 
Presence of a motorbike, car and/or a truck -0.429 0.567 
 Presence of a mobile phone 0.109 0.225 
 Presence of a radio 0.481 0.206 ** 
Presence of a television 0.748 0.292 *** 
Percentage of own land -0.002 0.004 
 Number of livestock units (TLU) -0.032 0.016 ** 
Constant 0.211 1.317 
 N 334  
R2 0.281     
* p < 0.1; **  p < 0.05;  p < 0.01. 
 
The results show that crop management intensity is highly and negatively correlated to the 
probability of adoption; i.e., farmers perceive that LVs require less intensive crop 
management than IVs. This is expected, as IVs may require new management practices. For 
example, the two IVs, Jalene and Gudane, tend to have larger tuber size, and additional 
management may be necessary to control tuber size. Furthermore, drought resistance is 
negatively correlated to the probability of adoption. Due to incidents of irregular rainfall in 
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the Rift Valley region, it is possible for farmers to perceive that LVs have better adaptation 
than a new variety. In contrast, farmers’ assessment of yield, disease resistance, and maturity 
period for the LVs does not have a significant relation to adoption decision. However, the 
relationship would have expected otherwise, as LVs are often considered inferior to yield and 
disease resistance. 
 
The results show that market-related attributes are more important than yield, disease 
resistance, and maturity period. Accordingly, stew quality is significantly and negatively 
correlated to farmers’ adoption decisions. Stew quality is expected to be relevant because 
ware potatoes are commonly consumed in the form of stew in Ethiopia. This result is 
consistent with estimates of ‘use of main buyer as a source of advice’. On the other hand, 
there is no significant association between farmers’ assessment for tuber size and shape and 
the likelihood of adoption.  
 
Regarding control variables, education level and presence of a radio or television have a 
significant relationship with the presence of adoption. Education of the head of the household 
is positively correlated with the probability of adoption, while age has no relationship. The 
positive contribution of education is expected as famers with more years in school tend to 
have better information processing capabilities. The household head being male positively 
contributes to the adoption decision. Furthermore, household characteristics such as presence 
of a radio or television are positively and significantly correlated to the adoption decision. 
This was also expected as access to wider information helps to broaden farmers’ 
understandings of new technologies. It is also interesting to note that while family size has a 
positive impact on adoption, number of livestock units has the opposite. This could relate to 
the fact that IVs are high yielding but less preferred by buyers. Hence, it is likely that for 
households with a larger family size (a high number of dependents), IVs might provide a 
better option for household consumption. It could also be argued that large family size means 
high labor force, which would positively affect the adoption decision. Households with a 
large number of livestock units are less likely to participate in adopting the IVs, as this would 
require additional labor and expertise apart from animal production. However, possession of 
a motor bike, car, and/or truck and percentage of own land do not have association with 
adoption decision. Although two-thirds of the respondents had a mobile phone, this has no 
correlation with the adoption decision. Perhaps, a mobile phone is considered more as a 
measure of status than as a means to access information. 
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 Persistence of adoption 
 
An Ordered Probit (with OLS estimation for comparison) is used to measure persistence of 
adoption for the IVs (Table 3.4). Observations were recorded using a recall method. 
 
Table 3.4 Parametric estimation for persistence of growing the IVs between 2006 and 2010  
  
           Years of adoption 
 OLS  Ordered Probit 
Variables  Coef. Robust Std. Err.  Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
Frequency of use of technical assistance from 
extension agents  -0.030 0.054 
 
 
-0.057 0.090 
 Frequency of use of technical assistance from research 
institutes  -0.054 0.059 
 
 
-0.090 0.106 
 Frequency of use of technical assistance from 
coops/associations  0.043 0.092 
 
 
0.118 0.147 
 Frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs  0.423 0.133 ***  0.637 0.155 *** 
Days spent in farmer training centers 0.006 0.005 
 
 0.007 0.006 
 Main buyer as a source of advice -0.255 0.059 ***  -0.533 0.151 *** 
Access to credit 0.025 0.095 
 
 0.263 0.178 
 Yield -0.003 0.004 
 
 -0.005 0.008 
 Disease resistance  -0.070 0.060 
 
 -0.059 0.124 
 Drought resistance  -0.079 0.057 
 
 -0.249 0.109 ** 
Intensity of crop management  -0.234 0.079 ***  -0.432 0.119 *** 
Maturity period   0.003 0.005 
 
 0.004 0.008 
 Tuber size  -0.092 0.104 
 
 -0.062 0.172 
 Tuber shape – full round  -0.093 0.130 
 
 -0.810 0.499 
 Stew quality -0.145 0.062 **  -0.295 0.112 *** 
Age 0.005 0.006 
 
 0.013 0.009 
 Farmer being a male 0.035 0.154 
 
 0.104 0.362 
 Farmers years of education 0.017 0.015 
 
 0.056 0.027 ** 
Family size 0.016 0.011 
 
 0.044 0.021 ** 
Presence of a motorbike, car and/or a truck 0.001 0.272 
 
 0.298 0.436 
 Presence of a mobile phone 0.154 0.111 
 
 0.217 0.204 
 Presence of a radio 0.239 0.090 ***  0.590 0.191 *** 
Presence of a television 0.287 0.166 *  0.440 0.233 * 
Percentage of own land 0.002 0.002 
 
 0.001 0.004 
 Number of livestock units -0.005 0.002 **  -0.031 0.012 *** 
Constant 1.354 0.574 **     
N 334    334   
R2 0.773     0.212     
* p < 0.1; **  p < 0.05;  p < 0.01. 
Comparing Table 3.4 with Table 3.3, access to credit does not influence the persistence of 
adoption although this variable is important for the adoption decision. However, the 
significance level of technical assistance from NGOs, drought resistance, family size, and 
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number of livestock units has improved by one level. Furthermore, stew quality, which 
negatively affects the adoption decision (Table 3.3), continues to influence the persistence of 
adoption decision. That means, farmers’ assessment about stew quality of the LVs strongly 
affects the likelihood of growing the IVs in subsequent seasons. Overall, the estimation of the 
Ordered Probit model is consistent with the OLS estimation. 
 
Intensity of adoption  
 
If information is available on the quantity of a dependent variable, Tobit or Heckman sample 
selection (treatment effect) model can better explain both the decision to adopt and the extent 
of adoption (Greene, 2003). However, the Tobit model is prone to two limitations. First, it 
imposes the effect of explanatory variables to be similar on the decision to adopt and the 
extent of adoption. Second, the Tobit model assumes the same variables affect the decision to 
adopt and the extent of adoption. The treatment effect model is suggested to solve both 
limitations (Green, 2003). The treatment effect model involves two equations – the selection 
equation, which provides information on what variables could affect the probability of 
adoption, and the outcome equation, which provides information on what variables could 
affect the extent of adoption.   
 
To specify the treatment effect model, a Probit and then OLS regression on positive 
observations (truncated regression) were carried out separately. The variables, which were 
included in the Probit model, are all considered in the selection equation. The variable 
‘farmer years of education’, which was highly insignificant in the OLS estimation, was 
dropped from the outcome equation as this is appropriate for proper model identification 
(Schipmann and Qaim, 2010). 
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Table 3. 5 Parametric estimation of intensity of adoption (2010): treatment effect model 
 
 Selection equation  
 
 Outcome equation as a percentage of 
 Decision to grow IVs   total cultivated total potato land 
Variable Coef. Robust Std.  Coef. Robust Std. Coef. Robust Std. 
Frequency of use of technical 
assistance from extension 
agents  0.032 0.109  
 
-0.011 0.009  0.009 0.016  
Frequency of use of technical 
assistance from research 
institutes  0.084 0.114  
 
0.024 0.014  0.053 0.040  
Frequency of use of technical 
assistance from 
coops/associations  -0.130 0.166  
 
-0.039 0.021  -0.057 0.039  
Frequency of use of technical 
assistance from NGOs  0.447 0.251 * 
 
0.008 0.019  0.008 0.059  
Days spent in farmer training 
centers 0.016 0.009 * 
 
-0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001  
Main buyer as a source of 
advice -0.522 0.164 *** 
 
0.055 0.035  0.025 0.079  
Access to credit 0.791 0.291 ***  0.078 0.035 ** 0.172 0.094 * 
Yield -0.015 0.010   0.003 0.002 ** -0.0001 0.003  
Disease resistance  0.058 0.146   0.022 0.015  -0.004 0.031  
Drought resistance  -0.185 0.129   0.025 0.015  0.025 0.032  
Intensity of crop 
management -0.346 0.131 *** 
 
0.021 0.019  0.023 0.043  
Maturity period   0.008 0.009   0.0004 0.001  -0.001 0.001  
Tuber size  -0.177 0.187   -0.053 0.023 ** -0.106 0.046 ** 
Tuber shape – full round  -0.381 0.488   0.022 0.071  0.061 0.139  
Stew quality -0.207 0.140   -0.005 0.013  -0.055 0.034 * 
Age 0.012 0.011   -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.002  
Farmer being a male 0.658 0.466   0.071 0.040 * 0.081 0.119  
Farmer years of education 0.089 0.031 ***  - -  - -  
Family size 0.037 0.023   -0.003 0.003  -0.003 0.007  
Presence of a motorbike, car 
and/or a truck -0.482 0.550  
 
-0.105 0.055 * -0.013 0.145  
Presence of a mobile phone 0.116 0.234   -0.074 0.031 ** -0.130 0.073 * 
Presence of a radio 0.565 0.217 ***  0.027 0.029  0.059 0.070  
Presence of a television  0.870 0.299 ***  0.047 0.025 * -0.0406 0.0912  
Percentage of own land -0.0006 0.0039   0.0019 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 
Number of livestock units -0.024 0.014 *  0.002 0.003  -0.002 0.005  
Constant -0.170 1.337   -0.266 0.147 * 0.372 0.257  
ath (ρ)     -0.352 0.289  -0.072 0.883  
           
LR test of independent 
Equations    
 
      
Chi-squared (1)     1.48    0.01  
Prob  >  chi-square     0.224    0.935  
N  334            85       85   
* p < 0.1; **  p < 0.05;  p < 0.01. 
 
Table 3.5 presents two outcome equations - land allocated to grow the IVs as a percentage of 
total cultivated land and as percentage of total land dedicated only for potatoes. Only one 
selection equation is presented, which is similar to the Probit model in Table 3.3. However, 
while Table 3.3 displays the presence of adoption representing the period 2006 to 2010, the 
selection equation in Table 3.5 is only limited to the 2010 data. Hence, the treatment effect 
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model provides information on what variables could affect the probability of adopting the IVs 
and what variables could affect the share of land allocated to growing IVs on the same 
period. The test result of the treatment effect model shows that there is no sample selection 
bias, as the correlation coefficient between residuals of both equations “ath (ρ)” is not 
significantly different from zero. The results of the selection equation and the Probit model 
and the outcome equation and the OLS regression (truncated) are similar; hence, only the 
results of the selection equation and outcome equation are presented to interpret the results. 
 
The results show that variables like use of main buyer as a source of advice, crop 
management intensity, farmers’ level of education, presence of a radio or television, which 
are significant at 1% level in the probability of adoption, are found to be less important for 
the extent of adoption. In contrast, percentage own land and tuber size show a significant 
relationship with the extent of adoption, which is not the case in the probability of adoption. 
The extent of adoption is also influenced by access to credit, yield, and presence of a mobile 
phone. 
 
3.4.2 Discussion 
 
The results showed that 73% of ware potato farmers did not adopt the IVs in the period 2006 
to 2010. The first question to answer is whether seed potatoes of the IVs were available and 
affordable for ware potato growers. First, during the survey, farmers reported that the price of 
seed potatoes of the IVs was not higher than the price of seed potatoes of LVs. The cost of 
the IVs (per 100 kg) on average ranged between 8.2 and 13 USD while the cost of the most 
common LV, Nechi Ababa, was around 9.5 USD. Second, there have been attempts by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, EIAR, and NGOs to promote the IVs (Ortiz 
et al., 2013). Abebe et al. (2010) already showed that seed potatoes of the IVs were being 
produced and put on the market by potato growers in the highlands. Thus, it can be concluded 
that low availability or a high price was not the main factor that led to low adoption. 
 
The AKIS variables ‘frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs’, ‘use of main 
buyer as a source of advice’, and ‘access to credit’ show a significant association with the 
presence and persistence of adoption, and only access to credit positively influences intensity 
of adoption. However, this result also shows the lack of coordination within the Ethiopian 
AKIS. While the focus of research institutes, extension agents, and NGOs is to promote the 
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IVs among potato farmers, the advice that farmers receive from main buyers appears to affect 
the adoption of the IVs negatively, implying an adverse effect of potato buyers on the 
innovation process. This result confirms the claim by Spielman et al. (2011) that private 
actors are excluded from the innovation system. Lack of coordinated action among research, 
extension, and buyers apparently creates a tension for ware potato farmers in their decision to 
adopt new varieties. Contrary to the findings of Adesina and Baidu-Forson (1995) and Zinnah 
et al. (1993), frequency of use of extension services and technical assistance from 
cooperatives have no significant effect on the probability of adoption. This confirms previous 
claims that the extension service in Ethiopia is generally ineffective in inducing technology 
adoption (Abate et al., 2011; Belay, 2003; Belay and Abebaw, 2004; Dadi et al., 2004). In 
contrast, Ortiz et al. (2013) documented a positive assessment about the role of extension in 
the Ethiopian potato innovation system. However, their study was more focused on 
specialized seed potato growers in the highlands, who often get technical support and seed 
from EIAR and CIP; hence their results may not necessarily apply to the situation of ware 
potato farmers in the Rift Valley region. Other studies also found that extension plays a 
limited role in technology adoption (Kafle and Shah, 2012; Mariano et al., 2012; Ransom et 
al., 2003; Schipmann and Qaim, 2010). Evidently, findings regarding the role of extension 
are not similar, implying differences in the way AKIS operates in a particular institutional 
setting. Considering ware potato farmers’ adoption decision as one criterion to measure 
performance, the Ethiopian AKIS has failed to effectively promote the IVs in the study area. 
 
The results show that crop management intensity is strongly correlated to the adoption 
decision. IVs may require more intensive crop management, which could adversely affect 
adoption decisions. For instance, Waller et al. (1998) reported that the non-alignment 
between traditional crop management and the integrated pest management (IPM) practices 
that come with the new varieties led to low adoption of those new varieties among potato 
farmers in Ohio, USA. However, surprisingly crop management intensity turns out to be less 
important (Table 3.5) when it comes to the extent of adoption, which could be related to the 
small area allotted to grow the IVs. Also, drought resistance affects the presence and 
persistence of adoption of new varieties. Under erratic rainfall conditions, farmers tend to 
rely more on LVs that they know are good in surviving unfavorable climate conditions. 
Similar results were reported for sorghum farmers, by Adesina and Baidu-Forson (1995), and 
rice farmers, by Mariano et al. (2012). In areas where rainfall is erratic, introducing water 
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harvesting technologies is likley to induce the adoption of new varieties (Wakeyo and 
Gardebroek, 2013). 
 
Surprisingly, other production-related variables such as disease resistance, yield, and maturity 
period did not have a significant relationship with the presence and persistence of adoption. 
As to disease resistance, ware potato farmers are generally convinced that all varieties tend to 
be susceptible to diseases. Furthermore, farmers claim that even though IVs appear less prone 
to diseases in the first cycle of production, they tend to degenerate faster over successive 
cropping cycles than the LVs. However, IVs start at a much higher level of quality than LVs. 
Thiele (1999), in the case of potatoes in the Andes, argued that the use of improved potato 
seed is profitable only if the farmer can use second and third generation seeds. Regarding 
yield, the IVs, such as Jalene and Gudane, are generally high yielding. However, just a higher 
yield does not lead to adoption, as other attributes are also important from farmers’ 
perspective (Waller et al., 1998). However, in one of the outcome equations (Table 3.5), yield 
appears to positively affect the extent of adoption. This implies that the yield attribute 
becomes important once farmers have made the decision to adopt the IVs. With regard to 
maturity period, the IVs Jalene and Gudane on average mature in 122 days while the common 
LV, Nechi Ababa, matures in 101 days. For farmers depending on rainfall, this difference in 
maturity period may not be so important. However, a longer maturity period might increase 
the incidence of late blight and other diseases. This study shows that maturity period does not 
affect adoption of IVs. 
 
Overall, ware potato farmers’ assessment of the LVs on disease resistance, yield, and 
maturity period played a limited role in their decision to adopt new varieties. It should, 
however, be noted that this result does not imply that yield, disease resistance, and maturity 
period are not important in farmers’ variety choice; instead, the results show the superiority 
of market-related quality attributes over production attributes when there are tradeoffs. The 
results confirm the claim by Schipmann and Qaim (2010) that farmers consider market-
related quality attributes as critical factors for adoption. Ware potato farmers’ assessment of 
stew quality of the LVs appears to be the main market-related quality attribute affecting 
adoption decision. The importance of economic incentives for adoption decisions is also 
reported by Dadi et al. (2004), in the context of teff and wheat varieties. However, farmers’ 
assessment with regard to tuber size did not have a significant effect on the probability of 
adoption. This is of a surprise because the IVs Jalene and Gudane tend to have relatively 
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larger tuber size, which could affect buyers’ willingness to buy potatoes. Ware potato farmers 
generally perceive that with an increasing tuber size stew quality may decrease. Perhaps, the 
effect of size might have been captured in the stew quality attribute. Nonetheless, we found 
tuber size negatively influencing the extent of adoption. The explanation is that, once the 
decision is made to adopt, IVs are likely to be grown in a small plot for own consumption 
while allocating the large portion of their potato land to grow LVs for a commercial purpose. 
The findings showed that education is significantly and positively correlated to the 
probability of adoption. This result is consistent with other studies (e.g., He et al., 2007; 
Mariano et al., 2012; Thangata and Alavalapati, 2003; Waller et al., 1998). Education can 
play a crucial role by reducing uncertainty and improving skills (Abadi Ghadim et al., 2005). 
Likewise, presence of a radio is highly significant in the presence and persistence of 
adoption. This result is consistent with a study in India, where radio was reported to have 
improved the adoption of new potato variety, (Adhiguru et al., 2009) but different from Ortiz 
et al. (2013), who reported that radio played a limited role in adopting new potato varieties 
among potato farmers in Ethiopia, Peru and Uganda. However, both education and radio have 
no significant influence on the extent of adoption. In contrast, the presence of a mobile 
phone, which was not significant in the adoption decision, negatively affects the extent of 
adoption. While education and radio could allow farmers access to wider information, 
farmers may use a mobile phone to access limited but important market information from 
main buyers. As discussed above, buyers do not seem to have a positive perception about the 
IVs, and subsequently farmers who adopted the IVs and have a mobile phone are likely to 
grow the IVs in a small piece of land than those who do not have a mobile phone. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
The main aim of this study was to provide insights into the determinants of adopting 
improved potato varieties in Ethiopia, focusing on the role of the agricultural knowledge and 
innovation system and ware potato farmers’ assessment of local varieties.  
 
The findings show that frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs, use of main 
buyer as a source of advice, and access to credit play a key role in ware potato farmers’ 
adoption decision. While technical assistance from NGOs and access to credit induce farmers 
to adopt the IVs, the use of the main buyer as a source of advice has an opposite effect. 
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Farmers’ assessment of quality attributes of the LVs affects adoption of the IVs. While 
production-related attributes such as yield and disease resistance are considered highly 
important by the Ethiopian AKIS, ware potato farmers considered them of secondary 
importance. Rather, farmers consider crop management intensity and stew quality as the main 
quality attributes. Among the household and farm controls, education, presence of a radio or 
television affect adoption of IVs. This finding suggests the importance of access to and 
ability to process information for adopting new varieties. 
 
This study contributes to the adoption literature as follows. First, the study  showed that the 
introduction of new crop varieties involves a complex problem of coordination between 
supply and demand factors, in which AKIS and market actors are involved. Second, it 
showed that the adoption decision by the farmer is a multi-criteria decision problem that 
involves trade-offs. While AKIS suppliers of new potato varieties tend to focus on agronomic 
characteristics, farmers also include non-agronomic characteristics, such as stew quality and 
buyer preferences, in their adoption decision. Third, compared to other staple food crops, 
there is only limited empirical research on the adoption of new potato varieties by ware 
potato growers. Following Thiele (1999), potato, with its specific agro-ecological and socio-
cultural specificities, deserves more attention. Hence, this study provides insights into the 
determinants of adopting new potato varieties in the Upper Rift Valley region of Ethiopia. 
 
This study leads to a number of policy recommendations. First, a supply chain view on 
quality, based on what farmers and buyers’ value most, is needed to improve the adoption 
rate of IVs. The study presents a recommendation for policymakers responsible for setting 
research agendas and for researchers to put more emphasis on the combination of agronomic 
and non-agronomic attributes in new variety development. Including the preferences of ware 
potato farmers and their customers into the process of setting research priorities asks for a 
participatory research approach. This recommendation is in line with Byerlee et al. (2007) 
who, in the context of new sorghum varieties, suggested a rethinking of the existing 
innovation diffusion system in Ethiopia. A second policy recommendation relates to the 
importance of education and access to information, which proved to be crucial in adoption 
decisions. Yet, although two-thirds of ware potato farmers in this study had a mobile phone, 
it did not have a significant effect on the probability of adoption. Institutions involved in the 
innovation process should therefore put more efforts into the utilization of this technology as 
part of the innovation system. For instance, Mittal et al. (2010) reported the positive 
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contribution of a mobile phone in India by disseminating specific information on price, 
availability of inputs, seed quality, and adoption of modern technologies. A third 
recommendation focuses on the use of broadcasting media, such as radio and television. As 
these media turned out to be important for the adoption decision, policymakers could use the 
recently expanding community level radio stations to educate and promote the adoption of 
new agricultural technologies. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Are middlemen facilitators or barriers to improve 
smallholders’ commercialization? 
 
This chapter is based on the article submitted to the Journal of Development Studies as 
‘Abebe, G.K., Bijman, J., Royer, A., Ruerd, R. and Omta, O. Are middlemen facilitators or 
barriers to improve smallholders’ commercialization?’. 
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 4. Are middlemen facilitators or barriers to improve smallholders’ commercialization? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Food value chains in developing countries are experiencing many changes given the rapid 
development of their supermarkets and the increasing quality and safety import requirements 
from developed countries (Henson and Jaffee, 2008; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). These 
changes represent new market opportunities for agricultural smallholders that can improve 
the quality and traceability of their products. All around the world, many smallholders are 
striving to comply with these increasingly stringent requirements. Whether they are 
successful depends to a large extent on the way production and distribution is coordinated 
along the value chain (Hernández et al., 2007; Neven et al., 2009; Swinnen and Maertens, 
2007). Different institutional arrangements, such as contract farming, vertical integration and 
producer organizations, have emerged in agrifood chains to successfully address these new 
challenges (Bijman, 2008; Henson et al., 2005; Moustier et al., 2010). There are, however, 
still many chains in Sub-Saharan Africa where middlemen play an important role in linking 
farmers to traders and final markets.  
 
It is widely recognized that intermediaries play an important role in facilitating trade by 
decreasing transaction costs related to search time and information asymmetry (Dixit, 2009; 
Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Hayami, 1996; Li, 1998; Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Townsend, 
1978). Middlemen are, by definition, economic actors in-between two other actors (Gadde 
and Snehota, 2001). Although most work to date, either theoretical or empirical, has inferred 
a rather positive role to middlemen in trading relations, other studies have been more critical.  
 
Using a game theoretic approach, Townsend (1978) demonstrates that intermediaries emerge 
endogenously as they allow economizing on the fixed cost of exchange, understood as 
transaction costs. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) argue that middlemen are a time-saving 
institution since they shorten the negotiation time of sellers and buyers for a transaction. 
Introducing the notion of quality uncertainty as in the sense of Akerlof (1970), Li (1998) 
argues that middlemen do have an advantage in terms of information. Looking at two 
parameters, the severity of the private information problem and the cost of middlemen’s 
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quality-testing technology, Li explains that if the information problem is not severe and if 
agents are willing to undertake exchange without knowing the exact quality of the goods, the 
presence of middlemen in trade is inefficient. However, if the information asymmetry 
prevents agents from trading since they cannot recognize the quality of the goods, then 
middlemen can be welfare-improving. Therefore, according to Li, middlemen are an efficient 
institution in markets where quality is costly to measure.  
 
However, Masters (2008) found a negative effect of middlemen on farmers’ income. He 
argues that the most persuasive and the least productive individuals are the ones who become 
middlemen. They take advantage of the existence of producers who have lower production 
costs than themselves, but do not know the market. Under such market conditions, 
middlemen prosper by ‘buying low’ and ‘selling high’. According to Masters, middlemen are 
a welfare reducing institution.  
 
In terms of empirical work, recently Abdul et al. (2012) reported the monopoly and 
monopsony power of middlemen in the context of Pakistani rice market. They argue that 
middlemen exploit smallholders by imposing their own terms and by representing themselves 
both as sellers and buyers. In contrast, in line with the argument put forward by Rubinstein 
and Wolinsky (1987), Gabre-Madhin (2001) finds that middlemen have a positive effect on 
overall surplus by enabling a more efficient allocation of search effort and therefore 
constitute a socially optimal choice. Nonetheless, this evidence demonstrates the positive 
contribution of middlemen from the traders’ perspective while empirical studies supporting 
this view from the side of smallholder farmers are scarce. Furthermore, it is likely that 
middlemen may behave differently depending on the nature of the crop and the institutional 
environment. Thus, further research is necessary to assess the (potential) role of middlemen 
in intensifying smallholders’ participation in remunerative and quality-oriented market 
segments, especially, in the modern economy where farmers are increasingly having access to 
a mobile phone. More specifically, this Chapter addresses the following research question: 
 
RQ3: Which factors do influence farmers’ decision to use middlemen in their trading 
relations, and what is the economic impact of such relationship? 
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This study examines a case in Ethiopia where middlemen are the dominant institution in the 
potato value chain. After controlling for selection bias using propensity score matching, the 
results show that potato farmers who relied on middlemen had 39% lower income per hectare 
than those farmers who had sold to direct buyers. This finding suggests that the middleman 
institution might be ill-suited to deal with new challenges in the modern economy and may 
even prevent the emergence of other forms of governance, such as contracts and preferred 
seller-buyer relationships, by lock-in farmers in existing relationships in which social 
switching costs appear to be high. 
 
The main objectives of this study are the following: (1) to investigate the determinants of 
smallholders’ choice to trade through middlemen, and (2) to analyse the impact of trading 
through middlemen on smallholders’ income. To achieve these objectives, a survey was 
conducted in the fall of 2010 among 345 potato growers in the Rift Valley region of Ethiopia, 
where potato is the dominant crop and middlemen are highly involved in potato marketing. In 
the empirical strategy, the study paid due attention to potential selection bias and endogeneity 
problems.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a literature review and discusses the 
theoretical framework. Section 4.3 details the data and methods. Section 4.4 presents the 
results and discussion. Finally, section 4.5 provides the conclusions.  
 
4.2 Literature review and conceptual framework 
 
4.2.1 Literature review 
 
In transaction cost economics, institutions emerge to minimize transaction costs (North, 
1994; Platteau, 1994; Williamson, 1998). The use of intermediaries is expected to generate a 
better match of buyers to sellers than unintermediated trade (Biglaiser and Friedman, 1999), 
and thus is assumed to economize on direct exchanges (Townsend, 1978). According to 
Hackett (1992), the use of middlemen is likely to enhance efficiency under the following 
conditions: (1) when demand variance is high and investment in intermediation effort has 
little effect on demand; or (2) when information on product quality is costly.  
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Landa (1981) argues that the institution of middleman is a low-cost arrangement that serves 
as an alternative to contract law or the vertically integrated firm. He further explains the 
connection between middlemen and social bonding in a society in which members strictly 
adhere to the code of conduct of the group and have a clear idea of who is an insider and who 
is not, offering opportunities to a rational trader to trade with middlemen. The middlemen’s 
ethnic status with sellers may become more important under conditions of contract 
uncertainty and positive transaction costs. However, social ties could also lead individuals to 
cooperate according to social norms even if this is against their own self-interest (Fehr et al., 
1997; Hoffman et al., 1998). Thus, while the use of middlemen may increase economic 
efficiency by giving transacting parties trust in the relationship, it may also decrease 
efficiency by, for instance, excluding new entrants from participating in the market or by 
applying price collusion (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Ethnical relationships may create 
economic inefficiencies in two ways (Fafchamps, 2000); by changing the relative bargaining 
powers of buyers and sellers, it can create monopolistic pricing; and by only transacting in 
the group, entrepreneurship is constrained. 
 
Gabre-Madhin (2001) reported, in the case of grain trade in Ethiopia, that middlemen: (1) 
provide price information, (2) arrange logistics of delivery, (3) grade products, (4) determine 
the market price, and (5) match buyers and sellers. In the case examined, direct trade between 
farmers and traders is unlikely since traders are unwilling to engage in exchange without a 
witness. Furthermore, working without middlemen could lead to a reduction of traders’ 
choice of possible trading partners. Traders have a preference working with a selective group 
of middlemen, and, in a particular region, traders deal with only a few middlemen in order to 
control trading relations more effectively. In case of opportunistic behavior from the part of 
the middlemen, traders can easily punish them, for example, by excluding from further 
trading relationships. Furthermore, Gabre-Madhin (2001) documented that traders in the 
grain market purchase only 30% of their total supply through middlemen, implying that 
traders also have the choice to buy directly from farmers, through middlemen, or in a 
combination of both. On the other hand, Minten et al. (2010), in the context of Indian 
horticulture wholesale market, documented a contrasting finding that middlemen play a 
limited role with regard to price information, logistics or grading services. The main reasons 
for the limited role of middlemen mentioned by these authors are: (1) presence of blurred 
roles between middlemen and traders, (2) little information sharing between farmers and 
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middlemen before coming to the market, (3) little effect of quality inspection by middlemen 
as traders would eventually check quality at the time of delivery, and only observable quality 
characteristics are  considered in the exchange, and (4) most farmers and traders have a 
mobile phone; thus  middlemen have  a limited role in the reduction of search costs. 
 
Overall, the literature provides mixed evidence about the role of middlemen in smallholders’ 
trading relations with buyers. This raises empirical questions and calls for further 
investigation into the economic value of the institution of middleman.  
 
4.2.2 Conceptual framework  
 
Smallholders’ decision to sell to a direct buyer (seller-buyer) or through a middleman (seller-
middlemen-buyer) can be conceptualized as a binary channel choice decision problem by 
farm households that try to maximize utility. Most of the empirical literature on smallholder 
farmers’ channel choice emphasizes the effect of transaction costs and socio-economic 
factors such as risk preferences, asset holdings, labor requirements, sales volume, profit 
margin, and geography (Alene et al., 2008; Barrett, 2008; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Gabre-
Madhin, 2001; Hernández et al., 2007; LeRoux et al., 2010).  
 
This study considers several variables related to human capital (age and education level), 
access to information, (access to a mobile phone and membership in a cooperative, social 
bonding (ethnic ties), access to market (location specific dummies and distance from farm to 
main road), quality (varieties grown), resource endowment (labor, presence of a horse/donkey 
cart, and number of livestock units), and variables capturing quality and volume of 
production (variety type and cultivated area). Summary statistics for these variables are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Age and education level are used as a proxy for human capital (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). 
Middlemen are generally considered important providers of market information. It is 
expected that the probability of using middlemen diminishes with farmers' age and education 
level, because older and better educated farmers tend to have more experience and 
assessment skills about buyers’ demands (Monson et al., 2008). As lack of access to market 
information is one of the major problems of smallholder farmers, farmers who have access to 
information is expected to be less dependent on middlemen. For instance, Muto and Yamano 
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(2009) found that mobile phone technology induced market participation of farmers living in 
remote areas and producing perishable crops. Likewise, membership in a cooperative could 
provide better access to price information (Kassie et al., 2011). Thus, members of a 
cooperative are expected to be less dependent on middlemen. 
 
Social bonding, such as ethnic ties, plays a significant role in trading relationships (Ali and 
Peerlings, 2011; Cornell and Welch, 1996; Fafchamps, 2000). Social bonding established 
through ethnic ties creates homogeneity and thus could positively impact business outcomes 
by reducing transaction costs (Annen, 2003; Fafchamps, 2000). However, such relationships 
could also negatively affect business outcomes as ethnically tied farmers may continue 
trading with middlemen even if it is not in their best economic interest (Fehr et al., 1997; 
Hoffman et al., 1998), because ethnic ties can lead to lock-in in the sense explained in the 
marketing literature (Bansal et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2007). According to Jones et al. (2007), 
personalized relationship creates lock-in effects because of high social switching costs such 
as potential loss of a personal bond or friendship. Lock-in can lead to welfare losses since it 
creates ex post monopoly or monopsony (Barrett, 2005) and thus opportunity for exploitation.  
 
The study used location dummies and access to an all-weather road as a proxy for access to 
market (Hagos et al., 2012). Accordingly, farmers who are close to the potato market are less 
likely to rely on middlemen since they are better positioned to find a direct buyer. Regarding 
product quality, the type of variety is used as an objective measure of potato quality. In the 
study area there are several varieties. From these varieties, variety ‘Nechi Ababa’ is the most 
common commercial variety supplied to the wet market in Addis Ababa and to other major 
cities. Because of the market demand for this variety, farmers that grow ‘Nechi Ababa’ are 
more likely to deal with direct buyers and to be less dependent on middlemen. Furthermore, 
volume of production can influence the choice of a trading partner. Accordingly, farmers who 
have high production volume are more likely to use intermediation than those farmers with 
low production volume because of the high market risk. In terms of resource endowment, 
farmers who have a horse or donkey cart are more likely to deal with direct buyers because 
they can transport their potatoes to the nearest market should they do not find a direct buyer 
at farmgate. Likewise, a large family size could provide more labor to carry potatoes to the 
nearest collection center if they do not find a buyer at farmgate (LeRoux et al., 2010) and 
thus are less likely to be dependent on middlemen. Also, farmers with a large number of 
92 
 
Are middlemen facilitators or barriers to improve smallholders’ commercialization? 
 
livestock units are more likely to use middlemen because of the high opportunity cost of 
labor to search for a buyer (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005).  
 
4.3 Data and Methods 
 
4.3.1 Data  
 
Study context 
 
West Arsi-zone, in the Rift valley region of Ethiopia, is one of the major potato growing 
regions in the country in which middlemen are highly involved in the potato market. In this 
region, middlemen constitute a ‘hidden population’. As a result, no official data can be found 
about their number. It appears that middlemen opt to work informally mostly because they do 
not want to pay registration fee or taxes on commission. The most common type of 
intermediation in the study area is the one between potato farmers and traders. By 
representing potato traders, middlemen can match buyers and sellers and negotiate farmgate 
prices. However, the actual harvesting is carried out by the traders’ hired labor. In return, 
middlemen receive commission from traders, but not necessarily from the farmers. Potato 
middlemen do not bear any market or production risk.  
 
Data collected among 107 middlemen showed that the average age of middlemen was 27 
years and had education level of junior high school or less, mostly dominated by men and one 
ethnic group. Prior occupation of the middlemen consisted of 44% farmers, 41% students, 
and 15% ex-soldiers. A single middleman on average intermediated with about 79 potato 
farmers and seven traders in 2009/2010. Based on self-perception of middlemen, 35% stated 
that they would take the position of traders when negotiating prices, while only 17% 
responded to favor farmers; however, 46% of middlemen stated that they would take a 
neutral position.  
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Data 
 
Data were collected in the spring of 2011 among ware potato farmers. A total of 350 potato 
farmers, from purposely selected 16 high potato growing peasant associations8 located in the 
Shashemene, Shala, and Shiraro districts, participated in the survey. Potato farmers were 
randomly selected from the land ownership register obtained from the Office of Agriculture 
and Rural Development in the three districts. In the event of unavailability of a farmer, the 
next farmer in the register was included in the survey. The study used a proportional random 
sampling approach, based on the concentration of potato production, when selecting farmers 
from the three districts and 16 peasant associations. After testing the questionnaire, the 
survey was conducted using a personally administered structured questionnaire. Data from 
five potato farmers were dropped during data cleaning.  
 
4.3.2 Empirical model for determinants of using middlemen  
 
Before introducing the empirical model, it is important to note how ware potato transactions 
take place in the study area.  Farmers can sell their potatoes in nearby markets to anonymous 
buyers or at farmgate to collecting wholesalers. The majority of farmers sell their potatoes at 
farmgate at a predetermined price (before harvest). Those farmers who sell at farmgate have 
two options – to sell their potatoes through middlemen or directly to collecting wholesalers 
(direct buyers). While the study of Fafchamps and Hill (2005) focused on analyzing the 
factors affecting smallholder (coffee) farmers’ decision to sell in nearby spot markets and at 
farmgate, the present study focuses on the factors affecting potato farmers’ choice of a 
trading partner at a farmgate, where some farmers sell through middlemen and the others sell 
to direct buyers. Direct buyers refer to traders (mostly collecting wholesalers) who buy 
directly from farmers without involving middlemen. 
  
Turning to the estimation strategy, in the presence of a representative middleman who 
engages in trade, farmers can choose whether to use middlemen (seller-middlemen-buyer 
relationship) or sell to direct buyers (seller-buyer relationship). However, the actual level of 
8 A peasant association covers around 800 hectare of land (Hagos et al. 2012), and is the lowest 
administrative unit in Ethiopia. 
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utility for each farmer 𝑈𝑖 is not observed. The part of each farmer’s utility function that is 
observable can be expressed as a function of a vector of exogenous variables 𝑋𝑖 and a vector 
of parameters β to be estimated: 
 
𝑉𝑖(𝛽′𝑋𝑖), where    𝑈𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖(𝛽′𝑋𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                     (1) 
 
𝑋𝑖 represents a vector of socio-economic characteristics; and  𝑢𝑖  is the unobservable portion 
of the farmer’s utility, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. 
 
A farmer will choose to sell his potatoes through middlemen if the utility gained from 
intermediation, 𝑈𝑖𝑀, is greater than the utility from direct selling, 𝑈𝑖𝐷. The probability of a 
farmer selling his potatoes through a middleman is given by 𝑝(𝑢𝑖 < 𝛽′𝑋𝑖). The fact that the 
error term is modeled to have a standard normal distribution motivates the use of a probit 
model (Wollni and Zeller, 2007). Thus, the model to be estimated is given by: 
 
𝑝(𝑀𝑖 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑢𝑖 < 𝛽′𝑋𝑖) = 𝛽′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖, for i = 1, . . ., N,                                                    (2) 
 
where 𝑀𝑖 = 1 if 𝑈𝑖𝑀 > 𝑈𝑖𝐷 , and 𝑀𝑖 = 0 if 𝑈𝑖𝑀 ≤  𝑈𝑖𝐷 
 
4.3.3 Empirical model for the impact of middlemen on farmers’ income 
 
Propensity score matching 
  
The study seeks to estimate the impact of smallholders’ use of middlemen on farmers’ 
income from potato sales. To achieve this objective, a counterfactual approach is followed to 
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Heckman et al., 1997), as it 
cannot be observed how farmers’ income from potato sales would have looked like without 
using middlemen.  Furthermore, it cannot be compared the outcomes of both groups of 
farmers as a farmer’s decision to use a middleman is of a non-random nature and thus could 
lead to a selection bias. Non-parametric statistical approaches are suggested to address the 
problem of self-selection bias related to non-random observational studies (Heckman et al., 
1997).  
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The sources of selection bias could relate to non-overlapping supports, unbalance in observed 
and/or unobserved confounders between the treated and the comparison groups (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). This bias could be reduced by adjusting the difference in the outcome 
variable due to pre-treatment characteristics using propensity score matching (PSM), which is 
the most commonly used method in this type of analysis (Heckman et al., 1997; Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1985; Sianesi, 2004). Thus, the study compares the gross income per hectare 
between both groups of farmers from potato sales realized in the preceding year (2009/2010). 
PSM helps to achieve a better estimation of the treatment effect, and provides comparison of 
the treatment effect controlling for the potential bias arising from self-selection. However, 
this only holds if the identifying assumptions, namely the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) and Common Support, are sufficiently met (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). CIA takes a strong assumption that all variables that influence treatment assignment 
and potential outcomes simultaneously are observed by the researcher, while the common 
support condition ensures that persons with the same observable values have a positive 
likelihood of being part of both in the treatment and comparison groups (Heckman et al., 
1999). 
 
When the CIA and common support condition hold, the difference in outcomes between the 
treatment and the control group is given by the PSM estimator of ATT as follows: 
  
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀 = 𝐸𝑃(𝑋)|𝐶=1{𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝐶 = 1,𝑃(𝑋)] −  𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝐶 =  0,𝑃(𝑋)]}                      (3) 
 
Where Y(1) and Y(0) are values of the outcome variables of interest for the treated (farmers 
who use middlemen) and control (farmers who sell to direct buyers without involving 
middlemen), respectively. Likewise, C = 1 and C = 0 refer to respectively treated and 
controlled farmers.  
 
Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the implementation of the PSM in this study 
follows several steps. The first step is the choice of models and variables to be included in the 
model. Therefore, the propensity scores are estimated using a probit model since both probit 
and logit models yield similar results for a binary treatment case (Smith and Todd, 2001). For 
the variable choice, several authors suggest that only variables that simultaneously influence 
participation decisions and the outcome variable, and variables that can be derived from 
96 
 
Are middlemen facilitators or barriers to improve smallholders’ commercialization? 
 
theory, empirical studies or institutional settings should be included (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008; Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). Thus, variables that are either fixed 
overtime or measured before participation should be part of the model, and data for the 
treatment and control group should come from the same source (Heckman et al., 1999) to 
ensure that the variables in the model are unaffected by the treatment (or anticipation of it). 
Furthermore, the treatment and comparison groups must operate in the same market 
environment (Bernard et al., 2008; Heckman et al., 1998). Regarding the number of variables, 
however, there are two views. While Bryson et al. (2002) argue that overparameterized 
models should be avoided because this can increase variance, Rubin and Thomas (1996) 
advice that a variable should only be excluded if either unrelated to the outcome or not a 
proper covariate. This study included all the covariates of the probit model to predict the 
propensity scores, following Uematsu and Mishra (2012). 
 
The second step in the PSM is the choice of matching algorithm. In this regard, various 
methods have been proposed, such as the nearest-neighbor (NN) matching, radius matching 
(RM), and kernel matching (KM). The NN matching can be performed with or without 
replacement. The former improves the average quality of matches and reduces bias, but 
increases the variance of the estimator (Smith and Todd, 2005). With RM, however, the 
nearest neighbour is not only within each calliper but all the comparison members within the 
calliper. While both NN matching and RM use only a few observations from the comparison 
group to construct the counterfactual outcome of the treated variable, the KM approach uses 
weighted averages of all indivduals in the comparison group to construct the counterfactual 
outcome (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). KM yields lower variance but could lead to bad 
matches, and thus requires the choice of an appropriate bandwidth to satisfy the common 
support condition. In general, the choice of PSM algorithm depends on the data structure. 
While in large sample size asymptotically all PSM algorithms should yield the same results, 
the choice of the matching algorithm is important in small sample size settings because of the 
trade-offs between bias and variance (Heckman et al., 1997). The study estimates the income 
effect using the RM matching because it uses not only the nearest neighbor within each 
caliper but also all of the comparison members within the caliper (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
RM allows for usage of extra (fewer) units when good matches are (not) available (Khandker 
et al., 2010) and thus avoids the risk of bad matches in the NN matching in case the closest 
neighbor is far way (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
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The third step involves checking of the common support condition. Lechner (2001) suggests 
a visual analysis of the density distribution of the propensity score in both the treatment and 
control groups. In this analysis, the study imposes the common support condition to satisfy 
the balancing property. The fourth step in the empirical strategy is to assess the quality of 
matching. Thus, the study uses several quality indicators such as standardized bias, t-Test, 
and bootstrapped standard errors (Lechner, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The fifth 
and final step in the PSM is sensitivity analysis. This study estimates the ATT using 
alternative matching algorithms, NN matching and  KM. Also, the study uses Rosenbaum 
bounds to test the senstivity of estimates for possible unobervable covariates.  
 
4.4 Results and discussion  
 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Of the randomly 
selected 345 farmers, 68% sold their potatoes through middlemen during the 2009/2010 
production cycle.  Table 4.1 shows that gross income from potato sales was higher for 
farmers that did not use middlemen. Other major differences were related to number of 
livestock units, ethnic ties, and location dummies. With regard to the latter, most of the 
farmers in the sample were from Shashemene district because of the high concentration of 
potato production compared to Shala and Shiraro districts. 
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Table 4.1 Variable definition and descriptive statistics of potato farmers 
Variable  Selling directly to 
buyers 
Selling  through 
middlemen 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Gross income per hectare from sale of potato (in birra) 10346 10064 8761 7116 
Age of the household head (in years) 36 10.4 37 10.6 
Male headed household (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.94  0.98  
Family size  9.32 5.12 9.71 5.2 
Education in school years (household head) 5.42 3.44 5.8 3.6 
Total livestock units 14.7 28.4 5.0 5.1 
Distance from potato farm to main road (in km) 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.9 
Cultivated potato area in 2006 (ha) 1.33 1.2 1.06 0.9 
Presence of a mobile phone (1= yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.63  0.69  
Presence of a horse or donkey cart (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.44  0.4  
Type of potato variety (1= Nechi Abebab; 0 = otherwise) 0.59  0.67  
Membership in a Cooperative (1= yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.5  0.58  
Household head has ethnic ties with main middleman or 
buyer (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.31  0.74  
Farmer did not switch to a new buyer at least in the last two 
years (1= yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.42  0.58  
Farmer is from Shashemene district (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.72  0.63  
Farmer is from Shiraro district (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.12  0.26  
Farmer is from Shala district  (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.16  0.11  
a 1US$ was approximately equal to 12.60 birr in 2009/2010. b Nechi Abeba is the most important commercial 
(local) potato variety in the study area. 
 
4.4.2 Probit Estimation  
 
Table 4.2 displays the observable characteristics used to analyze the determinants of farmers’ 
choice of a trading partner.  Before discussing the results, it is important to note potential 
concerns of endogeneity in the probit model.  
 
The variable related to ethnic ties is a suspect for endogeneity, because a farmer’s response to 
the question whether s/he has ethnic ties with the main buyer or middleman may depend on 
the identity of the trading partner. Therefore, this variable has to be instrumented by another 
observable variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable (ethnic ties) and 
exogenous to the dependent variable (farmer’s choice of a trading partner). In this regard, the 
study used a dummy variable ‘switched to another buyer’ as an instrument. Respondents were 
asked whether they had only one buyer over the last two years or had switched to different 
buyers. This instrument is relevant in this context because social ties can make switching 
costs high and may lock-in trading partners in the relationship. A farmer’s answer to this 
question does not necessarily depend on the identity of a trading partner and thus can be 
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reasonably assumed exogenous to the probability of choice (the farmer’s decision to trade 
through middlemen or sell to direct buyers). The study tested the strength of the instrument 
statistically. However, the standard stata command for probit models ‘ivprobit’ fits only when 
the endogenous variables are continuous, but not appropriate for discrete endogenous 
variables. As a result, this study used a linear probability model (provided in stata command 
‘ivreg2’) to assess the strength of the instrument (Nichols, 2011; Rivers and Vuong, 1988). 
Furthermore, this study is more interested in to test the weak instruments, which is a property 
of the first stage; thus assuming a linear probability model does not pose much problem 
(Nichols, 2011). The diagnostics tests based on ívreg2’ are reported below Table 4.2. The 
underidentification test (an LM test) shows that the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e., the 
excluded instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable and the model is identified). 
Also, the weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) shows that the instrument 
is sufficiently strong. 
 
Table 4.2 Estimates of the probit model (1=selling through middlemen; 0= selling directly to 
buyers) 
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Er. 
Age of the household head (in years) 0.019* 0.011 
Male headed household  0.534 0.394 
Family size  -0.011 0.021 
Education in school years (head) 0.075*** 0.029 
Total livestock units -0.079*** 0.021 
Presence of a mobile phone 0.16 0.191 
Presence of a horse or donkey cart -0.1 0.188 
Type of variety  0.168 0.168 
Membership in a Cooperative 0.212 0.163 
Distance from potato farm to main road -0.067 0.042 
Household head has ethnic ties with the main 
middleman or buyer (instrumented) 0.65*** 0.161 
Farmer is from Shashemene district  -0.242 0.285 
Farmer is from Shiraro district 0.707** 0.301 
Potato cultivated area in 2006 (ha) -0.224** 0.111 
_cons -0.702 0.619 
Wald chi2(12) 62  
Pseudo R2 0.24  
Observations 345  
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):                                           17.603 
                                                                                                    Chi-sq(1) P-val  =             0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                                                   17.743 
 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):                                                   0.000 
                                                                                                   (equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                                                                           5.605 
                                                                                                        Chi-sq(1) P-val  =           0.0179 
Instrumented:     ethnic ties 
Excluded instruments: not switched to new buyers  
* p < 0.1; **  p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Another suspect for endogeneity is volume of production. It is likely that a farmers’ decision 
to trade through middlemen or sell to direct buyers depends on the volume of production (or 
quantity to be sold), which is approximated by potato area.  Following Rivers and Vuong 
(1988) and Hernández et al. (2007), the study used the potato area cultivated in 2006 
production season (lagged variable) as a proxy to volume to avoid a potential endogeneity 
problem related to the current period (2010).  
 
The variable membership in a cooperative is less likely to be endogenous as cooperatives in 
the study area provide only general services (not market outlets for the potato crop), and 
membership is exogenous in which all farmers have equal chance to participate. Regarding 
the variables related to access to a mobile phone and number of livestock units, it could be 
argued that a farmer’s choice of a trading partner has led to accumulate wealth to buy these 
assets. However, this is remote as wealth accumulation also depends on several other factors 
(e.g., saving, expenditure, etc.), and potato is only one of the several agricultural practices 
generating family income (e.g., sale of other crops, cattle, etc.). Farmer’s decision to grow a 
specific variety is also exogenous to a farmer’s choice of a trading partner because most of 
the farmers grow more or less the same variety and sell to similar (or same) buyers. The 
remaining variables are related to location, individual or household’s characteristics and thus 
there is no reason to suspect the problem of endogeneity.  
 
The estimated probit model also satisfied the balancing property specified by Becker and 
Ichino (2002). Against the expectation, older (but only marginally) and educated farmers rely 
on middlemen rather than selling to direct buyers. Perhaps, older farmers appear to minimize 
the risk of searching for a buyer in the absence of intermediation. Likewise, for educated 
farmers, the opportunity cost of searching for a buyer appears to be high. For instance, 
educated farmers are more likely to engage in community leadership position such as in 
cooperatives and local administrative units. Also, the result showed that farmers with large 
livestock units are less likely to use middlemen. It appears that large livestock units would 
give farmers some insurance against any downside price risk in the event that they are unable 
to get a buyer. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between those farmers 
having a donkey or horse cart and the choice of trading partner. This perhaps could relate to 
the nature of potato sales arrangement in the study area. It was observed that the majority of 
farmers sell their potatoes at farmgate in which the buyers take responsibility in arranging 
transportation. Likewise, family size showed no significant relationship with the probability 
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of choice. This might be because harvesting of potatoes is usually carried out by buyers’ 
hired labor force due to quality related concerns. That is, traders hire daily laborers who can 
harvest and then load potatoes in a truck in the same day so that potatoes can be delivered 
fresh to the market in Addis Ababa and other major cities in the country. Variety type was 
used in the estimation as a proxy for difference in quality. However, there is limited 
variability between farmers who sell through middlemen or to direct buyers; both groups of 
farmers mostly supply the main commercial local variety ‘Nechi Ababa’. Nonetheless, lagged 
potato area is significantly correlated with a farmer’s choice of a trading partner. Thus, a 
farmer with high volume of production appears to prefer to sell to direct buyers rather than 
selling through middlemen. This could be because the study area is known for potato 
production and thus buyers normally would go to the area every harvest season. Thus, large-
scale farmers are more likely to attract direct buyers because of economies of scale.  
 
Ethnic ties has a significant relationship in the choice of trading partner. Thus, farmers who 
have ethnic ties with the main middleman are more likely to use middlemen in their trading 
relation than those farmers who are not ethnically tied. Likewise, district dummy related to 
Shiraro shows a significant and positive relationship with the use of middlemen. Thus, a 
farmer from Shiraro district has a higher chance of using middlemen than a farmer from 
Shala district, ceteris paribus. This makes sense because Shiraro is approximately located 60 
km far from Shashemene, which is the main trade hub of (ware) potatoes, and 25 km far from 
Shala district. On the other hand, distance to main road did not have a significant effect on 
farmers’ use of a trading partner, both groups of farmers had potato farms located close to the 
main road. Likewise, membership in a cooperative and the household head being male did 
not significantly affect farmers’ choice of a trading partner. Particularly, the study would 
have expected cooperative membership to be negatively correlated with the use of middlemen 
because members are assumed to have better access to information and market. This, perhaps, 
could be due to the ineffectiveness of cooperatives in Ethiopia for improving smallholders’ 
commercialization (Bernard et al., 2008; Ruben and Heras, 2012). Also, having a mobile 
phone did not have a significant effect in farmers’ decision to use middlemen. This may 
indicate that access to price information is not necessarily the main reason in smallholders’ 
choice of a trading partner. The results showed that there is limited variability regarding 
access to a mobile phone between the two groups of farmers. 
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4.4.3 Average treatment effect on the treated  
 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is reported using the radius matching 
algorithm. The ATT is computed based on gross income per hectare of potato land as this 
study could not obtain detailed production cost data from each farmer. Nonetheless, the cost 
structure of individual farmers is not expected to vary much. They all use family labor, apply 
fertilizer, use the same local variety, Nechi Abeba, particularly for commercial purpose, and 
harvesting, loading, and transporting is usually carried out by buyers’ own hired labor force. 
Furthermore, the study controlled for location-specific variables regarding access to market, 
family size for labor related costs, and potato variety for quality related costs. 
 
 In the following, the quality of the matching is discussed before interpreting the results. First, 
the common support assumption needs to be checked, following Abebaw and Haile (2013). 
Accordingly, the predicted propensity scores for the whole sample range between 0 and 
0.996, with a mean score of 0.687 (SD=0.013), while the predicted propensity scores for the 
treated and comparison groups range from 0.023 to 0.996, with a mean of 0.775 (SD=0.17), 
and 0 to 0.96, with a mean score of 0.496 (SD=0.26), respectively. Thus, there is enough 
evidence to believe that the common support condition is satisfied. Observations which fall 
outside of the region [0.023, 0.96] are dropped (18 from the treatment group and 0 from the 
control group) from the analysis. Figure 1 presents the region of common support. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of propensity scores 
 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
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Table 4.3 Matching quality indicators before and after matching 
Matching 
estimator 
Pseudo-R2  LR2 of probit model Observatio
n retained 
Mean standardized 
bias 
Total %  
|bias| 
reduction Before  After Before  After  Before After  
Radius matching         
Caliper = 0.05 0.24 0.01 103 (p=00) 3.7(p=0.99) 327 19.3 3.0 84 
Nearest neighbor         
Two neighbor 0.24 0.01 103 (p=00) 5.9(p=0.96) 327 19.3 4.7 76 
Kernel matching         
Bandwidth =0.02  0.32 0.01 103 (p=00) 4.2(p=0.99) 327 19.3 4.1 79 
Notes: Estimations for the propensity score, covariate imbalance testing and the common support graphing for 
the different types of matching estimators were performed  by using the program psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2012) provided by stata 12.0 software.  
 
As can be observed from Table 4.3, the overall mean standardized bias was reduced from 
19.3% before matching, to 3 to 4.7% after matching, with a total bias reduction of 76 to 84%.  
Similarly, the p-values of the likelihood ratio test that show joint significance of covariates 
was rejected after matching, whereas the pseudo-R2 was reduced from 0.24 to 0.01. Also, 
comparison of individual covariates after (radius) matching shows that the balancing 
condition is satisfied9. This shows that users and non-users of middlemen services are not 
statistically different on the observable characteristics after matching. According to 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), the balancing condition is successful if it results in a bias less 
than 20% for all covariates (Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4 Test of matching quality after matching 
 Variable Treated Control % bias p-Value after matching 
Age of household head (in years) 37.2 38.0 -8.2 0.40 
Male headed household  0.98 0.97 3.4 0.66 
Family size  9.73 9.87 -2.7 0.77 
Education (in school years)  5.72 5.44 8.1 0.42 
Total livestock units  5.15 5.48 -1.6 0.49 
Presence of a mobile phone 0.68 0.71 -5.3 0.57 
Presence of a horse/donkey cart 0.42 0.38 8.8 0.35 
Variety type 0.67 0.71 -7.7 0.41 
Membership in a Cooperative 0.56 0.56 1.4 0.89 
Distance from potato farm to main road (in km) 1.04 0.86 9.7 0.29 
Household head has ethnic ties with the main 
middleman or buyer  0.55 0.54 1.4 0.89 
Farmer is from Shashemene district  0.67 0.65 4.9 0.61 
Farmer is from Shiraro district 0.21 0.23 -4.7 0.65 
Farmer is from Shala district 0.11 0.12 -1.3 0.88 
Potato cultivated area in 2006 (ha) 1.06 1.08 -1.4 0.87 
 
 
 
9 The balancing condition is also satisfied for the other matching algorithms, but is not reported because of 
space.  
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The impact of using middlemen on farmers’ income 
 
A comparison of gross income10 between farmers who used middlemen and those who sold 
to direct buyers shows that the latter have earned on average 3,484 birr (277 US$) more, 
which is equivalent to 39%, income per hectare in the year 2009/2010 (Table 4.5). One may 
argue that farmers selling to direct buyers incur additional costs such as to search for a buyer. 
However, the region where this study was conducted is known for potato production. Hence, 
buyers go to this area every harvest season, and in most cases harvesting is carried out by 
buyers. Furthermore, many of the farmers have built relationships with buyers and have 
access to a mobile phone, which makes it easier to search for a buyer. Yet, it could be 
possible that potato traders do not want to put at risk their relationship with middlemen for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, direct buying may not guarantee sufficient supply and thus may put 
the traders in a low competitive position as most of the trade is commissioned by other 
traders.  Secondly, as middlemen tend to favor traders when negotiating with farmers about 
prices, buying through middlemen is the optimal choice for potato traders.  
 
Table 4.5 Average treatment effect for the treated based on radius matching (caliper =0.05) 
Variable Farmers selling 
through  middlemen  
Farmers selling to 
direct buyers 
ATT SEa 
Gross income per hectare from potato 
sales  in 2009/2010 (in birrb) 
8,793 12,277 -3,484** 1,748 
Off- farm income (including from sale of 
livestock) in 2009/2010 (in birr) 
2,137 5,110 -2,973 2,052 
a  Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. * p < 0.1; **  p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
b 1US$ was approximately equal to 12.60 birr in 2009/2010. 
 
As reported in Table 4.5, farmers appear to be economically better off in the absence of 
middlemen. The study also noted that middlemen are highly involved in the potato market, 
but not so much in the market for other crops, at least in the study area. This may be 
explained by the perishability of potato which gives a room for opportunistic behavior 
(Masten, 2000). Unlike other crops, ware (consumption) potato is difficult to store as farmers 
do not have the technology to do so, and potatoes are bulky to transport. With regard to off-
farm income, the average income for the comparison group exceeds the treatment group by 
10 Gross income per hectare was computed based on farmers’ response to the question that how much cash they 
received (net of transportation costs) from sale of potato produced in previous season. Then the total cash 
income was divided by the potato area during the same year. For comparison purpose, potato cash income per 
unit of area was converted into gross income per hectare. The term gross is used because the study did not 
account for the cost of production. 
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2973 birr (236 US$) in the same period. This also implies that farmers that sell to direct 
buyers are relatively earn higher income than those farmers using middlemen. This is indeed 
not surprising as the farmers that sell to direct buyers also have high number of livestock 
units as reported in Table 4.1. 
 
In the estimates, the study accounted for the difference in area coverage by comparing only 
income per hectare rather than total income. The difference in income per hectare between 
the treated and the comparison group could be attributed to one or more of the following 
factors. First, intermediation may favor traders; thus the price received by farmers could be 
lower than in the absence of middlemen. This scenario is likely to happen because 
middlemen normally receive commission from traders (not from sellers); thus, middlemen 
have the incentive to set a price lower than the market price in order to negotiate higher 
commission from traders. Second, the study accounted for the difference in potato quality by 
controlling only the type of variety grown. Nonetheless, farm management practices can have 
a significant effect on quality. Thus, it is possible that those farmers who put low efforts on 
farm management practices (and thus produce low quality potatoes) could choose to sell 
through middlemen. However, this is unlikely as the middlemen do not want to risk their 
relationship with traders by selling low quality potatoes. Third, selling through middlemen 
could be indeed inefficient. This is a plausible scenario because potatoes are largely delivered 
to the wet market in which only observable characteristics such as tuber size, color, and 
physical damage of potatoes determine quality. This implies that the use of middlemen in the 
trading relationship for the purpose of verifying quality is not efficient. According to Li 
(1998), if information on verifying quality is not severe, the presence of middlemen in trade 
is inefficient. Thus, by using their services farmers directly or indirectly receive low net 
price. To substantiate this view, the study gathered additional data regarding the services 
farmers receive from middlemen. As can be observed in Table 4.6, middlemen in effect 
provide limited quality enhancing services. 
  
Table 4.6 The type of services provided by middlemen (based on farmers’ response) 
Type of services  % yes  (n=236) 
Credit 3.8 
Training 2.5 
Inputs 0 
Storage services 0 
Transportation services 3.8 
Guarantee against cheating 26.7 
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The question then is why farmers still continue to sell through middlemen as they would be 
economically better off in the absence of middlemen. As shown in Table 4.6, middlemen 
offer (or arrange) almost no credit, training, inputs (e.g., fertilizer), storage, or transportation 
services. Furthermore, for potato farmers in the study area, searching for price information or 
a buyer has become less important nowadays than before due to the availability of mobile 
phones. The study showed that 65% of sampled farmers had access to a mobile phone. This 
finding suggests that the use of middlemen is mainly motivated by other factors than seeking 
for market information. In view of this, ethnic ties appears to explain better than economic 
incentives in smallholders’ choice of a trading partner. While 74% of the farmers that sold 
potatoes through middlemen had ethnic ties with the main middleman, only 31% of farmers 
in the comparison group maintained ethnic ties with the main potato buyer. The finding is 
consistent with that of Ali and Peerlings (2011) who argued that the negative effects of closed 
social networks exceed that of the positive effects, such as the reduction of transaction costs. 
Ethnically tied relationships can lead individuals to cooperate according to social norms even 
if this is against their own self-interest (Fehr et al., 1997; Hoffman et al., 1998). Sometimes a 
person who is closer could be more vulnerable than that of a stranger. Granovetter (1985) 
argues that although social relations may lay a necessary condition for trust and trustworthy 
behavior, such trust may present enhanced opportunities for ‘malfeasance’. Furthermore, 
social ties can restrict business exchanges to few agents who can manipulate the exchange 
process, for instance, by controlling information on prices and markets (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005).  
 
The results do not lend support to the findings of Gabre-Madhin (2001) that middlemen 
constitute a socially optimal choice. However, the present study differs in at least two ways. 
First, Gabre-Madhin (2001) focuses on the role of middlemen from the traders’ perspective. 
Thus, it could be possible that middlemen may minimize traders search time but still use 
asymmetric power relationship against farmers. Second, the study was carried out in the grain 
market in which perishability is less a problem compared to ware potatoes. Thus, it is 
possible that middlemen may behave differently depending on the market in which they 
operate. Nonetheless, the results reinforce the claim that the use of middlemen becomes more 
significant when buyers and sellers are unknown to each other or in periodic markets with 
extremely limited infrastructure. 
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Sensitivity of the ATT result 
 
As part of the sensitivity analysis, the study reports the ATT based on alternative matching 
algorithms (Table 4.7). These analyses were carried out with the imposition of common 
support, bootstrapped standard errors of 500 replications.  The implementation of the 
common support has resulted in exclusion of 18 potato farmers. The gross income per hectare 
is similar in the three estimators11, confirming the robustness of the estimates to different 
matching algorithms.  
 
Robustness of the ATT estimate for hidden bias 
 
The choice of matching algorithm is not robust against ‘hidden bias', and thus the study uses 
the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) to determine how strongly an 
unobservable variable would have influenced the outcome.  The Rosenbaum bound is 
reported in Appendix 4.1. As shown in Appendix 4.1, the null hypothesis that the outcome 
variable is related to unobservable covariates is rejected. Thus, the presumption that only 
observable covariates significantly affect farmers’ decision to use middlemen is plausible. 
 
Table 4.7 Robustness of ATT results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: significant levels are based on bootstrapped t-values (standard errors are reported in brackets). 
 * p < 0.1; **  p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
11 The study also estimated using variants of each of the estimators, and the results are consistent. Results are 
not report here for brevity. 
12 Because of the less number of farmers in the control group, matching was performed ‘with replacement’. 
Thus, it was possible to maintain reasonably high observations in the region of common support for the different 
estimators. 
Matching algorithms   Observation 
retained12 
ATT on gross income 
(birr per hectare) 
Matching 
condition 
Radius matching (with replacement)    
       Calliper = 0.01 305 4,122** (1,878) Satisfied  
       Calliper =0.03 327 4,103** (2,014) Satisfied  
       Calliper = 0.05 327 -3,484** (1,748) Satisfied  
Nearest neighbour (with replacement)    
        Neighbour = 1 - - Not satisfied  
        Neighbour = 2 327 -3,930** (2,007) Satisfied  
        Neighbour = 3 327 3,443* (1,867) Satisfied  
Kernel matching (with replacement)    
        Bandwidth =0.01 327 -4,187** (2,070) Satisfied  
        Bandwidth =0.02 327 -3,896**(1,957) Satisfied  
        Bandwidth =0.05 327 -3,225* (1,694) Satisfied  
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
Middlemen continue to play a major role in many value chains. Most theoretical and 
empirical work on middlemen highlights the positive role of intermediaries in facilitating 
trade by decreasing transaction costs related to search time and information. However, 
following the recent trends in food value chains toward quality and safety requirements and 
some theoretical (Hackett, 1992; Masters, 2008) and empirical work (e.g., Minten et al., 
2010), the study hypothesized that middlemen as an institution might be ill-suited to deal 
with new challenges in the modern economy. To test this hypothesis, the study investigated 
the factors leading to the reliance on middlemen by smallholder farmers, and the impact of 
using this institution on farmers’ income (and the implication on intensifying smallholders’ 
commercialization). In this respect, the potato market in the Rift Valley region of Ethiopia 
provides rich evidence as the institution of middlemen is highly prevalent in potato 
marketing.  
 
The results show that age, education, volume of production, number of livestock units, 
location (a proxy for access to market), and ethnic ties significantly affect farmers’ decision 
to use (or not) the institution of middleman when selling potatoes. To estimate the economic 
impact of trading through middlemen, the study controlled for self-selection bias using the 
propensity score matching. The findings showed that the use of middlemen in the potato 
market is inefficient from the welfare perspective of smallholder potato farmers. Income per 
hectare from potato sales was lower by 39% for farmers who relied on middlemen compared 
to farmers who sold to direct buyers. Sensitivity analyses have shown that the results are 
plausible to make causal interpretations.  
 
The study also investigated why smallholder potato farmers still use middlemen when in fact 
doing so may be economically inefficient. The explanation relates to ethnic ties, which result 
in lock-in and thus prevent smallholders from using other types of institutional arrangements. 
By analyzing the factors leading to farmers’ reliance on the institution of middleman in the 
potato trade and the impact of such relationship on economic performance, this study 
contributes to the broader body of literature on the impact of social networks on the economic 
performance of smallholder farmers (Ali and Peerlings, 2011; Fafchamps, 2000; Fafchamps 
and Minten, 1999; Moore, 1997; Nooteboom, 2007). The study suggests that middlemen 
prevent the emergence of other forms of institutional arrangements, such as formal contracts 
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or preferred seller-buyer relationships, which could better intensify smallholders’ 
commercialization in remunerative and quality oriented markets. 
 
The study also provides relevant policy implications. First, it is apparent that the institution of 
middleman arises as an informal way of structuring exchange and economizing on transaction 
costs. However, this institution may also limit competition in trading relations. Similar to 
middlemen in the fishing industry in Mexico (Pedroza, 2013), middlemen in the potato sector 
appear to constitute a ‘hidden population’ as they choose to work unnoticed by the formal 
authorities. The problem with this type of trading relationships is the presence of considerable 
ambiguity about the nature of their activities (Feige, 1990), and the (potential) negative effect 
of this relationship on economic performance. Thus, a policy measure is suggested to closely 
monitor the activities of middlemen in their relationship with smallholders. One area of 
intervention could be through introducing a more transparent pricing system in the value 
chain. At the moment, farmers do not exactly know how the price they receive is determined 
by the actual buyers. Second, most of the middlemen are self-employed people with low 
opportunity cost of labor. Thus, this study suggests a policy measure not attempting to avoid 
this institution but rather providing assistance to help them perform their activities in a more 
transparent and responsible manner. Transparency in contractual relationships between 
farmers, middlemen, and traders can promote competition and improve smallholders’ 
welfare. Third, the increasing demand for high quality and safety requirement of the modern 
market calls for a more integrated contractual relationship such as preferred buyer-seller or 
contract farming arrangements. In this regard, middlemen prevent the emergence of such 
institutional arrangements, for instance, by misinforming smallholder farmers through their 
social networks. Thus, educating farmers (for example, through development agents) about 
the potential benefits of integrated market chains is crucial to intensify smallholders’ 
commercialization in high value markets.     
 
Finally, the study notes some possible limitations, particularly, in relation to the cross-
sectional nature of the data. The research is based on gross income. This assumes that the cost 
structure of individual farmers is similar. Although this seems plausible in the existing 
condition of the potato market and the relatively low opportunity cost of labor at the 
smallholders’ level in the study area, the results could still be different if farmers selling to 
direct buyers incur additional costs (e.g. search costs), and the opportunity costs of labor for 
110 
 
Are middlemen facilitators or barriers to improve smallholders’ commercialization? 
 
these farmers are relatively high. The results of this study could still suffer from unobservable 
covariates. For instance, farmers’ use of middlemen and profitability may be affected by 
entrepreneurship traits which the study only attempted to capture by using age and education 
level. Future research may also benefit from a quantitative analysis of the effect of 
middlemen on the income of potato traders.  
 
Appendix 4.1 Sensitivity results of Rosenbaum bounds for gross income per hectare  
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0 0 -4225 -4225 -5114 -3262 
1.1 0 0 -4510 -3937 -5386 -2972 
1.2 0 0 -4758 -3669 -5634 -2664 
1.3 0 0 -4988 -3426 -5880 -2396 
1.4 0 0 -5198 -3173 -6077 -2141 
1.5 0 0 -5381 -2977 -6293 -1916 
1.6 0 0 -5561 -2754 -6492 -1673 
1.7 0 0 -5737 -2566 -6658 -1448 
1.8 0 0 -5902 -2376 -6822 -1223 
1.9 0 0 -6040 -2195 -6963 -1034 
2 0 0 -6179 -2035 -7122 -808 
2.1 0 0 -6324 -1880 -7264 -620 
2.2 0 0.01 -6455 -1709 -7392 -440 
2.3 0 0.01 -6577 -1566 -7528 -250 
2.4 0 0.02 -6692 -1410 -7654 -88 
2.5 0 0.03 -6800 -1261 -7754 81 
2.6 0 0.05 -6895 -1132 -7857 252 
2.7 0 0.07 -6992 -1002 -7964 428 
2.8 0 0.11 -7087 -854 -8078 590 
2.9 0 0.14 -7190 -718 -8203 724 
3 0 0.19 -7278 -607 -8297 883 
Note: gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors; sig+   - upper bound significance 
level;  sig-   - lower bound significance level;  t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges Lehmann point estimate; t-hat-  - 
lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate; CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .95); CI-    - lower 
bound confidence interval (a=  .95). 
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Contract farming configuration: Smallholders’ 
preferences for contract design attributes 
 
 
This chapter is based on the article that has been published as ‘Abebe, G.K., Bijman, J., 
Kemp, R., Omta, O. and Tsegaye, A., 2013. Contract farming configuration: Smallholders’ 
preferences for contract design attributes. Food Policy 40, 14-24’. 
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 5. Contract farming configuration: Smallholders’ preferences for contract design 
attributes 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Participation in global markets calls for greater integration in agrifood value chains to 
respond to the quality and safety requirements of international customers. Contract farming 
(CF) has been claimed to have a positive impact on local economies by improving the 
welfare of rural households (e.g., Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2010; Bijman, 2008; Grosh, 
1994; Reardon et al., 2009a; Singh, 2002). However, CF also remains a much debated 
institutional arrangement (e.g., Key and McBride, 2003; Key and Runsten, 1999; Oya, 2012; 
Singh, 2002). Discussion on CF mainly revolves around recurrent issues, such as the role of 
private-led CF schemes in addressing market failures (Grosh, 1994) and in reducing the risk 
of agribusiness firms with regard to production, land expropriation, and labor (Herath and 
Weersink, 2009), and emerging issues, such as agri-food globalization, private standards, and 
land grabbing (Oya, 2012). Analyses of CF often use a political economy perspective, an 
institutional economics perspective, or a combination of both.  
 
In the political economy view, CF is seen from the lens of unequal power relations, conflict, 
and labor related issues (Little and Watts, 1994; Wilson, 1986).The main concern is that CF 
can lead farmers into problems such as loss of autonomy, increased production risk, and 
indebtedness (Little and Watts, 1994; Porter and PhillipsHoward, 1997; Rehber, 1998; Singh, 
2002). 
 
Conversely, the institutional economics view emphasizes the role of CF in addressing market 
failures (e.g., Barrett, 2008; Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius, 
2002; Minten et al., 2009; Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007). More specifically, this literature 
focuses on the micro-functioning of CF schemes, dealing with transaction costs resulting 
from uncertainty, risk, market imperfections, and coordination failures.  
 
Empirical studies in developing countries provide varied analyses about participation and 
welfare effect of CF. Several authors found that participation improves farmers’ income (e.g., 
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Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012; Warning and Key, 2002), although the extent to which 
participation contributes to the welfare of smallholders continues to be a methodological 
question (Barrett et al., 2012). Evidence is mixed, however, concerning inclusion. While 
Warning and Key (2002), in Senegal, Miyata et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2011), in China, 
found no evidence of exclusion of smallholders from participation, others, such as Singh 
(2002), in India, Guo et al. (2005), in China, and (Key and Runsten, 1999), in Latin America, 
reported the opposite. The literature also documents several problems affecting CF 
performance: high default rate, biased terms, delayed payments, cheating, and lack of 
compensation for crop failure (Guo et al., 2005; Singh, 2002). Furthermore, Barrett et al. 
(2012) reported cases of high participation turnover due to lack of commitment to honor 
agreements by either party. 
 
A general conclusion from the literature is that CF improves income. Even those who are 
critical of CF schemes generally agree that participation improves household income (Little, 
1994; Singh, 2002). Indeed, farmers will only participate in CF if there is an expected gain in 
doing so (Bellemare, 2012). Likewise, firms will choose CF when the expected benefits from 
contracting exceed those of the alternatives, such as buying on a spot market or producing on 
proprietary farms. 
 
One question the existing literature does not address is about farmers’ preferences for 
particular contract terms and provisions. While the main motivation of smallholders to enter 
into CF is the resolution of market failure, a closer look at participation decisions may 
disclose how different contract provisions are evaluated. Eventually, smallholders’ contract 
acceptance can be improved by better aligning contract terms and provisions with farmers’ 
preferences (Minten et al., 2009).  
 
This Chapter addresses the following research question: 
 
 RQ4: Which contract attributes do motivate smallholders to participate in a contract 
farming scheme? 
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This study argues that contract terms and conditions, hereafter called contract design 
attributes, can affect farmers’ decisions to participate in CF by varyingly affecting their 
expected level of utility from participation. In theory, contracting parties choose a contract 
design that provides little incentive to opportunism. However, in practice, contracts are 
biased toward agribusiness firms and often expose smallholders to ex post risk (Singh, 2002), 
because firms choose contract design attributes that will offer them the highest payoffs 
without considering farmers’ expected utility level (Barrett et al., 2012). Masakure and 
Henson (2005) noted that contracts involving smallholders are rarely governed by explicit 
performance and risk-sharing incentives. Hence, the likelihood that a contract design is 
attractive to smallholders remains uncertain. For the firm, this could lead to high transaction 
and coordination costs due to possible side-selling, default, and underinvestment (Delpierre, 
2009; Miyata et al., 2009). 
 
In reviewing the CF literature, the study noted several gaps. First, although many authors 
discussed the importance of contract design attributes, surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to measure the relative importance of these attributes directly from farmers’ perspective. 
The study builds on Masakure and Henson (2005), who explicitly focused on ex ante aspects 
of smallholder’ motivation toward CF. While these authors asked farmers about their 
motivation to enter into CF, the study goes a step further by using an experimental approach 
to elicit their preferences on contract design attributes. For example, while the authors 
reported oral contracts as the preferred contract form by the buyer firm, they did not 
investigate whether this option was also preferred by the farmers. Second, there is a general 
assumption in the literature that farmers are risk averse, and that their motivation to 
participate in CF is primarily to manage output price risks (Chavas and Holt, 1996; 
Michelson et al., 2011). Subsequently, agribusiness firms tend to design contracts with pre-
fixed price, quantity, and quality specifications. However, contract design is a complex 
process involving many trade-offs (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002), and farmers may have 
different risk preferences for the different markets in which they operate. Third, previous 
studies on CF heavily focused on the income and broader welfare effects, as well on 
individual-specific characteristics, as key determinants for participation. Yet, the effect of 
different contract design attributes on smallholders’ contract choice has not received much 
attention. 
 
117 
 
Chapter 5 
 
The main objective of the present study is to explore the relative importance of different 
contract design attributes that could differentially affect the motivation of smallholders to 
participate in a CF scheme. Better information on farmers’ preferences can be used by 
agribusiness firms to design better contracts as well as by policy makers in developing an 
enabling institutional environment. 
 
The study fits the framework developed by Barrett et al. (2012), where participation decision 
is conceptualized as a sequence of four stages: firm choice of procurement location; firm 
contract offer; smallholder contract acceptance; and firm and smallholders’ decisions to 
honor the contract. In this framework, the fourth stage (contract compliance) is the outcome 
of the preceding stages, which reflect the attractiveness of the contract offer and the 
likelihood of the offer being accepted by farmers. Hence, the study is, in effect, an attempt to 
understand the preferences of farmers toward a contract offer ex ante, and can be considered 
as a first order condition for causality studies such as Bellemare (2012) and Barrett et al. 
(2012).  
 
To achieve this objective, the study combined a literature review to define contract design 
attributes, an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method to identify the most important 
contract design attributes, and a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit individual 
preferences. Choice-based approaches are relatively new to the CF literature.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a literature review 
and the conceptual framework. Section 5.3 presents data and methods, followed by section 
5.4, where it presents the empirical results and discussion. Finally, section 5.5 provides the 
conclusions.  
 
5.2 Literature review and conceptual framework 
 
The objectives of this literature review are to explore the factors leading to CF, understand 
agricultural contract functions and concepts, and identify contract design attributes that could 
motivate smallholders to participate in CF. The study does not aim to provide a full literature 
review of the determinants and the effects of CF; readers are advised to read the overview by 
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Little and Watts (1994), Kirsten and Sartorius (2002), Bijman (2008) or, more recently, 
Barrett et al. (2012). 
 
5.2.1 Market imperfections and transaction costs – antecedents for participation in CF 
 
Contracting between farmers and their buying firms can be conceptualized as a specific form 
of governance structure. According to transaction cost economics (TCE), governance 
structures are institutional arrangements that have evolved (or have been chosen) in order to 
prevent or reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). Although the TCE literature usually 
emphasizes asset specificity as the main source of transaction cost, in agricultural 
transactions, uncertainty is the most common determinant of governance structure (Masten, 
2000). Agricultural transactions involve high uncertainty because products are perishable and 
harvested seasonally. When farm products are delivered to the processing industry, 
transactions involve high coordination costs because of aligning production, harvesting, 
collection, and processing. In developing countries, which are often characterized by high 
market failures, smallholders are exposed to additional risk and uncertainty (Delgado, 1999; 
Key and Runsten, 1999; Poole et al., 1998; Poulton et al., 2010). Production risks are not only 
resulting from uncontrollable factors such as weather conditions, the quantity and quality of 
output is also affected by the environmental uncertainty related to failing input markets (e.g., 
unavailability of fertilizer at crucial moments in the growth cycle of the plant). In addition, 
farmers face price uncertainty due to high fluctuations in demand, and technological 
uncertainty due to insufficient assistance for using new crop varieties or inputs (Smale et al., 
1994). By entering in a CF scheme, smallholders have the opportunity to engage in the 
production of a remunerative crop, a production that otherwise would entail high 
uncertainties that present prohibitive risks. 
 
From the perspective of the agribusiness firm, CF can be an attractive governance structure as 
it allows reducing the transaction costs related to procurement risks. Particularly for 
companies processing agricultural products, uniform quality and consistency of supply is of 
crucial importance (Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007; Vermeulen et al., 2008). For preferred 
suppliers of fresh produce to supermarkets, CF schemes can reduce their risk of sourcing 
products that have the proper certificates, indicating the products have been produced under 
the strict quality requirements of the (foreign) retailer (Jaffe et al., 2011). 
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Transactions involving seed potatoes  
 
The transaction this study has been analyzing is the production of seed potatoes by 
smallholder farmers and the sale of seed potatoes to a trading company. This trading 
company, in turn, sells seed potatoes to domestic and (mostly) foreign ware potato growers. 
The production of seed potatoes is more risky than most other crops, for several reasons. 
First, seed potato production requires intensive cultivation practices like selecting the 
appropriate planting date and harvesting date, frequency of tillage, fertilizer application at the 
right moment in plant growth cycle, frequency of fungicide application, and storage (Hirpa et 
al., 2012). There are several trade-offs in crop management practices. For instance, focusing 
too much on yield growth may not lead to proper tuber size (as demanded by the buyer). This 
is even more challenging as tuber size is not easy for farmers to observe on a daily basis. 
Second, seed potato production is costly as it requires large amount of planting material per 
unit of land (Batt, 2003). Third, potato is a seasonal product and rather perishable. This 
requires a timely coordination to minimize the loss of value during the process of harvesting, 
storage, distribution and marketing. 
 
The complex nature of seed potato production may therefore expose smallholders to direct 
transaction costs, such as searching and selecting of the right quality seed and other inputs, 
and indirect transaction costs resulting from missing input markets or the failure to identify 
appropriate trading partners. In addition, seed potato production requires specific investment 
in human capital, due to the specificity of crop management practices. Thus, the high cost of 
seeds, the need for specific inputs, the special skills needed, and the limited market 
opportunities of the harvested product all call for an institutional arrangement that sufficiently 
reduces direct and indirect transaction costs, while maintaining the incentive structure for 
individual farmers. Such hybrid governance structure can be the CF scheme.  
 
While TCE literature seeks to forecast or explain the incidence of particular governance 
structure (as the outcome of an economizing process), this study is more interested in the 
details of the contractual arrangement and how the different contract attributes can 
accommodate particular risks. The main functions of agricultural contracts include 
minimizing of coordination and transaction costs, providing incentives (including penalties), 
and sharing of risks (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002; Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999). To 
realize these functions, a contract design may incorporate several instruments, such as risk-
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sharing mechanisms, incentive schemes, contract menus, repeated contracting and 
renegotiation options, and simplified and transparent contract terms (Bogetoft and Olesen, 
2002). 
 
In a CF scheme, the main contract design problem of the firm relate to the quality and price 
of the product; the sufficiency of supply; the necessary inputs; and the coordination of 
production, harvesting and delivery (Key and Runsten, 1999). Often the firm’s solution to 
this problem is to define profit maximizing contract terms assuming that the farmer will 
accept and honor them. However, contract design is a multi-criteria decision problem 
involving trade-offs (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002) and, hence, should also include the 
incentive considerations and risk-bearing capacities of smallholders (Lajili et al., 1997). 
 
Table 5.1 shows the relationship between contract design concepts, functions, and attributes. 
While contract design attributes can be considered as factors that affect smallholders’ 
motivation to participate in CF, they can also be conceptualized as instruments that are used 
by a firm to achieve coordination, motivation, and transaction cost minimization objectives.  
 
Table 5.1 Contract design concepts, functions, and attributes 
Contract design 
concepts 
Contract 
functions 
Contract design 
attributes 
Coordination Coordination of production, 
harvesting,  and processing/marketing; 
allocation of  risks  
 
Form of contract; product quality specification, seed 
quality specification, quality control mechanism, 
place of quality inspection; input supply 
arrangement, technical assistance, transportation, and 
credit  
   
Motivation  Provide proper incentives for effort 
and investment; reduce opportunism 
and renegotiation, allocation of value; 
continuity 
Price option, form of contract, quantity, and contract 
duration; product quality specification, and quality 
control mechanism; specification of who bears what 
risk 
   
Transaction 
costs 
Reduce direct and indirect cost of 
contracting;  increase transparency  
Form of contract; product quality specification; 
sanctions; conflict resolution procedure 
 
5.2.2 Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework explains how farmers choose CF to reduce uncertainty, and how 
different contract design attributes could varyingly affect their motivation to participate in 
CF. In order to understand smallholders’ motivation toward CF, the study first proposes 12 
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contract design attributes that were adapted from Masakure and Henson (2005). Using a 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), they reported 11 attributes that varyingly influenced 
smallholders’ choice to participate in CF in the context of a high-value fresh produce exports. 
The study used a choice-based research design, which requires respondents to choose among 
alternatives rather than to rank or rate them (Chang et al., 2012). A choice task that involves 
more than six attributes is not recommended (Green and Srinivasan, 1990), as this tends to 
confuse respondents (Sawtooth Software, 2008). Thus, the study had to limit the contract 
design attributes to six. To do so, the study carried out a pilot study among 20 seed potato 
farmers, 60% of them had experience in CF. The results were analyzed using the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) method. AHP has been used in several applications of multi-criteria 
decision making (Ghodsypour and O'brien, 1998), and evaluates a set of alternatives in a 
hierarchical structure. 
 
Table 5.2 Pilot study results (n=20) 
Source of uncertaintya  Contract design attributes Mean score b 
Output market uncertainty  Price option 0.369 
Form of contract 0.359 
Contract duration 0.149 
Contract quantity 0.123 
   
Quality uncertainty  Seed quality specification 0.479 
Product quality specification 0.217 
Quality control mechanism 0.182 
Place of quality inspection 0.122 
   
Input market uncertainty Input supply arrangement 0.361 
Technical assistance 0.269 
Transportation arrangement 0.250 
Credit arrangement 0.121 
a  Based on Masakure and Henson (2005);  b Figures in bold correspond to the attributes used in the DCE 
 
Table 5.2 details the relative importance of different contract design attributes. The farmers 
evaluated every pair of contract design attributes using a pairwise comparison matrix 
(Sinuany-Stern et al., 2000). In the pairwise comparison, two contract design attributes from 
each of the three sources of uncertainty were shown on either side of a 9-point scale, where 1 
shows both contract design attributes are equally important and 9 represents that one of the 
contract design attributes is extremely preferred over the other. Subsequently, farmers 
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evaluated a total of 18 judgments13 (pairwise comparisons). The AHP uses the eigenvector 
method to yield priorities for criteria and for elements by criteria, and then synthesizes the 
priorities of the elements by criteria into composite measures to arrive at a set of ratings for 
the elements (Sinuany-Stern et al., 2000); the best alternative is the one with the highest rate.  
 
Concerning output market uncertainty, farmers considered price option and form of contract 
more important than contract duration and quantity. As to quality uncertainty, seed and 
product quality specifications were more important than quality control mechanism and place 
of quality inspection. Regarding input market uncertainty, farmers considered input supply 
arrangement and technical assistance more important than transportation and credit 
arrangements. The six highest weighted contract design attributes (Table 5.2, mean scores in 
bold) are used in the conceptual framework; they will be discussed individually below. 
 
Price option 
 
Price volatility is one source of uncertainty that may affect smallholders’ participation 
decision in CF. Different price options may entail different risks and rewards (Hueth and 
Ligon, 1999). Price option refers to the payment conditions farmers accept in exchange for 
delivering an agreed product quality and quantity. The common price options are fixed, 
variable, or formula (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002; Miayata et al., 2009). For simplicity, the 
study focuses on fixed and variable price options. 
 
If a contract specifies a fixed payment ex ante, farmers only bear the production risk while 
the firm takes all the market risk. By accepting a lower expected price, farmers, in effect, 
agree to pay a risk premium. Indeed, a fixed price option increases the firm’s risk exposure. 
However, the firm can employ different risk management tools that are not available for 
farmers. Conversely, if farmers consider a fixed price option unattractive, the firm can use a 
variable price option. This strategy may reduce moral hazard problems, by making both 
parties residual claimants, but may increase farmers’ price risk exposure (Wolf et al., 2001). 
Since this study is to be conducted with seed potato farmers, the variable price option is 
disaggregated into size-based and yield-based.  
 
13 The number of pairwise comparison is given by n(n-1)/2; where n is a matrix of contract design attributes in each of the 
three sources of uncertainty, which is  3[4(4 − 1)/2].   
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Obviously, there are trade-offs in choosing one price option over another. While choosing a 
fixed price option provides farmers insurance against downside price risks, this option would 
disfavor them when the ex post spot market price by far exceeds the price agreed in the 
contract. Based on evidence from several empirical studies (Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 
2009; Tripathi et al., 2005), farmers are expected to prefer a fixed price option over a variable 
one, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, seed potato production that targets a specific tuber size 
increases the intensity of crop management practices. Hence, farmers are expected to prefer 
the yield-based over the size-based price option, ceteris paribus. 
 
Form of contract 
 
Allocation of risks and rewards could be affected by the form of the contract, which can be 
written or oral (Barrett et al., 2012). A written contract specifies detailed roles and 
responsibilities, procedures for monitoring, and penalties for performance non-compliance 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Although a written contract could provide better enforcement 
possibilities, it remains incomplete (Williamson, 1979). In an oral contract, reputation and 
repeated interactions are the main enforcement mechanisms (Wolf et al., 2001). Levin (2003) 
argues that oral contracts can substitute written contracts by promoting trust in the 
relationship, providing the incentive to pay promised compensation, and giving the parties the 
option to walk away.  
 
Due to limited prior exposure to working with agribusiness firms, farmers are expected to 
prefer the coordination and motivation provisions of a contract to be specified in a written 
form over an oral form, ceteris paribus.  
 
 Seed quality specification   
 
Seed quality uncertainty shows the systematic link between input and output markets; i.e., it 
implies that specific inputs are necessary to get definite output quality (Little and Watts, 
1994; Scott, 1985). From the farmers’ perspective, seed sourced from anonymous suppliers 
may lack quality and could expose them to production risk, such as yield, and price risk, due 
to poor output quality. CF can reduce seed quality uncertainty if the buyer firm is supplying 
seed as part of the contract. Seed quality specification becomes more important when output 
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quality is difficult to measure (Goodhue, 2011). By supplying seed of a known quality, a part 
of the quality risk will be reduced, both for farmers and the buyer firm. 
 
From the above discussion, two seed quality specification options can be considered: seed 
sourced from the buyer firm or from another supplier. When seed is sourced from the buyer 
firm, quality (and supply) of the seed is assured, but farmers are bound to sell the output only 
to the buyer firm (Henson et al., 2005). Conversely, when seed is sourced from another 
supplier, the quality of the seed is not guaranteed because the other supplier may have an 
incentive to cheat. Moreover, the market for good quality seed may not be accessible for 
farmers.  
 
The trade-off for the farmers would be whether to use buyer firm supplied seed that could be 
overpriced because the firm may have monopoly power in supplying the seed but reduces the 
risk of low quality seed, or to buy seed from other suppliers, at a lower price but take the risk 
of low quality seed. Because the implication of seed quality for both production and price risk 
is high, farmers are expected to prefer the buyer firm despite concerns for higher seed costs, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Product quality specification 
 
Quality uncertainty is one source of risk in agricultural transactions (Wolf et al., 2001). The 
desire for high (specific) quality attributes increases the firm’s willingness to engage in CF 
(Goodhue, 2011; Henson et al., 2005). Likewise, searching for buyers and getting to know 
their quality requirements is difficult in an imperfect market environment. Hence, CF is 
expected to reduce farmers’ quality uncertainty because the quality demand of the buyer firm 
will be known ex ante. Accordingly, two contract options can be considered: minimum 
quality for all deliveries or provisions for variable quality.  
 
Minimum quality for all deliveries refers to cases where farmers receive the same payment 
per unit by virtue of meeting a pre-specified minimum quality level. Consequently, farmers 
assume the risk of product rejection without receiving a premium for an above average 
quality. This option entails a low price risk related to an imperfect quality measurement by 
the buyer, as there will be a single standard to measure quality. A firm that targets a single 
channel may find this option appropriate. In contrast, a firm having differentiated markets 
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may accept or even prefer different quality levels. Because payment depends on performance, 
this arrangement may stimulate farmers to deliver a high quality product. However, this 
option requires several quality measurement criteria. Consequently, the cost of measuring 
quality is expected to be high and may expose farmers to additional price risk (Hueth and 
Ligon, 1999). For instance, a farmer who has delivered a high quality product, after investing 
in quality improvements, could still receive a low price due to a measurement error by the 
buyer firm. 
 
Generally, the choice for farmers is between a fixed quality option, which offers little 
incentive for improving quality and holds the risk of complete rejection, and a variable 
quality option, which may expose them to downside price risk because of a quality 
measurement error. However, in a CF scheme, the risk of incorrectly measuring quality tends 
to be more frequent than the risk of complete rejection, and thus farmers are expected to 
prefer a fixed quality contract over a variable one, ceteris paribus. 
 
Input supply arrangement   
 
In an imperfect input market, farmers may have limited access to specialized inputs. In order 
to access such inputs, farmers may consider to participate in CF. This may give the firm a 
monopoly power over the provision of specialized inputs and a monopsony power in the 
product market (Key and Runsten, 1999). To avoid becoming fully dependent on the buyer 
firm, farmers may opt to source key inputs from a third party. However, provision by public 
agencies is often less efficient and effective (Dorward et al., 2004), which could endanger the 
CF relation between the buyer firm and smallholders. 
 
Input supply, therefore, could be arranged by the buyer firm, the government, or an NGO. 
When inputs are supplied by the buyer firm, the firm has the advantage of controlling the 
quality of inputs and key crop management practices (Wolf et al., 2001). Alternatively, when 
inputs are supplied by the government or by an NGO, the firm can allocate its resources to 
other activities and can avoid the risk of credit default and collection costs. The pros and cons 
of this type of public-private partnerships are increasingly discussed in the literature (Boselie 
et al., 2003; Harou and Walker, 2010, cited in Barrett et al., 2012; Poulton and Macartney, 
2012). 
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Given the trade-off in each arrangement, farmers are expected to prefer the buyer firm to 
supply the inputs despite concerns that the firm could overcharge for these inputs, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Technical assistance   
 
Similar to the input supply arrangement, the need to access information (on technology, 
timing, and quality, see Key and Runsten, 1999) may motivate farmers toward CF. Access to 
new production techniques not only helps farmers to improve production and market 
performance of the contracted crop, it can also have a positive spillover effect on other crops 
(Masakure and Henson, 2005; Minten et al., 2009). Technical assistance can be arranged in 
different ways. The buyer firm could provide all the required technical assistance. While this 
type of arrangement may allow farmers to get technical assistance and research-based 
information, the buyer firm could overcharge farmers for this service. Alternatively, 
government or NGO extension agents could provide technical assistance. However, they may 
be less effective in providing contract-specific technical assistance. 
 
Given the above considerations, farmers are expected to prefer the buyer firm to provide 
technical assistance despite concerns that the firm may overprice the services, ceteris paribus.  
 
Table 5.3 Summary of the conceptual framework  
Categories Contract attributes    Attribute levels 
Output market 
uncertainty  
Price option 1 A fixed  price, for all deliveries  
2 Variable price, depending on yield 
3 Variable price, depending on tuber size 
   
Form of contract 1 No written contract   
2 Written contract   
    
Quality 
uncertainty 
 
 
Product quality specification 
1 Minimum quality requirements for all deliveries 
2 Variable quality is accepted, with variable price  
Seed quality specification 1 Seed supplied by buyer firm 
2 Seed purchased from another supplier   
    
 Input market 
uncertainty Input supply arrangement 
1 Provision of inputs by the buyer firm 
2 Provision of inputs by the government  
3 Provision of inputs by an NGO 
   
Technical assistance  
1 Provision of technical assistance by the buyer firm 
2 Provision of technical assistance by the government  
3 Provision of technical assistance by an NGO 
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In sum, the conceptual framework highlights the trade-offs farmers encounter in evaluating 
different sets of contract design attributes. Table 5.3 summarizes the conceptual framework 
discussed before. 
 
5.3 Data and methods 
 
5.3.1 Study context and description of the data 
 
Ethiopia is endowed with good agro-ecological zones (cool highlands) for the production of 
relatively disease free and high quality seed potatoes. Although some improved varieties 
exist, which were released by the state research institutes, the uptake for such varieties is very 
low (Hirpa et al., 2012), because adaptation of these varieties to local conditions is low and 
seed supply systems are poorly developed. 
 
Following the 2005 Agriculture Development Led Industrialization policy, the country has 
attracted many foreign firms. As of 2009, the government had either granted or promised to 
grant around three million hectares of land to foreign investors (Weissleder, 2009). As this 
practice has been scrutinized by activists and international NGOs (Li, 2011; Oya, 2012), CF 
has become increasingly attractive for foreign firms. Although the government considers CF 
as a suitable policy instrument to integrate farmers into agricultural value chains (Minot, 
2011), participation continues to be low, with many problems of non-compliance and side-
selling (Getaneh and Bekabil, 2008).  
 
In 2006, a foreign-owned agribusiness firm started a CF scheme to produce seed potatoes for 
the export market. West Shewa Zone, one of the areas selected for this purpose, has a 
population of over two million, with an average family size of 4.8 and an average farm size 
of 1.4 ha (Deininger, 2003). Farmers in the area grow several crops in addition to potatoes. 
However, participation to the CF scheme was limited to farmers who had agricultural land 
along the irrigation canal, which was built by the local government. The foreign-owned firm 
provided different seed varieties, which were all imported, and other inputs to the contracted 
farmers. Furthermore, the firm assigned personnel to provide technical assistance and to 
monitor farm management practices.  
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The experiment was conducted between September and November 2011. Half of the 
respondents were purposely selected because of their experience in growing seed potatoes 
under a CF scheme. But the other half were randomly selected from the land ownership 
register. From those who did not participate before, 82% of them indicated their intention to 
participate in the next season. This helped us to attain the maximum level of realism to 
conduct the experiment.  
 
The questionnaire contained three parts: open questions, socio-economic data, and the DCE. 
The open questions were meant to understand respondents’ perception about CF. 
Accordingly, 98% of farmers responded that participation could bring some benefits, such as 
improved income, access to key inputs and technical assistance. However, 68% of 
participated and 38% of non-participated respondents expressed their concerns about CF, 
which included possible disagreement on contract terms, lack of trust in the relationship, and 
low contract price.  
 
Regarding the socio-economic variables, it was expected that some individual and household 
level characteristics affect the probability of choice. Therefore, the study collected data on 
age, education level, sex, farm size, experience in potato farming and contract farming, 
access to irrigation, and distance from the main road (Table 5.4).  
 
5.3.2  Discrete choice experiments 
 
Choice experiments are based on the Lancaster’s (1966) theory of consumer choice, where 
individuals derive utility from the different characteristics a good possesses, and McFadden’s 
(1974) random utility theory, providing the econometric rationale of choice experiments. 
Following Lancaster (1966), attributes have been defined as characteristics of a good. 
However, recent studies have extended this concept to include aspects of policy design 
(Colombo et al., 2005), agro-environmental scheme design (Ruto and Garrod, 2009), 
community forestry design (Gelo and Koch, 2012), and land use management contract design 
(Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012). 
 
Discrete choices experiments (DCE) are used when a choice problem involves two or more 
discrete alternatives. Among the discrete choice models, logit is the most widely used model 
(Train, 2003). In this model, the random term is assumed to be independently and identically 
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distributed as type 1 extreme value distribution; i.e., the model takes the assumption that 
unobserved factors are uncorrelated over alternatives and have the same variance for all 
alternatives. In this study, DCE is used to construct alternatives that are defined in terms of 
contract design attributes and the levels these attributes could take.  
 
5.3.3 Empirical model specification 
 
The model developed in this study considers the contract design attributes (levels) shown in 
Table 5.3, which are assumed to deliver a certain level of utility to the potato farmers when 
participating in a CF scheme. 
 
While the multinomial logit model is the widely used functional form in DCE, it does not 
accommodate preference heterogeneity within choice data and does not allow each 
respondent to respond to multiple choice sets (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; McFadden, 
1974). A conditional logit model is appropriate when the choice among alternatives is 
modeled as a function of the characteristics of the alternatives rather than the characteristics 
of the individual making the choice. This makes the conditional logit model appropriate for 
estimating behavioral models. 
 
The model specification follows Train (2003). In a sample consisting of N respondents with 
choice of J unordered alternatives on T choice tasks, the indirect utility that an individual 
farmer n drives from choosing alternative j on a choice task t from a finite set of J alternatives 
is given by 
 
 𝑉𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑛 + 𝛾𝑗𝑧𝑛+𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                                         (1) 
 
where 𝑉𝑛𝑗𝑡 stands for the value (utility) of alternative j to individual n on choice task t,  𝛼𝑗𝑛  is 
the alternative-specific intercept, 𝛾𝑗 captures preference heterogeneity related to individual-
specific characteristics, 𝑧𝑛 is a vector of individual-specific variables for individual n, 𝛽𝑛 
captures systematic preference heterogeneity related to contract design attributes, xnjt is a 
matrix of contract design attributes specific to alternative j, and εnjt is a matrix of a random 
term to account for the aspects of utility that the researcher does not observe. 
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Eq. (1) presents a general model that allows estimating alternative-specific effects (Gelo and 
Koch, 2011). First, the study employs a pure conditional logit model by restricting 𝛾𝑗 = 𝛾 and 
𝛼𝑗𝑛 = 𝛼  to model individual choices solely as a function of the characteristics of the 
alternatives. That is, assuming that  𝛽𝑛 = 𝛽 and the error term is independently and 
identically distributed as type 1 extreme value and independent across alternatives, the logit 
choice probabilities can be derived by the following conditional logit model 
  Pnit = exp (βxnit+α+γhn)∑ exp (βJj=1 xnjt+α+γhn)                                                                                                    (2)        
 
where 𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡 be the probability of individual n choosing alternative i on choice task t among J 
alternatives. In the conditional logit model (Eq. 2), the explanatory variables x assume 
different values in each alternative at each choice set. However, the impact of a unit of x is 
usually assumed to be constant across alternatives, giving only a single coefficient estimate 
for each x variable. Hence, the impact of a variable on the choice probabilities derives from 
the difference in the value of the characteristics across alternatives.  
 
Second, the study relaxes the assumption and includes socio-economic factors; that is, the 
conditional logit model given in Eq. (3) separates explanatory variables into alternative-
specific attributes of the choices, such as contract design attributes, and characteristics of the 
individual, such as age, sex, and education. This implies that the effect of individual-specific 
variables would be different for each alternative as indicated in Eq. (1). Thus, the alternative-
specific conditional logit model probability is given by 
  Pnit = exp (βnxnit+αin+γizn)∑ exp (Jj=1 βnXnjt+αjn+γjzn)                                                                                                (3)        
 
5.3.4 Experimental Design 
 
DCE are used in this study to estimate the effect of different contract design attributes on the 
attractiveness of a contract. How well a discrete choice experiment performs partly depends 
on the options used in the choice experiment, and how the options are grouped into choice 
sets (Street et al., 2005). The AHP results (Table 5.2) provided a narrow range of contract 
design attributes and levels that the study then used to create choice sets using the Sawtooth 
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Software. The study tested the experimentally generated questionnaire for the clarity of 
choice sets. The final questionnaire consisted of three versions, which vary in the order and 
type of choice sets. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of the three versions to 
make sure that the order of the choice sets does not affect respondents’ preferences and to get 
more variation in the preferred choices. 
 
Regarding the sample selection, the strategy was to include all the 72 farmers that already had 
a contract and the same number from the pool of non-contracted farmers. For the latter, 120 
farmers were randomly selected from the land ownership register and continued the 
experiment until 72 farmers. Thus, a total of 144 respondents were selected, and each 
respondent was given 15 experimentally generated choice tasks, each contained two cards. 
Each card was described by one of the levels of the six contract design attributes. Hence, 
respondents were asked to evaluate their preferred set of contract design attributes in 15 
different choice tasks, making it a panel of 2160 choice tasks and 4320 observations. The 
alternatives were constructed in a way that respondents had to make trade-offs to avoid any 
dominant choice tasks, in which one alternative is strictly superior to the other. During the 
experiment, the principal investigator explained respondents about each choice task before 
moving to the next task to ensure that they understood the trade-offs between profiles. 
 
Scanning through Table 5.4, the descriptive statistics for participated and non-participated 
farmers are similar with the exception of access to irrigation. This is not surprising as the firm 
contracted with farmers that can produce seed potatoes during the off-rainy season. 
 
Table 5.4. Household and individual characteristics of sample farmers 
  Participated 
before (n=72) 
Not participated before 
(n=72) 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age (year) 39.7 14.3 39.2 11.9 
Education (school year) 5.9 3.8 5.9 3.2 
Experience in agriculture (year) 18.3 12.3 18.6 11.3 
Farm size (ha) 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.2 
Distance from farm to main road (km) 2.7 1.9 2.3 1.3 
Respondent being male (%)  81.9  94 
Intention to participate in the next season (% yes)  80.6  82 
Access to irrigation  (% yes)  100  29 
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5.4 Results and discussion 
 
Table 5.5 presents the estimated utility function parameters of the conditional logit model 
(clogit) and the alternative-specific conditional logit (asclogit) model.  
 
Table 5.5 Estimations of the clogit and asclogit models  
Variablea clogit  asclogit 
 Coef. (std. err.) Odds ratio  Coef. (std. err.) Odds ratio 
Oral contract 
(Written contract ) 
-3.01*** 
(0.16) 
0.05  -2.15*** 
(0.14) 
0.12 
Minimum quality for all deliveries 
(Variable quality specification) 
-0.87*** 
(0.13) 
0.42  -0.64*** 
(0.09) 
0.53 
Seed from buyer 
(Seed from other supplier)  
1.62*** 
(0.12) 
5.06  1.02*** 
(0.08) 
2.77 
Fixed price 
(Size-based price) 
-0.29*** 
(0.11) 
0.75  -0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.72 
Variable price (yield-based) 
(Size-based variable price) 
0.28*** 
(0.15) 
1.32  0.57*** 
(0.14) 
1.77 
Inputs by buyer 
(Inputs by an NGO) 
1.16*** 
(0.11) 
3.18  0.89*** 
(0.12) 
2.44 
Inputs by the government 
(Inputs by an NGO) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
1.04  0.06 
(0.11) 
1.06 
Technical assistance by the buyer 
(Technical assistance by an NGO) 
0.84*** 
(0.10) 
2.32  0.61*** 
(0.10) 
1.85 
Technical assistance by the government 
(Technical assistance by an NGO) 
 
0.19* 
(0.10) 
1.20  0.20** 
(0.09) 
1.22 
Sex    -0.06 
(0.20) 
 
Age (ln) -   -0.28 
(0.33) 
 
Farm size (ln) -   -0.12 
(0.09) 
 
Experience in agriculture (ln) -   0.02 
(0.17) 
 
Education -   -0.02 
(0.06) 
 
Prior experience in CF -   0.06 
(0.14) 
 
Access to irrigation    0.07 
(0.13) 
 
Distance from the main road in km -   -0.02  
(0.04) 
 
Constant -   0.87 
(0.94) 
 
Respondents  144   144  
Observations 4320   4320  
Log likelihood -1718.89   -833.51  
* P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01; (robust) standard errors are given in parentheses; VIF, uncentered, 1.75. a Note: variables in 
brackets are the base alternatives. A variance estimator was applied to allow intragroup correlation (Baum et al., 2011). 
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5.4.1 Estimations of the conditional logit model 
 
Referring to Table 5.5, with the exception of price option and product quality specification, 
all the other variables showed expected signs. With regard to contract form, the probability 
that farmers choose the base alternative written contract is 95%; that is, if a firm attempts to 
switch from a written contract to an oral contract, the odds of being chosen by farmers is only 
5%, ceteris paribus. As to the input supply and technical assistance, the buyer firm is more 
likely to be chosen than the base alternative NGO; other things being equal, if a contract 
specifies input supply and technical assistance from the buyer firm, the odds of being chosen 
by farmers is 3.2 and 2.3 times higher than the base alternative NGO, in that order. In 
addition, the probability that farmers choose technical assistance by government agents is 
55% compared to the base alternative NGO. Similarly, seed sourced from the buyer firm is 5 
times more preferred than seed sourced from elsewhere, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a 
fixed quality specification is less likely to be chosen than a variable quality specification. 
Thus, if the firm opts for a fixed quality specification, the odds of being chosen by the 
farmers will be 25% less than the odds of farmers choosing the base alternative size-based 
price option. However, the probability that farmers choose a yield-based price option is 57%, 
compared to the alternative size-based price option; that is, if a firm switches its pricing 
strategy from a size-based to a yield-based one, the odds of choosing the latter is 32% higher 
than the odds of choosing the former. The relatively higher preference toward the yield-based 
price option over the size-based was expected due to the high rejection risk in the latter. 
 
5.4.2. Comparing estimations of the clogit model and asclogit model 
 
Table 5.5 also provides a comparison of parameter estimation based on the conditional logit 
model and the alternative specific conditional model. In general, the sign and significant level 
of the choice-specific variables are the same in both models. However, in the alternative 
specific conditional logit model (1) the significance level of technical assistance by the 
government has increased; (2) the odds of choosing oral contract, fixed quality specification, 
and yield-based price option have all increased; and (3) the odds of choosing seed source, 
inputs, and technical assistance from the buyer firm have all decreased. Overall, the log 
likelihood has improved. This is expected as the inclusion of individual specific-variables is 
likely to improve the estimations of the conditional logit model (Train, 2003). However, the 
coefficients of the individual-specific variables were not statistically significant, implying 
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that the individual-specific variables included in the model did not systematically affect the 
probability of choice.14 
 
5.2.1 Discussion  
 
Smallholders producing seed potatoes in Ethiopia prefer a variable price contract. This result 
seems to contradict the common assumption  that smallholders in developing countries are 
risk averse (Fafchamps, 1992), as well as the empirical findings of Miyata et al. (2009), 
Minten et al. (2009), Tripathi et al. (2005), and Bielza et al. (2007). The findings suggest that 
a pricing strategy contingent on certain performance criteria is more preferred than a fixed 
price. The results correspond to the findings of Wang et al. (2011) who reported 
smallholders’ preference for a floating price. 
 
Inconsistency of findings across cases may suggest that motivational differences vary 
depending on institutional settings. In the study area, a formula price was used by the firm, 
which was based on the price of ware potatoes at the nearby local market and the yield and 
size of seed potatoes. However, failure to meet the specified tuber size entails a significant 
loss for farmers; they receive only 25% of the price for ware potatoes at the local market.  
 
There are several reasons why risk averse farmers may still opt for a variable price. First, 
farmers are suspicious that fixed prices will also be low prices. Thus, farmers appear to 
perceive that contracts not only hold low prices because of the ‘insurance premium’ they pay 
to the buyer, but also lead to underpayment because once farmer are locked into the contract 
the buyer can take advantage of the asymmetric power relationship. Second, farmers seem to 
believe that they can outperform fellow farmers. As principal investigator in the experiment, 
the first author observed that farmers were optimistic about their chances of meeting the 
quality requirements set by the buyer firm. This suggests that the fixed price option may 
penalize farmers who have entrepreneurial skills (as has been argued by Rehber, 1998). 
Third, earlier studies have documented trends of escalating food prices in Ethiopia (Alem and 
Söderbom, 2012), and have shown that the agricultural commodity market is characterized by 
speculative behavior (Tadesse and Guttormsen, 2010).  It was also learned from farmers that 
14 The study re-estimated the asclogit model with only ‘irrigation’ and with only ‘experience in agriculture’, 
together with the contract design attributes; nonetheless, the model yielded no significant difference from the 
results reported in Table 5. This implies that access to irrigation and experience in agriculture did not have 
influence on the choice of contract design attributes. 
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the price of potatoes had been on the rise, which could be another factor in their decision 
toward a variable price.  
 
Farmers’ preference for a written contract could have at least two explanations. First, in a thin 
market environment, farmers need a guaranteed market for their product before they actually 
invest in production (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). A written contract could better serve this 
purpose than an oral contract as the former details the coordination and motivation aspects of 
a contract ex ante which could be used to resolve conflicts ex post. Second, a trust-based 
relationship is established primarily through repeated transactions (Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999). Since agribusiness firms generally work in areas where they have not previously been 
operating, local farmers may not trust them (Guo et al., 2005; Singh, 2002). As a result, 
farmers may seek all contract provisions to be specified in a written form. Consistent with the 
result, Harou and Walker (2010, cited in Barrett et al., 2012) reported Ghanaian farmers’ 
regret for accepting oral contracts from agribusiness firms. In the study area, the agribusiness 
firm used a written contract. 
 
The preference for seed supplied by the buyer firm is also consistent with the risk averse 
attitude of farmers in the input market; i.e., the buyer firm is considered more reliable than 
any other source. This was expected as seed quality has a substantial effect on yield and price 
risk (Scott, 1984). Being the residual claimant of the contract, the firm has an incentive to 
supply good quality seeds. Furthermore, seed sourced from the buyer firm can facilitate risk 
sharing when producing a crop with specific attributes. All contracted farmers in the study 
area used firm-supplied seed. 
 
The results on product quality specification show that farmers generally prefer a variable 
quality scheme rather than a fixed one. This implies farmers’ willingness to accept a price 
risk that is due to a possible quality measurement problem. This result could at least relate to 
two factors. First, although the pricing scale adopted could still penalize them, a variable 
quality specification contract appears to be understood by farmers as a way to avoid the 
major risk that not all produce will be purchased. Second, as discussed above, farmers seem 
to believe that they can deliver an above average quality product. The implication for 
agribusiness firms is that a differentiation marketing strategy may be necessary to induce 
contracted farmers to deliver a high quality product. The practice in the study area was 
mixed; while the agribusiness firm used a fixed size-based output quality specification, the 
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yield-based one was variable. This practice seems to confirm the first point. During the 
experiment, it was learned from farmers about the difficulty of managing tuber size, which 
was also the main source of conflict between the farmers and the agribusiness firm. While the 
firm put a severe penalty for growing oversized potatoes, farmers preferred to sell the 
oversized seed potatoes in the alternative market as consumption (ware) potatoes because the 
price they could receive by selling in this market was much higher than what they would 
receive from the firm, which was only 25% of the local price. In contrast, when the farmers 
produced seed potatoes within the acceptable size range, they had a strong incentive to sell to 
the firm as the price they could receive from the firm was much higher than what they could 
get by selling in the local market.  
 
With regard to input supply arrangement, the result confirms the risk averse attitude of 
farmers in the input market. This finding is in line with most of the literature, which 
concludes that input markets in developing countries are missing or imperfect (Fafchamps, 
1992; Key and Runsten, 1999). Although public sector intervention is justified when markets 
fail, it is often ineffective due to unreliable delivery schemes and political interferences 
(Dorward et al., 2004; Poulton and Macartney, 2012). Moreover, growing non-traditional 
crops, such as tomato, seed potatoes, and other vegetables, uses large amounts of pesticides 
and fertilizer compared to traditional and staple crops (Singh, 2002). Hence, it could be 
convenient and efficient for smallholders to receive inputs from the buyer firm. In the study 
area, contracted farmers used firm-supplied inputs.  
 
Similar to the input supply arrangement, farmers prefer the buyer firm over the state or NGOs 
in receiving technical assistance. This result was expected as private firms are generally 
considered more trustful and effective than public agencies in delivering timely extension 
services (Bellemare, 2010; Umali-Deininger, 1997). However, when the buyer firm is unable 
to offer technical assistance, farmers prefer government agencies over NGOs. This result 
shows an apparent tension between farmers’ preferences and NGOs practices. The focus of 
NGOs is often on resource-poor households in addressing technology gaps left by the state 
(Farrington, 1993; 1995; Umali-Deininger, 1997). Furthermore, the work of NGOs often 
lacks consistency due to the multiple roles they play: partly responding to government failure, 
partly addressing market failure, and partly engaging in advocacy (Bebbington, 1996). As a 
result, smallholders may not consider NGOs as a reliable source of technical support in CF 
schemes. In the study area, smallholders have had experiences with several NGOs. 
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In general, farmers’ choice of contract design attributes appears to be in line with the 
predictions of the transaction costs economics theory. Thus, farmers’ choice of written 
contract over oral form, variable over fixed quality specification, and firm-supplied seed, 
inputs, and technical assistance over other sources of supply are all motivated by 
transactional risks related to uncertainty about buyer behavior, price risks, and missing 
markets. Likewise, farmers’ choice of variable price over fixed price is related to the 
incentive regime.  
 
Regarding the reliability of the estimations in Table 5, the uncentered vif test result shows 
1.75 on average, implying no concern of multicollinearity. Also, the likelihood ratio test for 
the asclogit model shows no significance difference between the restricted model, with only 
contract design attributes, and the unconstrained model, with all the variables.15  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
Contract farming (CF) is becoming increasingly important in developing countries, partly 
because of domestic and foreign supermarkets requiring sophisticated value chains, partly 
because of the growing use of quality certificates and corporate social responsibility 
guarantees by downstream customers (Henson et al., 2005; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). 
Recent discussions in the general CF literature mainly focus on smallholders’ participation, 
contractual relations, and on how to measure the welfare impact of CF. With the objective of 
providing insights that can help to improve existing and future CF schemes, this study has 
explored smallholders’ motivation for participation. The study hypothesized that farmers’ 
motivation to participate in CF largely depends on the nature of the contract design attributes. 
The study tested this hypothesis by applying the DCE method, which followed a literature 
review and an AHP approach.  
 
15 Hausman McFadden test for the independence of irrelevant of alternatives (IIA) assumption is not possible in 
our study as each respondent had to face two mutually exclusive alternatives (e.g., fixed versus variable price, 
written versus no written contract, etc.). To test the IIA assumption, at least three alternatives are needed to test 
that the inclusion of a third alternative should not change the odds ratio of the other pairs of choices. One 
possibility was to include a no-choice option in the design. However, this did not seem realistic in our study as it 
provides no information on the impact of attributes on a choice set (Enneking et al., 2007), and the tendency to 
choose the no-option is highly likely (Dhar, 1997).  
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The study shows that smallholders are generally positive about the prospect of CF to improve 
their livelihood, although the majority of them suspect contracts to favor agribusiness firms. 
In terms of motivation, this study shows that farmers’ willingness to participate in CF 
increases if a contract design has the following attributes: a written form; inputs, technical 
assistance, and seed supplied by the buyer firm; and variable output quality and variable price 
options. 
 
The study provides several contributions to the literature. First, the study shows that input 
market uncertainty is more important than output market uncertainty in smallholders’ 
decision to participate in CF. In the input market, farmers consider CF as a mechanism of 
risk-sharing to reduce input supply and seed quality uncertainty. In the output market, 
farmers appear to be worried about the risk of underpayment by the firm once they are locked 
into a fixed-price contract. They tend to prevent this type of risk by opting for a variable 
quality specification and a variable output price. The significance of this result for CF 
schemes includes the following. From the behavior of smallholders in the output market, it 
can be concluded that fear of underpayment by the firm as well as factors outside of 
contractual relations such as institutional factors (e.g., rising food prices) and individual 
factors (e.g., entrepreneurial attitude of farmers) are most important. These factors, as a 
result, tend to discourage farmers from participation because CF limits smallholders’ freedom 
to make autonomous decisions. Conversely, in the input market, smallholders seem to have 
been constrained by several problems, such as the unavailability of (quality) inputs, the lack 
of information on where to get and how to use them, and the lack of access to credit for 
buying these inputs. The conditions in the input market, therefore, tend to encourage farmers 
toward participation in CF. Furthermore, the findings imply that the attractiveness of a CF 
scheme partly depends on the strength of the institutional environment in solving input 
market constraints, and partly on the willingness of agribusiness firms to choose a pricing 
strategy based on variable prices.  
 
Second, the study provides a new dimension of analyzing farmers’ decision to participate in 
CF using a multi-category discrete choice model, where the choice of a contract is modeled 
as (1) a set of different contract design attributes, and (2) a combination of contract design 
attributes and individual-specific characteristics. Parameter estimates of the (alternative-
specific) conditional logit model show that contract choice is largely determined by the 
characteristics of the choice sets rather than the characteristics of the farmer making the 
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choice. This implies that heterogeneity in a contract design may not be necessary in a CF 
scheme. 
 
Third, unlike most studies on CF, which have a development economics or political economy 
perspective, the study takes a managerial perspective. The study shows the applicability of 
DCE models to investigate the attractiveness of different contract design attributes in CF 
relations. Knowledge on the preferences of farmers for participation could help agribusiness 
firms to design better contracts that would minimize the problem of side-selling, contract 
non-compliance, and low levels of participation. The findings suggest that an optimal 
contract can be designed through balancing the risk averseness of farmers in the input and 
output market and entrepreneurial desire of farmers in the output market.  
 
The findings have two policy implications. First, smallholders have shown strong motivation 
to receive technical assistance and key agricultural inputs from agribusiness firms. Hence, to 
promote smallholder participation in CF and global value chains, public agencies should 
support agribusiness firms that engage in CF, for instance, by establishing infrastructure, 
facilitating access to credit, and providing other investment incentives. This finding also 
contributes to the discussion on public-private partnership, which emphasizes how 
institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors can best be aligned to 
appropriately allocate resources for development projects (Hodge and Greve, 2009; Poulton 
and Macartney, 2012). Second, the risk averse attitude of smallholders in the input market 
calls for institutional interventions to reduce these risks. One intervention area could be 
strengthening of collective action, such as producer organizations, to supply key agricultural 
inputs to smallholders. This type of intervention may also induce agribusiness firms to offer 
more competitive contracts to smallholders. 
 
Finally, the study raises several issues that deserve further research. First, the study found 
that smallholders are generally risk averse. It would be interesting to know if farmers change 
their risk attitude in different institutional settings and crops. Second, it may be relevant to 
study the perception of agribusiness firms toward contract design attributes that smallholders 
considered more important. Third, it may be important to further explore the applicability of 
DCE models in CF schemes. Fourth, although the results are robust regarding smallholders’ 
choices toward contract design attributes, there could be some bias in the estimates due to a 
potential problem of endogeneity. For instance, the study attempted to capture smallholders’ 
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entrepreneurial attitude using the variable ‘experience in agriculture’. However, this may be a 
poor proxy, and further research may select other variables that could better measure 
entrepreneurship traits. Measuring entrepreneurial attitude is a common problem in the CF 
literature (see Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012). Future research may also focus on 
contract schemes used for potatoes delivered to the wet market, the processing industry, and 
fast food restaurants, because production and transaction characteristics may differ from 
those of seed potatoes. 
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 6.  Discussion and conclusions  
 
This chapter discusses the main findings and provides the main conclusions. Section 6.1 
provides brief answers to the research questions raised in chapter one. General discussion and 
conclusions will be presented in section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses the contribution of the 
thesis to the literature, followed by the practical implications in section 6.4. Finally, section 
6.5 outlines directions for further research. 
   
6.1 Conclusions   
 
Smallholders have constraints to improve quality and access high value markets because of 
several factors such as high transactional risks associated to the nature of the product (e.g., 
perishability, bulkiness, etc.), the market conditions (asymmetric information or power 
relation), and the institutional environment (e.g., lack of appropriate agricultural 
technologies, information, technical assistance, etc.). Within the framework of Co-innovation 
for Quality in African Food Chains (CoQA), the aim of this thesis has been to gain insights 
into the factors affecting smallholders to improve quality and market access by analyzing 
their relationship with upstream and downstream actors and thus to generate information 
relevant for the development of sustainable value chains in the potato sector. More 
specifically, the thesis has aimed to address:  
 
• product or technology related quality alignment problems by analyzing the 
interactions between Ethiopian smallholder farmers and their upstream actors; and  
• value chain related quality alignment problems by analyzing interactions between 
farmers and downstream actors (seller-buyer relationships). 
 
The main focus of the first part of the study has been to examine the factors affecting quality 
alignment related to product quality (e.g., product development and variety choice) and the 
relationships between farmers and downstream actors. This type of analysis is important to 
understand the knowledge/information gap regarding the quality characteristics of potatoes 
demanded by farmers and downstream actors, and the institutional arrangements used to 
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govern contractual relations. Thus, the first part of the present study has addressed the 
following research question. 
 
RQ1: How do farmer and trader preferences for specific quality attributes and coordination 
mechanisms in farmer-trader relationships affect the alignment of quality in the Ethiopian 
potato value chain? 
 
This research question has been answered through two separate but related surveys. 
 
In the initial survey, seven different potato varieties have been identified in a pilot study. Of 
these seven varieties, three are improved varieties (IVs) and four are traditional or local 
varieties (LVs). Based on a literature review and the pilot study, the main quality attributes of 
potatoes have been categorized into production-related (yield, disease resistance, maturity 
period, intensity of crop management, and drought tolerance) and market-related (stew 
quality, cooking quality, tuber size, and tuber color). Then the seven potato varieties were 
presented to farmers to evaluate these varieties regarding the distinguished production- and 
market-related quality attributes. Farmer-based evaluation of the different varieties showed 
that these varieties differ in terms of production- and market-related quality characteristics. 
Furthermore, no one variety has superior quality in both production- and market-related 
quality attributes. This means that farmers’ decision to grow one variety over the other 
involves trade-offs. The study showed that farmers evaluated the IVs to have lower market-
related quality attributes compared to the LVs, while they evaluated the IVs to have better 
production-related quality attributes compared to the LVs, particularly in yield and disease 
resistance. As farmers continue to grow LVs, the study concludes that there is a mismatch or 
misalignment between the focus of the research institutes, mainly on production-related 
quality attributes, and the preferences of the farmers, putting more emphasis on market-
related attributes. 
 
The second survey has extended the scope of the initial survey by including the major 
downstream actors, namely collecting wholesalers, stationed wholesalers, retailers, and hotel 
managers. The main focus of this part of the study has been to analyze contractual relations 
between these actors. Such relationships can affect individual incentives to improve quality, 
as it has been argued by transaction cost economics theory. While some indicators were 
available to signal quality, such as the use of variety name or production region, other quality 
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problems, particularly in the central wet market, such as premature, damaged, and blackened 
tubers remained. Thus, to respond to these quality problems, contractual relationships 
between collecting wholesalers and stationed wholesalers were largely trusted-based, as 
inspecting the quality of a given delivery involves high transaction costs. Likewise, in the 
relationship between farmers and collecting wholesalers, contractual relationships were 
largely carried out at farmgate. Buying potatoes at farmgate appears to have helped collecting 
wholesalers to monitor quality closely. For the farmers, selling potatoes at farmgate tend to 
offer better incentives to improve quality than selling potatoes at the nearest spot market. The 
study found that, in the latter case, farmers face high price risk due to a quality measurement 
problem.  
 
Following the largely explorative approach in the first part of the study, the second part of the 
present study has specifically addressed the factors affecting ware (consumption potato) 
farmers’ decision to adopt the IVs. The study showed that 73% of ware potato farmers did 
not even try the IVs at all. The second part of the study has offered insights into the factors 
leading to the low uptake of the IVs by answering the following research question.  
 
RQ2: How do the agricultural knowledge and innovation system and smallholder farmers’ 
perception of local varieties affect the adoption of improved potato varieties? 
 
This study has distinguished the causes of low adoption by examining the role of the 
agricultural knowledge and innovation system (AKIS) and farmers’ preferences for LVs. 
 
Firstly, to understand the underlying causes of low adoption, the study has included several 
variables related to the AKIS and farmers’ perception of LVs, in addition to the household 
related socio-economic factors found in most adoption studies. The study found that 
frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs, use of main buyer as a source of advice, 
and farmers’ access to credit have an effect on farmers’ adoption decision. In this study, the 
variable ‘use of main buyer as a source of advice’ has been used as a proxy for buyers’ 
preferences for specific varieties. The result showed a negative relationship between buyers’ 
preferences and the likelihood of adopting the IVs. In effect, this finding has confirmed the 
farmer-based evaluation in the first part of the present study in which the IVs were evaluated 
low in market-related quality attributes (e.g., stew quality). However, the other AKIS 
variables such as frequency of use of extension services, technical assistance from research 
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institutes, and farmer organizations and days spent in farmer training centers showed no 
relationship with the farmers’ adoption decision. Furthermore, regarding the intensity of 
adoption, only access to credit was (positively) correlated. In general, the key AKIS 
variables, frequency of use of technical assistance from research and extension services, did 
not have an effect in the farmers’ decision to adopt the IVs.  
 
Secondly, the study has analyzed the relationship between farmers’ perception of the quality 
of the LVs on the adoption of IVs. Understanding this relationship is important because a 
high value attached to the LVs could lead to a low value attached to the IVs, even if they 
have favorable attributes, and thus could affect the adoption of IVs. Prior studies have only 
focused on the relationship of adoption decision and the characteristics of the new technology 
and/or smallholders’ socio–economic characteristics (e.g., Adesina and Baidu-Forson, 1995; 
Feder et al., 1985; Sall et al., 2000). The study showed that farmers’ favorable perceptions of 
the crop management intensity and drought resistance of LVs have a negative effect on the 
adoption of IVs. This means that farmers perceived the IVs to require more crop management 
and to be more susceptible to drought incidents than the LVs. The study found no 
significance relationship between farmers’ perception of LVs regarding disease resistance 
and yield potential and their decision to adopt the IVs. However, the perception of farmers’ 
regarding the market-related quality attributes of the LVs showed a strong negative 
relationship with their decision to adopt the IVs. Thus, farmers’ positive perception regarding 
the market-related quality attributes of LVs has a negative effect on the adoption of IVs.  
 
In addition to the formal institutions such as the AKIS, social networks can affect economic 
exchanges. In this respect, the institution of middleman has been dominant in the potato 
market. The third part of the present study has identified the main factors that affect farmers’ 
decision to trade through middlemen, and the economic impact of such relationship by 
answering the following research question. 
 
RQ3: Which factors do influence farmers’ decision to use middlemen in their trading 
relations, and what is the economic impact of such relationship? 
 
This research question has been answered in two steps.  
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Firstly, the study has conceptualized farmers’ decision to sell through middlemen as a binary 
channel choice decision problem by farm households that try to maximize utility. To this 
effect, the study has included several new variables in addition to those variables found in 
most channel choice studies. The study identified that education, age, number of livestock 
units, volume of production, location, and ethnic ties have a strong relationship with farmers’ 
decision to use middlemen in their trading relations with traders. Education, location (district 
dummy) and ethnic ties showed a strong positive relationship in the farmers’ decision to trade 
through middlemen rather than selling to direct buyers while volume of production and 
number of livestock units showed a strong opposite relationship. The fact that ethnic ties has 
a strong positive relationship with the use of middlemen raises an important question 
regarding the economic outcome of ethnically tied relationships. Following recent trends in 
food supply chains toward quality and safety requirements, middlemen might be ill-suited to 
deal with new challenges of quality improvement. This has led to the second objective of this 
study. 
 
Secondly, to analyze the economic impact of using middlemen in trade relations, the study 
has used a propensity score matching (PSM) technique in which respondents were grouped 
into treatment and control groups. The treatment group included those farmers who reported 
that they used middlemen to sell their potatoes. Likewise, those farmers in the control group 
were the ones who reported that they sold potatoes to direct buyers. The study has used 
several procedures to improve the quality of the estimates and to control any selection bias 
from unobserved covariates. The study showed that farmers who sold to direct buyers had 
earned more income per hectare than their counterparts who sold potatoes through 
middlemen. That means that using the institution of middleman in trade relation seems 
economically inefficient. The study has attributed this result to the (negative) consequences 
of social ties; 74% of farmers in the treatment group had ethnic ties with the main 
middleman, while only 31% of farmers in the control group had ethnic ties with the main 
buyer. The study concludes that farmers’ decision to use middlemen in their trading relation 
is economically inefficient.    
 
While the first three parts of the present study have mainly focused on the ware 
(consumption) potato market, the last part of the study has focused on the seed potato market, 
investigating the details of a specific type of institutional arrangement, namely a contract 
farming scheme. This study has identified different contract design attributes that motivate 
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smallholders to participate in a contract farming scheme by answering the following research 
question.  
 
RQ4: Which contract attributes do motivate smallholders to participate in a contract farming 
scheme? 
 
To answer this question, the study has followed three approaches – a literature review, a pilot 
study, and a survey. The literature review has been carried out to find a menu of contract 
design attributes used elsewhere. The pilot study has been conducted to select the most 
important contract design attributes related to three quality uncertainty levels (output market 
uncertainty, quality uncertainty, and input market uncertainty). Using the analytical hierarchy 
process (AHP) approach, six out of twelve attributes have been selected, two attributes from 
each level of uncertainty. In the third approach, a survey has been used to collect data on 
farmers’ preferences for contract  attributes, the six contract design attributes – namely price 
option, contract form, product quality specification, seed quality specification, input supply 
arrangement, and technical assistance.  
 
By analyzing the survey data using an alternative specific (conditional) logit model, the study 
has identified the main contract design attributes influencing smallholders’ decision to 
participate in a contract farming scheme. Farmers’ showed strong preferences toward a 
variable price option over a fixed price option; a written contract form over an oral form; a 
variable output quality specification over a fixed output quality specification; and seed, 
technical assistance, and inputs supplied by the trading company (buyer firm) rather than 
being supplied by state agencies or NGOs.  
  
6.2 General discussion and conclusions 
 
Following New Institutional Economics (NIE), markets are only one form of institution 
fulfilling economic exchanges and providing coordination functions. Distinguishing 
institutions into the institutional environment and institutional arrangements is important to 
understand the difference between particular sets of rules and structures governing particular 
contractual relations. In the NIE framework, the institutional environment provides the 
context in which the institutional arrangement operates, and consists of property rights, social 
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norms and traditions, and formal and information enforcement mechanisms, amongst others 
(Davis and North, 1971)).  
 
Commercialization can allow to fulfill smallholders’ diverse consumption bundle and to 
specialize in production of those crops in which they are relatively skilled (Barrett, 2008).  
Previous studies on smallholder commercialization in sub-Saharan Africa have mainly 
focused on traditional or cereals crops. However, these studies may have limited 
generalizability for the potato crop because of differences in characteristics, notably 
perishability and bulkiness. Potato, an important crop worldwide, has received little attention, 
particularly, from a value chain perspective. Enhancing potato farmers’ commercialization 
requires ‘getting institutions right’, for instance, by making signiﬁcant investment in 
production technologies, by availing varieties with market-preferred quality attributes, and by 
establishing well-functioning input and output markets. This thesis has focused on the role of 
institutions (institutional environment and institutional arrangements) in quality improvement 
and market access by analyzing market and contractual relationships between farmers and 
upstream and downstream value chain actors. 
 
6.2.1  Relationships between farmers and upstream actors 
 
To improve market access, (ware) potato farmers need to grow varieties that are demanded 
by markets. When improved varieties are made available, for instance, by state research and 
breeding institutes, these new varieties also must possess the quality attributes that the final 
markets demand. In Ethiopia, research institutes seem to give the highest priority to 
developing varieties with enhanced production-related quality characteristics (e.g., yield 
potential) but do not seem to include market-related quality attributes. The consequence of 
this is that the majority of (ware) potato farmers in the study area continue to grow LVs, 
which are relatively inferior regarding the production-related quality attributes. This study 
has analyzed smallholders’ upstream relationships with research institutes and the role of 
extension, farmer organizations, farmer training centers, NGOs, and access to credit to 
understand quality alignment problems regarding the low uptake of IVs. Only frequency of 
use of technical assistance from NGOs and access to credit showed a strong (positive) 
relationship with smallholders’ decision to adopt IVs.  
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The quality alignment problem related to farmer preferences versus AKIS priorities may 
relate to several factors. Firstly, the generic nature of information provided by the publicly-
sponsored extension system may not be appropriate to make farmers understand specific 
quality attributes of a new variety; thus, a lack of information might have prevented farmers 
from growing the IVs. For example, the study, in chapter three, found (strong) negative 
correlation between adoption decision and crop management intensity, when considering the 
perception of all farmers. However, when only the perception of those farmers who adopted 
was considered in the outcome equation, this variable showed no effect. This shows that there 
is a lack of adequate information about the quality characteristics of the IVs. Secondly, there 
appears to be a lack of coordination among the three main components of AKIS (national 
research institutes, regional research institutes, and agricultural universities) and the 
extension service when diffusing new technologies. A third issue that could explain the 
misalignment between farmers and AKIS relates to the priorities of the Ethiopian public 
extension service. This service has received the criticism that extension workers are more 
focused on input provision rather than on technical assistance (Spielman et al., 2010), and 
that extension workers lack up-to-date knowledge and skills (Belay and Abebaw, 2004). This 
situation can negatively affect the adoption of new technologies.  Fourthly, the formal AKIS 
in Ethiopia pays little attention to farmers’ experiences and farmers’ knowledge. Thus, 
farmers may not trust the system and thus may not listen to what extension service or 
research institutes teach them regarding new technologies (e.g., new varieties). Lastly, 
farmers may indeed see quality differences between the IVs and the LVs. When asked to 
evaluate quality attributes of several potato varieties, farmers who had experience with IVs 
gave the highest score for market-related quality characteristics to the LVs.  
 
The above discussion implies that the quality alignment problems related to farmer 
preferences versus AKIS priorities can only be solved when some form of joint decision 
making or congruence of objectives is introduced. Although enhanced production-related 
quality attributes are necessary for developing new varieties, this may not be sufficient to 
induce farmers to grow IVs. 
 
6.2.2 Relationships between farmers and downstream actors   
 
In addition to farmer-AKIS relations, smallholder commercialization involves several other 
actors at different levels of the value chain. The relationships between these actors can affect 
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the alignment of quality, because incentives to improve quality can differ between actors. 
This thesis has analyzed contractual relationships at dyadic level: between farmers and 
collecting wholesalers, between collecting wholesalers and stationed wholesalers, between 
farmers and anonymous buyers in a spot market arrangement in the ware potato market, and 
between farmers and a trading company in a contract farming arrangement in the seed potato 
market. In addition, quality is also dependent on other factors such as environmental (e.g., 
weather condition and disease incidents) and crop management (e.g., weed control, and 
application of fertilizer and pesticides), and harvest, storage, and transport. The content of the 
contractual relation can affect the choice farmers make with regard to production processes. 
For instance, traders can influence the behavior of farmers through a variety of institutional 
arrangements such as through direct monitoring, quality measurement, input control, and 
residual claimancy (Hueth et al., 1999). This thesis has analyzed the effect of several 
institutional arrangements on the alignment of quality and the implication for smallholder 
commercialization. 
 
In chapter one, it was hypothesized that in the presence of public (third party) quality control 
systems (e.g., quality certification ), it would be more economical for agents to rely on public 
quality control systems rather than using private mechanisms (Raynaud et al., 2005). 
However, this does not seem to happen in the Ethiopian potato value chain, perhaps due to 
lack of well-functioning institutions. Consequently, sellers and buyers have to rely on private 
mechanisms to control quality, which are discussed below. 
 
In the relationship between farmers and collecting wholesalers, most transactions are carried 
out at farmgate. Furthermore, as presented in chapter two, more than 56% of harvesting 
activities were carried out by traders in the study period. This type of arrangement appears to 
have allowed collecting wholesalers to closely monitor potato quality. Apart from solving the 
quality uncertainty of downstream actors, this type of relationship indeed has several 
advantages for smallholders. First, smallholders can negotiate prices before harvest. Given 
the perishability of potatoes, selling at farmgate will prevent being confronted with 
opportunistic behavior of traders in the spot market. Second, farmers do not have to search 
for transportation as this will be arranged by traders. Third, this can avoid other costs such as 
handling and miscellaneous outlays should they deliver the product to the market. However, 
in this type of arrangement smallholders have small chance of involving their labor during 
harvesting as traders may bring their own worker force. This may be a concern (but not 
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related to quality alignment) if cost of harvest is considered in determining the final payment 
and if the opportunity cost of household labor is low. The other concern in a farmgate type of 
arrangement is that this appears to exclude small-scale farmers. Due to economies of scale, 
traders prefer to transact with those farmers who are able to deliver one full truck, preferably 
from a single plot. Thus, a farmgate type of arrangement is not available to all farmers. The 
alternative for small-scale farmers is to carry their potatoes to the nearest market, which 
brings another quality alignment problem due to differences in incentive to improve quality.  
 
When small-scale farmers sell their potatoes in the nearest market, they are subjected to high 
price risks due to a quality measurement problem in this market. This can happen due to one 
or more of the following causes: (1) traders in the spot market transact with several farmers at 
a time on a specific market day; they do not take much time to inspect the quality of the 
whole sack they buy; therefore they tend to pay a price for average quality (even if the quality 
of the potatoes is higher than average) (2) farmers deliver potatoes in a sack in which only the 
top part is visible for inspection by traders; traders expect that farmers put lower quality at the  
bottom of the sack; therefore, they tend to pay a price that is lower than the true quality of the 
potatoes would justify; (3) there is a large difference  between the price for low quality 
potatoes compared to high quality potatoes; thus, the price risk of incorrect measuring of 
quality is high; and (4) given the perishability of the product and the high transport cost for 
farmer bringing potatoes to the market, farmers have few alternatives than to sell at the 
market day. Thus, the conditions in the spot market make farmers to be more vulnerable to a 
quality measurement problem because when a given delivery is wrongly (or deliberately) 
judged as low quality by traders a significant portion of their income can be wiped out.  
 
Measuring product quality in spot market type of arrangement is also an imperfect indicator 
of a farmer’s effort (Hueth et al., 1999), because  (1) when  deliveries are made in large 
volumes, measuring the quality of each item in a given delivery would be costly for the 
trader, and measuring a sample of the delivery would not provide a perfect measure of 
quality; and (2) certain type of quality may not become apparent until the commodity has 
traveled further downstream thus may put traders for another quality uncertainty. For 
instance, due to poor storage conditions, potatoes may develop internal sprouting (Sawyer 
and Dallyn, 1964) that may physically look good at the time of sale, but this could lead to fast 
external sprouting and spoilage losses for traders. Consequently, traders buying from the 
nearest spot market may have to either invest much time to verify quality (which is costly), 
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choose not to monitor quality at all, or use a relatively crude set of grades to measure quality. 
This thesis found that traders buying in the spot market use a crude measure of quality, which 
has a negative effect on the prices farmers receive in this market. Thus, selling potatoes in a 
spot market arrangement provides fewer incentives to improve quality compared to a 
farmgate type of arrangement. 
 
Most of the relationships between farmers and collecting wholesalers in the potato value 
chain also involve middlemen. Previous studies have emphasized the positive role of social 
networks in economic exchanges. The main argument for this positive role is based on the 
presumption that social bonding, such as ethnic ties, can create homogeneity and thus 
positively impact business outcomes by reducing transaction costs (Annen, 2003; Fafchamps, 
2000). However, this thesis showed that using the institution of middleman in trading 
relations is welfare reducing because of the lock-in it creates. The study found that 
personalized relationships between farmers and middlemen lead to high social switching 
costs (e.g., a loss of a personal bond or friendship) and thus to an ex post monopoly or 
monopsony situation which leads to lower prices for the farmer’s product, (Bansal et al., 
2004; Jones et al., 2007).  
 
In the relationship between collecting and stationed wholesalers, a trust-based institutional 
arrangement seems to be dominant. In this study, a written contract was only observed in the 
relationship between stationed wholesalers and big hotels. Thus, the coordination between 
downstream actors is largely enforced implicitly through reputation effects and repeated 
interactions. In general, the existing contractual relationships between downstream actors can 
positively affect the alignment of quality in the chain, because trust-based relationships can 
eliminate the need for formal contracts, which are costly to write, monitor, and enforce (Dyer, 
1997).  
 
Even though farmgate and trust-based contractual arrangements discussed before can provide 
stronger incentives to improve quality for domestic markets, smallholder commercialization 
in highly remunerative markets, such as the export market, requires a more integrated 
(formal) type of contractual relations (Masakure and Henson, 2005). A contract farming 
arrangement is considered an institutional solution to solve smallholder market access 
problems (e.g. Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012; Key and Runsten, 1999). However, the 
attention paid by the contract farming literature regarding the details of contractual relations 
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from the perspective of smallholders’ is relatively low. This thesis has analyzed seed potato 
farmers’ preferences for contract terms and conditions (so called contract design attributes). 
The findings showed that smallholders have preferences for a variable price compared to a 
fixed price, a written form of contract compared to an oral contract, a variable output quality 
specification, and seed, input, and technical assistance supplied by the trading company 
instead of by independent suppliers or the state. Based on the findings of this thesis, farmers’ 
preferences for these contract design attributes can largely be explained from the perspective 
of smallholders’ risk aversion behavior on the one hand and entrepreneurship on the other 
hand. 
 
For the trading company, farmers’ preference for a variable price option can help to minimize 
its risk exposure as the market risk would be borne by the contracted farmers. In addition, this 
strategy may reduce moral hazard problems by making both contracting parties residual 
claimants. Nonetheless, a variable price contract increases farmers’ price risk. The question is 
why risk averse farmers may still opt for a variable price option when in fact such strategy 
may entail higher risk? The thesis found the following explanations. First, farmers perceive 
prices in a contract farming scheme as low prices, even after accounting for the ‘insurance 
premium’ that is inherent in a fixed-price contract. Thus, by choosing a variable pricing 
option, farmers try to avoid the risk of underpayment. Second, farmers who wish to 
participate in a contract farming scheme appear to have high entrepreneurial attitude. Thus, 
fixed price option can be less desirable for these farmers as the final payment will not depend 
on effort and skills. Third, prices for agricultural products are often on the rise in Ethiopia 
(Tadesse and Guttormsen, 2011). Thus, farmers have a fear that being locked into a fixed-
price contract may penalize them should prices go up significantly. Relatedly, smallholders’ 
preferences for a variable quality specification can be explained from the perspective of risk 
aversion. Although a variable output quality specification scheme could expose farmers to 
additional price risk due to problems in measuring quality, this could lead to another major 
risk (risk of complete rejection) should a given delivery not meet the minimum quality 
criteria. Thus, by opting for a variable quality specification, farmers know that they will 
always sell their delivery (even if it is against a low price). Furthermore, preferences for a 
variable output specification can be explained from the perspective of entrepreneurship. 
Farmers with such attitudes may believe that they can deliver the best product quality and 
thus receive the high price the trading company is willing to pay for this quality. Regarding 
the supply of seed, input, and technical assistance, farmers’ choice for the trading company to 
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deliver these inputs corresponds to their risk averse attitude. From the farmers’ perspective, 
this type of arrangement is a reliable source of supply of proper inputs. Also, supply of inputs 
by the trading company is a form of risk sharing when producing a crop with specific 
attributes. Thus, the findings from this thesis support the view that private firms are more 
trustful and effective than public agencies in timely delivering extension services and supply 
good quality inputs (e.g. Bellemare, 2012; Umali-Deininger, 1997). 
 
Farmers also showed a strong preference for a written contract over an oral contract. 
Although this appears to have been paid little attention in the contract farming literature, this 
thesis has shown the significance of differentiating between contract forms and contract terms 
because of the implication this may have in a contract farming arrangement. Particularly, in a 
low trust environment, farmers appear to minimize the risk of non-compliance from the side 
of the trading company by opting for a written contract in which detailed roles and 
responsibilities, procedures for monitoring, and penalties for performance non-compliance 
are specified. The problem with the written form of contract is that it is still incomplete, 
which makes ex post adjustments difficult (Williamson, 1979). 
 
6.3  Contributions to the literature 
 
The thesis has contributed to the literature, particularly, from the perspective of technology 
adoption, seller-buyer relationships, and social networks. .  
 
6.3.1 Technology adoption  
 
The thesis has contributed to the literature on technology adoption by conceptualizing 
adoption decisions as a multi-attribute decision problem involving tradeoffs. Most publicly-
sponsored agricultural research is largely driven by food security issues; thus, production-
related quality attributes have received high priority in new variety development. This thesis 
showed that smallholders’ willingness to adopt a new variety largely depends on whether the 
new varieties have the preferred market-related quality attributes.  
 
Previous adoption studies have focused on the relationship between adoption and the 
characteristics of the new technology (e.g., Adesina and Baidu-Forson, 1995; Sall et al., 
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2000), or smallholders’ socio-economic characteristics (e.g., Feder et al., 1985). This thesis 
has taken a step forward by showing the relationship between adoption decision about new 
varieties and the characteristics of traditional varieties. The thesis has demonstrated that 
farmers’ assessment of production- and market-related attributes of local varieties strongly 
influence farmers’ decision to adopt IVs. Farmers’ attachment to local varieties could be due 
to a lack of adequate knowledge about the quality characteristics and the (crop) management 
of new varieties. The thesis contributes to the discussion on the significance of the system 
approach (participatory research approach), which takes farmers and other actors at the center 
of the innovation process (Hall et al., 2001; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008; Leeuwis and Van den 
Ban, 2004; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; Sumberg, 2005). 
 
The thesis has paid due attention to the potato crop, which has become an increasingly 
important food and cash crop in several developing countries. Potato has received little 
attention in the adoption literature, particularly compared to other staple crops like rice, 
maize, and sorghum despite important differences between potato and cereal crops (Ortiz et 
al., 2013). The findings from traditional adoption literature do not provide sufficient 
information about the factors that influence farmers’ decision to adopt new potato varieties. 
Furthermore, the thesis has analyzed the effectiveness of AKIS in the adoption decision by 
taking ware (consumption) potato farmers as a unit of analysis rather than focusing on seed 
potato farmers. In this regard, the thesis has provided further arguments that the potato 
innovation system will only be successful when ware potato farmers adopt new varieties. 
 
6.3.2 Seller – buyer relationships  
 
The thesis has provided further argument on the effect of the institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements regarding the alignment of quality and the implication for 
smallholder commercialization. 
 
Although spot market arrangements have been extensively studied, particularly from the 
perspective of transaction cost economics, little research has been done in comparing the 
effect of farmers’ decision to sell in the spot market and at farmgate. Compared to selling to 
the spot market, selling at farmgate has often been considered less remunerative (Fafchamps 
and Hill, 2005). One question, which seems overlooked, is the problem of measuring quality 
that smallholders encounter when they decide to sell in the nearest spot market. The thesis 
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has provided further insights into the importance of a farmgate type of arrangement in 
enhancing smallholders’ incentive to improve quality and market access, because farmers’ 
effort is better rewarded in this type of arrangement than that of the spot market. Indeed, the 
transaction cost economics theory has recognized the problem of a spot market arrangement 
regarding the difficulty of measuring quality. However, such analysis has been largely made 
from the buyers’ perspective; as traders are the ones to be mostly affected because of the 
difficulty of measuring the performance of the seller (Hueth et al., 1999). This thesis 
complements to the findings of Muto and Yamano (2009) by showing the importance of a 
farmgate type of arrangement for smallholders’ selling perishable and bulky products, such as 
potatoes, sweet potatoes, and cassava.  
 
In addition, the thesis has contributed to the contract farming literature by analyzing 
smallholders’ preferences for contract design attributes in the seed potato market. Due to the 
complexity of seed potato production, smallholders can be exposed to direct transaction costs, 
(e.g., searching and selecting of the right quality seed and other inputs) and indirect 
transaction costs (e.g., missing input markets or the failure to identify appropriate trading 
partners). Furthermore, seed potato production requires specific investment in human capital 
and inputs. The thesis showed smallholders’ tension regarding the input market and output 
market uncertainty. While the uncertainty in the input market motivates farmers for 
participation, the risk of underpayment (when accepting a fixed-price contract) and the lack 
of freedom to make autonomous decisions in the output market tend to refrain them from 
participation. In this regard, the thesis has provided an argument about the significance of 
institutional support (for instance, supplying the necessary inputs through farmer 
organizations) and flexible contracts to ease the tension and thus to stimulate smallholders to 
participate in contract farming. 
 
6.3.3 Social networks  
 
This thesis has contributed to the discussion on the role of social networks in improving/ 
hindering smallholder commercialization in the modern economy. By analyzing the factors 
leading to farmers’ reliance on the institution of middleman in the potato trade and the impact 
of such relationship on economic performance, the thesis showed that ethnic ties can lead to 
lock-in and thus prevent smallholders from using other types of institutional arrangements, 
such as formal contracts or preferred seller-buyer relationship, which could improve 
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smallholders’ commercialization in remunerative and quality oriented markets. The findings 
are in line with Ali and Peerlings (2011), who also have reported the negative effect of 
ethnically tied relations on economic performance.  
 
6.4 Practical implications 
  
This thesis draws several practical implications, primarily to research institutes and other 
public agencies and to managers of agribusiness firms.  
 
6.4.1 Implications for research institutes  
 
Chapters two and three have provided lessons for policymakers and researchers about how to 
increase adoption of improved potato varieties. It was shown that smallholders’ production 
decisions are largely motivated by market conditions. Too much focus of the research 
institutes on production-related quality attributes can lead to a low adoption rate unless new 
varieties have market-related quality attributes at least as good as those of the LVs. Research 
priorities therefore need to be aligned with the quality requirements of downstream actors to 
enhance the uptake of IVs by ware potato farmers. Subsequently, a high demand for IVs by 
ware potato farmers would offer a better market for seed potato farmers.  
 
Research institutes and other agencies involved in the innovation process (e.g., the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development) need to direct their innovation strategy toward 
participatory approach. Firstly, a rethinking of the existing innovation diffusion system is 
necessary toward a system perspective, which involves various actors into the process of 
setting research priorities or more generally in the innovation process. Secondly, research 
priorities should not only focus on production-related quality attributes, it should also give 
equal or even more attention to market-related quality attributes. So far, most attention has 
been paid to production-related quality attributes due to the high potential of potatoes for 
food security. However, this thesis has highlighted the significance of potatoes being beyond 
‘hunger breaker’. In the region where this study was conducted, potato is mainly considered a 
cash crop and an important product for smallholder commercialization (e.g., 50% of the 
annual income in 2009/2010 production cycle came from potato sales). Indeed, this could 
differ from region to region. This thesis further suggests that innovation strategy should 
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address region specific problems; that is, potato varieties that are needed in food surplus 
regions may not be equally needed in food deficit regions. Thirdly, the thesis has highlighted 
the importance of education and access to information in technology adoption. As more than 
two-thirds of ware potato farmers in the study area have a mobile phone, further effort is 
needed to disseminate technology-specific information more effectively. 
  
6.4.2 Implications for other public agencies   
 
This thesis has shown that smallholders need institutional supports in several ways. Firstly, 
even though selling at farmgate provides better incentives to improve quality and market 
access for ware potato farmers, this type of arrangement appears to exclude small-scale 
farmers because of they are too small. Establishing village collection centers may encourage 
traders to buy from these farmers, may even promote further smallholder commercialization. 
Secondly, middlemen in the potato chain choose to work unnoticed by the formal authorities 
and appear to have a negative effect on smallholder commercialization. Thus, the activities of 
middlemen need to become more transparent to promote competition in the value chain and 
improve smallholders’ welfare. Furthermore, educating farmers about the potential benefits 
of integrated market chains is necessary to overcome the negative aspects of social networks 
in trading relations. Thirdly, the thesis has shown smallholders’ positive perception regarding 
the potential welfare impact of contract farming. Thus, public institutions should support 
agribusiness firms that engage in a contract farming scheme through, for instance, 
establishing infrastructure, facilitating access to credit, and providing other investment 
incentives. Equally, institutional support is necessary to strengthen smallholders’ bargaining 
position with agribusiness firms, for instance, through farmer organizations (e.g., producer 
organizations) to make contracts more competitive. 
 
6.4.3 Implications for mangers of agribusiness firms  
 
The thesis has provided important practical implications for managers of agribusiness firms 
who wish to work with smallholders. Firstly, managers can analyze the motivation of contract 
farmers toward a contract farming scheme (in a given context) using a multi-category discrete 
choice model, where the choice of a contract is modeled as a set of different contract design 
attributes (or contract terms and conditions). For instance, in the context of a seed potato 
contract farming scheme, this thesis showed that the attractiveness of a contract is largely 
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determined by the nature of the contract terms and conditions, much less to smallholders’ 
socio-economic characteristics. The thesis has provided the insight that farmers’ willingness 
to participate in a contract farming scheme increases if the contractual relationship is based 
on a written form; inputs, technical assistance, and seed supplied by the buyer firm; and 
variable output quality and variable price specifications. Secondly, the thesis has provided 
further implication for managers that they need to invest more in building trust at the early 
stage of their contractual relation with farmers, because farmers’ preference for a written 
form of contract implies that they have little trust in the relationship.  
 
6.5 Directions for further research  
 
This thesis has provided several implications for further research. 
 
6.5.1 Further research with respect to the role of the institutional environment  
 
The institutional environment affects economic exchange and smallholder commercialization 
in many ways. From the formal institutional environment, the role of research and extension 
services has been examined only in relation to decisions of farmers to adopt new potato 
varieties or not.  Similar studies can be made to assess the role of research and extension in 
other crops such as wheat, sorghum, and barely in the context of Ethiopia. Such 
comprehensive analysis will help to guide the decision on research and extension priorities of 
public-sponsored institutes; more specifically, to help redesign the agricultural and 
knowledge innovation system in Ethiopia and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
From the perspective of informal institutions, the study has only analyzed the role of the 
middleman in potato trade. The study has focused on the impact of social ties on economic 
performance. This study can be extended to include other aspects that might have an effect on 
smallholders’ decision to continue trading through middlemen. Furthermore, as the thesis has 
highlighted the dominance of the institution of middleman in the potato market, future 
research may look at the role of the institution of middleman in the market for other crops. 
Also, future research may analyze the efficiency of using middlemen from the traders’ 
perspective and how gain is distributed between farmers, middlemen, and traders. 
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6.5.2 Further research concerning institutional arrangements 
 
This thesis has considered spot market, farmgate, and trust-based arrangements from the ware 
potato farmers’ perspective, and a contract farming scheme from the seed potato farmers’ 
perspective.  In this regard, there are several areas in which researchers may continue. 
 
Firstly, the thesis showed that most transactions regarding ware (consumption) potatoes are 
carried out in a farmgate type of arrangement. Although this type of arrangement improves 
quality (alignment) and smallholder commercialization, it limits smallholders from using 
their labor in the harvesting activity, as this is often done by traders’ own workers. Future 
research may investigate the extent of this problem in the potato value chain and the effect in 
smallholders’ welfare. Secondly, the thesis has analyzed production- and market-related 
quality attributes of potatoes based on farmers’ experience. Thus, an experimental approach 
could complement this study in asserting the significance of farmer-based characterization of 
product quality (e.g., by comparing the market quality of the LVs and IVs). Thirdly, chapter 5 
has used discrete choice models to analyze the attractiveness of contract design attributes. 
However, this has two limitations: (1) only limited (and context specific) contract design 
attributes have been used in the analysis; and (2) the analysis has been made from the 
perspective of smallholder farmers. Thus, future research may expand this study by including 
other variables, testing these variables in other crops, and/or by carrying out similar research 
from the perspective of agribusiness firms.  
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 Summary  
 
Market access for smallholder farmers in developing countries often requires the 
improvement of product quality. As products are traded in value chains, quality improvement 
entails the coordination of activities and decisions by all actors in the chain. Thus, enhancing 
smallholders’ commercialization requires, for instance, making signiﬁcant investment in 
production technologies, availing market oriented varieties, and establishing well-functioning 
input and output markets. Markets are one form of institutions providing coordination 
functions. From the perspective of new institutional economics (NIE), there are also other 
types of institutions facilitating economic exchange. Distinguishing the institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements is important to understand the difference between 
the particular sets of rules and structures governing contractual relations.  
 
The present thesis aims to gain insights into the factors affecting smallholders to improve 
quality and market access by analyzing their relationship with upstream and downstream 
actors and to generate information relevant for the development of sustainable value chains in 
the potato sector. More specifically the thesis aims to explore: 
 
• product or technology related quality alignment problems by analyzing interactions 
between smallholder farmers and upstream actors; and 
• value chain related quality alignment problems by analyzing interactions between 
farmers and downstream actors (seller-buyer relationships). 
 
At the level of the institutional environment, the thesis has aimed to examine the role of 
agricultural knowledge and innovation system (AKIS) and the institution of the middleman 
on quality alignment. This type of analysis can provide  important insights for economizing 
on transaction costs in the farmer-upstream and downstream relationships. At the micro level 
of analysis, the thesis has aimed to examine the effect of several institutional arrangements, 
namely, spot market, farmgate, trust-based, and contract farming arrangements, on quality 
alignment. Such analysis is important to evaluate a broad range of institutional arrangements 
and to search for the appropriate ones that can shape and monitor economic activities in the 
context of less-developed agrifood chains such as the potato value chain in Ethiopia. To 
achieve the aims, this thesis has been structured around four research questions. 
167 
 
Summary 
 
Chapter two aims to answer the following research question: 
 
How do farmer and trader preferences for specific quality attributes and coordination 
mechanisms in farmer-trader relationships affect the alignment of quality in the Ethiopian 
potato value chain?  
  
This question has been addressed in two steps.  
 
In the first step, seven varieties  (consisting of three improved and four ‘local’ varieties) were 
identified based on a pilot study. Also, quality characteristics were categorized into 
production-related quality attributes (yield, disease resistance, maturity period, farm 
management practices, and drought tolerance) and  market-related quality attributes (stew 
quality, cooking quality, tuber size, and tuber color). Next, a survey was conducted among 
346 (ware) potato farmers to evaluate the production- and market-related quality attributes of 
these varieties. One question that needed to be answered was whether these varieties indeed 
have significant quality differences as perceived by farmers. Farmer-based evaluation of the 
different varieties showed that these varieties differ, particularly, with respect to tuber size, 
stew quality, yield, maturity period, and disease tolerance. Furthermore, the findings showed 
that no one variety has superior quality in both the production- and market-related quality 
attributes. While the improved varieties (IVs) were evaluated highest in terms of production-
related quality attributes (yield and disease tolerance), the local varieties (LVs) were 
evaluated highest regarding market-related quality attributes (e.g., stew quality). 
Consequently, farmers are faced with trade-offs when choosing one variety over the other. 
Another question relates to the relative influence of different quality attributes on farmers’ 
variety choice. The findings showed that potato farmers’ variety choice is more influenced by 
the market-related quality attributes than by the production-related quality attributes. In 
situations with a trade-off, ware potato farmers tend to align their production decision with 
the quality demand of downstream actors by growing the LVs.  
 
In the second step, another survey was conducted among the major downstream actors, 
namely collecting wholesalers, stationed wholesalers, retailers, and hotel managers, to 
understand the quality requirements of these actors (that may have an effect on smallholders’ 
variety choice) and to analyze seller-buyer relationships affecting individual incentives to 
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improve quality. The findings showed that tuber size (moderate size tubers) and color 
(white/yellowish) are the most important market-related quality attributes demanded by the 
downstream actors. In the relationship between farmers and downstream actors, different 
quality signaling mechanisms, such as variety name or production region, are used.  
However, there are other quality problems (such as premature, damaged, and blackened 
tubers) that cannot be verified using such mechanisms. Thus, in dealing with these quality 
problems, contractual relationships between downstream actors (collecting wholesalers and 
stationed wholesalers) are largely trust-based. Likewise, in the relationship between farmers 
and collecting wholesalers, contractual relationships are largely carried out at farmgate. 
Nonetheless, the farmgate type of arrangement appears to have excluded small-scale farmers. 
When these farmers take their potatoes to the nearest spot market, they face high price risk 
due to a quality measurement problem. Even though traders are also facing a quality 
measurement problem, the findings show that farmers are more severely affected than the 
traders. In the farmer-buyer relationships, the main cause of misalignment is difference in 
incentives to improve quality between farmers that sell in the nearest spot market and the 
(anonymous) buyers in this market. In this respect, the findings provide further insights into 
the problem of quality alignment in a spot market arrangement.  
 
Chapter three continues to analyze the main factors affecting the uptake of IVs by specifically 
addressing the following research question.  
 
How do the agricultural knowledge and innovation system and farmers’ perception of local 
varieties affect the adoption of improved potato varieties? 
 
To examine the role of AKIS, this study included the following variables: frequency of use of 
technical assistance from research, extension services, NGOs, and/or farmer organizations 
(cooperatives); training in farmer training center; use of main buyer as a source of advice; 
and access to credit. The study showed that frequency of use of technical assistance from 
NGOs, use of main buyer as a source of advice, and access to credit have an effect on 
farmers’ adoption decision. While frequency of use of technical assistance from NGOs and 
access to credit showed a positive relationship, the use of main buyer as a source of advice 
showed a negative relationship. This result confirmed the farmer-based evaluation as 
presented in chapter two in which the IVs were evaluated low in market-related quality 
attributes. The other AKIS variables showed no significant relationship with farmers’ 
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adoption decision. However, only access to credit was positively related to the extent of 
adoption (amount of land allotted for growing the IVs).  
 
Regarding the relationship between farmers’ perception about the production- and market-
related quality attributes identified in chapter two, the findings in chapter three showed that 
farmers’ perceptions for crop management intensity and drought resistance of LVs have an 
effect on the adoption of IVs. This means that farmers perceived the IVs to require more crop 
management and to be more susceptible to drought incidents than the LVs. The study also 
found no significance relationship between farmers’ perception of LVs regarding disease 
resistance and yield potential and the decision to adopt the IVs. On the other hand, tuber size 
and stew quality have a significant influence on (ware) potato farmers’ decision regarding the 
extent (a portion) of land to be used for growing the IVs. Thus, while both production- and 
market-related quality attributes are important factors in farmers’ decision to adopt IVs, 
market-related quality attributes tend to influence both the probability and intensity of 
adoption. This further confirms the importance of market-related quality attributes in farmers’ 
adoption decision. 
 
In addition to the variables related to AKIS and quality attributes, the second study has also 
analyzed the effect of socio-economic variables on the adoption decision. Education level and 
the presence of a radio and/or television showed a strong positive relationship with adoption 
while the number of livestock units showed negative relationship with the decision to adopt. 
A farmer being male and the size of the family  also showed a positive relationship with 
adoption (but only marginally).  Alternatively, having a large portion of own land showed a 
strong positive relationship with the extent of adoption.  
 
Chapter four aims to examine the role middleman on smallholder commercialization. It is 
widely recognized that intermediaries can play an important role under conditions of contract 
uncertainty and positive transaction costs and may thus facilitate trade by decreasing 
transaction costs related to search time and information asymmetry. However, there are also 
concerns that such institutions could force individuals to cooperate according to social norms 
even if this is against their own self-interest. The institution of middleman may decrease 
efficiency, for instance, by excluding new entrants from participating in the market or by 
applying price collusion. Overall, the literature provides mixed evidence about the role of 
middlemen in smallholders’ trading relations with buyers. Therefore, chapter four has 
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empirically examined the factors that influence smallholders to trade with middlemen and the 
effect of this relationship on the economic outcome, by addressing the following question. 
 
Which factors do influence farmers’ decision to use middlemen in their trading relations, and 
what is the economic impact of such relationship?  
 
To identify the factors influencing smallholders’ decision to trade through middlemen, the 
study has conceptualized it as a binary channel choice decision problem by farm households 
that try to maximize utility. Of the randomly selected 346 farmer, 68% of them sold potatoes 
through middlemen. Using a probit model, the study showed that education, age, number of 
livestock units, volume of production, location, and ethnic ties significantly affect farmers’ 
decision to use (or not) the institution of middleman. Next, after controlling for selection bias 
using propensity score matching, the study estimated the economic impact of such trading 
relationship. The findings showed that smallholders who relied on middlemen had 39% lower 
income per hectare than those farmers who sold to direct buyers. This finding suggests that 
the middleman institution is ill-suited to deal with new challenges in the modern economy 
and may even prevent the emergence of other forms of governance, such as contracts and 
preferred seller-buyer relationships, by locking farmers in existing relationships in which 
social switching costs appear to be high.  
 
Chapter five focuses on a more formal type of institution, the contract farming arrangement. 
While contract farming (CF) can enhance smallholders’ income in developing countries, 
empirical research on the motivation of smallholders to participate in CF is scarce. With the 
objective of providing insights into contractual relations that can induce smallholders to 
participate in CF, chapter five has addressed the following research question. 
 
Which contract attributes do motivate smallholders to participate in a contract farming 
scheme? 
 
The general hypothesis of this study is that smallholders’ motivation to participate in CF 
largely depends on the nature of the contract attributes (so-called contract design attributes). 
This hypothesis was tested by applying alternative specific (conditional) logit model, 
following a literature review and an AHP approach to select the contract design attributes 
included in the model, which also relate to three levels of uncertainty: output market 
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uncertainty, quality uncertainty, and input market uncertainty. In doing so, six out of twelve 
contract design attributes were selected, namely,  price option, contract form, product quality 
specification, seed quality specification, input supply arrangement, and technical assistance, 
in relation to the three levels of quality uncertainty. The findings showed that smallholders 
have strong preferences for a variable price option over a fixed price option; a written 
contract form over an oral form; a variable output quality specification over a fixed output 
quality specification; and seed, technical assistance and inputs supplied by the trading 
company (buyer firm) rather than having these inputs supplied by state agencies or NGOs. 
Overall, smallholders’ choice for written contract over oral form; variable over fixed quality 
specification; and firm-supplied seed, inputs and technical assistance over government 
agencies or NGOs can be explained from the risk averse behavior of smallholders 
(households). On the other hand, smallholders’ choice of variable price over fixed price can 
be explained from entrepreneurial attitude of smallholders wishing to work in a contract 
farming arrangement.    
 
In sum, the four research questions raised in chapter one have allowed the present study to 
explore the challenges and opportunities to improve quality and market access in the 
Ethiopian potato value chain.  
 
Regarding the upstream relationships, smallholders’ variety selection decision is largely 
dependent on market-related quality attributes. Thus, enhancing the uptake of new varieties 
requires the development of varieties with market-related quality attributes, adequate 
information exchanges, and joint (or delegated) decision-making. The implication is that 
research institutes and other agencies need to involve more actors in deciding on the 
innovation goals as outlined in the participatory innovation diffusion approach.  
 
With regard to seller-buyer relationships, the thesis provides several contributions.  
 
First, a farmgate type of arrangement provides collecting wholesalers better opportunity to 
closely monitor quality while, at the same time, allowing smallholders to minimize the risk of 
opportunistic behavior of traders in the spot market. However, a farmgate type of 
arrangement is not available for all farmers; thus a spot market arrangement remains a 
concern for small-scale farmers because of the high price risk related to measuring quality. 
This type of arrangement entails high transaction costs for sellers of perishable and bulky 
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products. Second, the relationship between smallholders and collecting wholesalers is also 
negatively affected by the involvement of middlemen. This could lead to welfare losses 
because of the undesirable consequence of ethnic ties to lock-in. Third, the relationship 
between downstream actors is largely trust-based. This relationship appears to be more 
efficient as it eliminates the need for formal contracts, which are costly to write, monitor, and 
enforce. Lastly, even though farmgate and trust-based contractual relationships can provide 
better incentives to improve quality for the national market, smallholder commercialization in 
highly ruminative markers, such as the regional market, needs more integrated type of 
contractual relations, such as contract farming arrangement. To this effect, the thesis provides 
an analytical framework to analyze contractual relations in a contract farming scheme by 
conceptualizing smallholders’ preferences as a multi-category discrete choice problem, where 
the choice of a contract is modeled as a set of different contract design attributes. The 
implication for agribusiness managers is that they can use this approach to design context 
specific contracts. In the context of this study, smallholders’ preferences for the different 
contract design attributes can be explained from the perspectives of their risk aversion 
behavior and entrepreneurship attitudes. Institutional support in the input and output markets 
is important to strengthen smallholders’ bargaining position leading to competitive contract 
offers. 
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De aardappel is wereldwijd een belangrijk gewas geworden, met name vanwege de 
veranderingen in het individuele consumptiegedrag en het consumentenbewustzijn van de 
aardappel als gezond voedsel. Vandaar dat het voor het versterken van de commercialisering 
van de aardappelboer nodig is om “instituten goed te krijgen”. Bijvoorbeeld door significante 
investeringen te doen in productietechnologieën, door gebruik te maken van 
marktgeoriënteerde variëteiten en door het opzetten van goed functionerende input en output 
markten. Markten zijn een vorm van instituten die coördinerende functies verschaffen. Vanuit 
het new institutional economics (NIE) perspectief zijn er ook andere type instituten die 
economische uitwisselingen faciliteren. Instituten onderverdelen in het institutionele milieu 
en de institutionele maatregelen is belangrijk om het verschil tussen de bepaalde groepen 
regels en structuren te begrijpen voor bepaalde contractuele relaties.  
 
Deze thesis streeft ernaar om inzicht te verkrijgen in de factoren die kleine boeren 
beïnvloeden om kwaliteit en markttoegang te verbeteren, door hun relatie met 
stroomopwaartse en stroomafwaartse actoren te analyseren en om informatie te genereren die 
relevant is voor het ontwikkelen van duurzame value chains in de aardappelsector. Om 
precies te zijn heeft deze thesis als doel om: 
 
• Product of technologie gerelateerde quality alignment problemen te onderzoeken 
door interacties tussen kleine boeren en stroomopwaartse actoren te analyseren; en 
• value chain gerelateerde quality alignment problemen te onderzoeken door 
interacties tussen boeren en stroomafwaartse actoren (verkoper-koper relaties) te 
analyseren. 
 
Op het niveau van het institutionele milieu, is het doel van deze thesis om de rol van zowel 
agriculturele kennis en innovatiesystemen (AKIS) als de rol van het instituut van de 
tussenpersoon in quality alignment te onderzoeken. Dit type analyse is belangrijk om te 
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bezuinigen op transactiekosten in de boeren-stroomopwaartse (stroomafwaartse) relaties. Op 
het microniveau van deze analyse is het doel van deze thesis te onderzoeken wat het effect is
 van verschillende institutionele maatregelen, namelijk spot market, farm gate, op vertrouwen 
gebaseerde en contractuele landbouw overeenkomsten op quality alignment. Een dergelijke 
analyse is belangrijk om een breed scala aan institutionele maatregelen te evalueren en om te 
zoeken naar de geschikte maatregelen die economische activiteiten kunnen vormen en 
monitoren in de context van minder ontwikkelde agrifood ketens, zoals de aardappel value 
chain in Ethiopië. Om het doel van deze thesis te bereiken is het onderzoek geformuleerd aan 
de hand van vier onderzoeksvragen.  
 
Hoofdstuk twee heeft als doel de volgende onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden: 
 
Hoe beïnvloeden de voorkeuren van boer en handelaar voor specifieke kwaliteitskenmerken 
en coordinatie mechanismesn in de boer-handelaar relatie de quality alignment  in de 
Ethiopische aardappel value chain? 
 
Deze vraag is behandeld in twee delen. 
 
In het eerste deel werden zeven variëteiten (bestaande uit drie verbeterde and vier ‘lokale’ 
variëteiten) geïdentificieerd op basis van een pilot study. Deze zijn later gecategoriseerd in 
product gerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken (rendement, ziekteresistentie, rijpperiode, boerderij 
management praktijken, en droogte tolerantie) en marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken 
(stoofpotkwaliteit, kookkwaliteit, knolgrootte, en knol kleur). Vervolgens werd er een survey 
afgekomen onder 346 aardappelboeren om de productie en marktgerelateerde 
kwaliteitskenmerken van deze variëteiten te evalueren (op een vijf-punts Likert schaal). Een 
vraag die beantwoord moest worden was of deze varïeteiten inderdaad significante 
kwaliteitsverschillen hebben in de ogen van boeren. De evaluatie van de boeren van de 
verschillende variëteiten laat zien dat deze variëteiten verschillen, met name met betrekking 
tot knolgrootte, stoofpot kwaliteit, oogst, rijpperiode, en ziekteresistentie. Bovendien lieten 
de bevindingen zien dat geen enkele variëteit superieure kwaliteit heeft in zowel de productie 
als de marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken. Hoewel de verbeterde variëteiten (improved 
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varieties, IVs) het hoogst geëvalueerd werden met betrekking tot productiegerelateerde 
kwaliteitskenmerken (oogst en ziekteresistentie), werden de ‘lokale’ variëteiten (local 
varieties, LVs) het hoogst geëvalueerd aangaande marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken 
(bijvoorbeeld stoofpotkwaliteit). Vandaar dat boeren een trade-off moeten maken wanneer ze 
voor de ene variëteit kiezen in plaats van een andere. Dit leidt tot een andere vraag ‘Welke 
kwaliteitskenmerken hebben de meeste invloed op de keus van de boer voor een bepaalde 
variëteit?’. De bevindingen lieten zien dat de keuze van de boeren voor een bepaalde variëteit 
meer beïnvloed wordt door marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken dan door 
productiegerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken. Wanneer er sprake is van een discrepantie, dan 
hebben aardappelboeren die hun aardappelen verkopen voor consumptie de neiging om de 
productie beslissing in overeenstemming te brengen met de kwaliteitseisen van 
stroomafwaartse actoren door LVs te verbouwen. Dit benadrukt het belang van 
marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken voor de variëteitskeuze. 
 
In het tweede de werd een andere survey afgenomen onder de grote stroomafwaartse actoren, 
namelijk inzamelende groothandelaren, locatiegebonden groothandelaren, detailhandelaren 
en hotel managers. Deze survey werd afgenomen om the kwaliteitskenmerken van deze 
actoren (die mogelijk effect hebben op de variëteitskeuze van kleine boeren) te begrijpen en 
om verkoper-koper relaties te analyseren die invloed hebben op de individuele stimulans om 
kwaliteit te verbeteren. De bevindingen lieten zien dat knolgrootte (gematigd grote knollen) 
en kleur (witachtig/geelachtig) de belangrijkste marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken zijn 
die de meeste stroomafwaartse actoren eisen. In de relatie tussen boeren en stroomafwaartse 
actoren worden verschillende systemen gebruikt om kwaliteit te signaleren, zoals 
variëteitsnaam of productie regio. Desondanks zijn er andere kwaliteitsproblemen (zoals 
premature, beschadigde of zwarte knollen) die niet te controleren zijn door het gebruik van 
dergelijke mechanismen. Dus, om te reageren op deze kwaliteitsproblemen, waren 
contractuele relaties tussen stroomafwaartse actoren (inzamelende groothandelaren en 
locatiegebonden groothandelaren) met name gebasseerd op vertrouwen. In de relatie tussen 
boeren en inzamelende  groothandelaren werden contractuele relaties grotendeels uitgevoerd 
buiten de boerderij (at farmgate). Desalniettemin lijkt de farmgate regeling kleine boeren te 
hebben buitengesloten. Wanneer boeren hun aardappel naar de dichtstbijzijnde spot market 
brengen worden zij geconfronteerd met een hoog prijsrisico vanwege problemen in de 
meetbaarheid van de kwaliteit. Hoewel het probleem van de meetbaarheid van de kwaliteit 
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een evenredige betrekking heeft op handelaren, lieten de bevindingen zien dat boeren 
zwaarder geraakt worden dan de handelaren. In de boer-koper relaties is de hoofdoorzaak van 
misalignment het verschil in stimulans tussen boeren die op de dichtstbijzijnde spot market  
verkopen en de (anonieme) kopers in deze markt om de kwaliteit te verbeteren. In dit opzicht 
geven de bevindingen meer inzicht in het probleem van quality alignment in een spot market 
regeling (vanuit het perspectief van de boeren) waar verschilde boeren op een vaste marktdag 
hun aardappelen aanbieden. 
 
Hoofdstuk drie gaat verder met het analyseren van de factoren die de opname van IVs 
beïnvloeden, door de volgende specifieke onderzoeksvraag te behandelen.  
 
Hoe beïnvloeden het agriculturele kennis- en innovatiesysteem en de perceptie van boeren 
van lokale variëteiten het opnemen van verbeterde aardappel variëteiten? 
 
Om de rol van AKIS te onderzoeken bevat deze studie verschillende variabelen, namelijk 
frequentie gebruik  technische assisatentie van onderzoek, uitbreidingsdiensten, NGO’s, en/of 
boeren organizaties (cooperaties), training in boeren training centers, gebruik van 
voornaamste afnemer als bron van advies en toegang tot krediet. De variabele ‘gebruik van 
voornaamste afnemer als bron van advies’ was gebruikt als indicator om van stroomafwaartse 
actoren de perceptie van de IV’s te begrijpen. De studie toonde aan dat de frequentie van 
gebruik van technische assistentie van NGO’s, gebruik van voornaamste afnemer als bron 
van advies en toegang tot krediet effect hebben op de boers keuze voor opname van 
verbeterde aardappel variëteiten. Frequentie van gebruik van technische assistentie van 
NGO’s en toegang tot krediet lieten een positieve relatie zien, terwijl gebruik van 
voornaamste afnemer als bron van advies een negatieve relatie aangaf. Dit resultaat bevestigt 
de evaluatie van boeren in Hoofdstuk 2 waarin de IVs laag werden geëvalueerd op 
marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken. De andere AKIS variabelen lieten geen significante 
relatie zien met de boers keuze voor opname van verbeterde aardappel variëteiten. 
Desalniettemin was alleen toegang tot krediet positief gerelateerd aan de uitbreiding van 
opname (hoeveelheid land toegekend aan het verbouwen van IVs). 
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Betreft de relatie tussen perceptie van de boeren op de productie- en marktgerelateerde 
kwaliteitskenmerken zoals vastgesteld in Hoofdstuk twee, toonden de bevindingen in 
Hoofdstuk drie aan dat de perceptie van boeren op gewas management intensiteit en droogte 
tollerantie van LVs een negatief effect hebben op de opname van de IVs. Dit betekent dat 
boeren van mening zijn dat de IVs meer gewas management nodig hebben en gevoeliger zijn 
voor droogte incidenten dan de LVs. De studie vond ook dat er geen significante relatie 
bestaat tussen de perceptie van de boeren op LVs wat betreft ziekte resistentie en oogst 
potentieel en de keuze om de IVs aan te nemen. Aan de andere kant hebben knolgrootte en 
stoofpotkwaliteit een significante invloed op de beslissing van de aardappel boeren 
aangaande de grootte (een deel) van het land dat gebruikt wordt voor het verbouwen van IVs. 
Dus, hoewel zowel productie- als marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken belangrijke 
factoren zijn in de beslissing om IVs aan te nemen, neigen marktgerelateerde 
kwaliteitskenmerken zowel de waarschijnlijkheid als de intensiteit van aanname te 
beïnvloeden. Dit bevestigt wederom het belang van marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken 
voor de keuze voor aanname van verbeterde variëteiten. 
 
Naast de variabelen gerelateerd aan AKIS en kwaliteitskenmerken, onderzocht de tweede 
studie ook het effect van socio-economische variabelen op de aanname keuze. 
Onderwijsniveau, aanwezigheid van radio en/of tv lieten een sterke relatie met de aanname 
keuze zien, terwijl het aantal vee eenheden een negatieve relatie met aanname keuze 
aantoonde. Een mannelijke boer en familiegrootte gaven ook een positieve relatie aan met 
aanname keuze (echter marginaal). Anderzijds had het hebben van een groot eigen land een 
positieve relatie met  de omvang van de aanname van verbeterde variëteiten. 
 
Hoofdstuk vier heeft als doel de rol van de informele institutie (tussenpersoon) in de 
commercialisering  van de kleine boer te onderzoeken. Het is algemeen erkend dat 
tussenpersonen een belangrijke rol kunnen spelen onder omstandigheden van contract 
onzekerheid en positieve transactiekosten en dus handel kunnen vergemakkelijken door de 
transactiekosten gerelateerd aan zoek tijd en asymmetrische informatie te verlagen. 
Desalniettemin zijn er ook situaties waarin dergelijke instituties ervoor kunnen zorgen dat 
individuen samenwerken volgens sociale normen, zelfs als dit tegen hun eigenbelang indruist. 
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Op deze manier kunnen zij dus de efficiëntie verlagen door, bijvoorbeeld, nieuwe 
binnenkomers te weren van participatie in de markt door heimelijke prijscomplotten toe te 
passen. Globaal gezien klinkt er uit de literatuur verschillend geluid over de rol van de 
tussenpersoon in de handelsrelatie van kleine boeren en kopers. Vandaar dat Hoofdstuk vier 
empirisch heeft onderzocht welke factoren invloed hebben op de keuze van kleine boeren om 
handel te drijven via tussenpersonen en het effect van deze relatie op het economische 
resultaat, door de volgende vraag te adresseren. 
 
Welke factoren beïnvloeden de beslissing van de boeren om een tussenpersoon te gebruiken 
in hun handelsrelaties en wat is de economische impact van een dergelijke relatie? 
 
Om de factoren te identificeren die invloed hebben op de keuze van kleine boeren om handel 
te drijven via tussenpersonen, heeft de studie deze keuze geconceptualiseerd als binair 
kanaalkeuze beslissingsprobleem van boeren die het nut proberen te maximaliseren. Van de 
346 willekeurig geselecteerde boeren verkocht 68% hun aardappelen via tussenpersonen. 
Door het probit model toe te passen liet het onderzoek zien dat opleiding, leeftijd, aantal vee 
eenheden, productievolume, locatie en etnische banden de beslissing om wel (of niet) het 
instituut van een tussenpersoon te gebruiken significant beïnvloeden. Vervolgens, na 
controleren op selectie bias door propensity score matching, schatte de studie de 
economische impact van een dergelijke handelsrelatie. De bevindingen tonen aan kleine 
boeren die afgaan op tussenpersonen een 39% lager inkomen per hectare hadden dan de 
boeren die aan directe kopers verkochten. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat het instituut van 
de tussenpersoon niet geschikt is om om te gaan met nieuwe uitdagingen in de moderne 
economie en zelfs mogelijk de opkomst van andere manieren van bestuur, zoals contracten en 
preferred seller-buyer relaties, kunnen verhinderen door boeren op te sluiten in bestaande 
relaties met, ogenschijnlijk, te hoge sociale switching costs.  
 
Hoofdstuk vijf focust op een meer formeel type instituut, namelijk de contractuele landbouw 
overeenkomst. Hoewel contractuele landbouw (contract farming, CF) het inkomen van kleine 
boeren in ontwikkelingslanden kan verhogen, is empirisch onderzoek naar de motivatie van 
kleine boeren om deel te nemen in CF zeldzaam. Met het doel om inzicht te geven in 
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contractuele relaties die kleine boeren ertoe bewegen deel te nemen in CF, behandelt 
hoofdstuk vijf de volgende vraag. 
 
Door welke contractuele kenmerken worden boeren gemotiveerd om deel te nemen in een 
contractueel landbouw project? 
 
De algemene hypothese van dit onderzoek is dat de motivatie van kleine boeren om deel te 
nemen in CF grotendeels afhankelijk is van het karakter van de contractuele kenmerken (de 
zogeheten contract design attributes). Deze hypothese was getest door een alternatief 
specifiek (conditioneel) logit model toe te passen, in navolging van een literature review en 
een AHP aanpak, om zo de contract design attributes te selecteren die opgenomen zijn in het 
model. Deze zijn verwant aan drie niveaus van onzekerheid: output markt onzekerheid, 
kwaliteitsonzekerheid, en input markt onzekerheid. Op deze manier werden zes van de twaalf 
contract design attributes geselecteerd, namelijk: prijskeuze, vorm van het contract, 
specificatie van productkwaliteit, specificatie van zaadkwaliteit, een regeling van de aanvoer 
van input en technische ondersteuning – in relatie tot de drie niveaus van 
kwaliteitsonzekerheid. De bevindingen tonen aan dat boeren een sterke voorkeur hebben voor 
een variabele prijskeuze in plaats van een vaste prijskeuze; een geschreven contract in plaats 
van mondeling; een variabele specificatie van productkwaliteit in plaats van een vaste; en dat 
zaden, technische ondersteuning en input voorzien worden door de handelaar (kopende partij) 
in plaats van overheidsinstellingen of NGO’s. In het algemeen kunnen de keuze van de kleine 
boeren voor geschreven contracten in plaats van mondelinge contracten, de keuze van 
variabele in plaats van vaste kwaliteitsspecificaties en de voorkeur voor de koper als 
leverancier van zaad en technische ondersteuning in plaats van overheidsinstellingen of 
NGO’s verklaard worden vanuit het risico vermijdend gedrag van de kleine boeren. Aan de 
andere kant kan de keuze van een variabele prijs in plaats van een vaste prijs verklaard 
worden vanuit de ondernemende instelling van kleine boeren die volgens contractuele 
landbouw regelingen willen werken. 
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Samenvattend maken de vier onderzoeksvragen, zoals geopperd in hoofdstuk een, het 
mogelijk om in deze studie de uitdagingen en mogelijkheden in het verbeteren van de 
kwaliteit en markttoegang in de Ethiopische aardappel value chain te onderzoeken. 
 
Betreft de stroomopwaartse relaties is de variëteitkeuze van de kleine boeren grotendeels 
afhankelijk van de marktgerelateerde kwaliteitskenmerken. Dus het versterken van de 
opname van nieuwe variëteiten vereist het ontwikkelen van marktgeoriënteerde variëteiten, 
adequate informatie uitwisseling en gezamenlijke (of gedelegeerde) besluitvorming. Het 
gevolg is dat onderzoeksinstituten en andere organisaties verschillende actoren bij het 
innovatieproces moeten betrekken, zoals beschreven in de participatory innovation diffusion 
benadering.  
 
Met betrekking tot de verkoper-koper relaties, heeft deze thesis verschillende bijdragen. 
 
Ten eerste, een farmgate overeenkomst geeft inzamelende groothandelaren betere 
mogelijkheden om kwaliteit nauw te monitoren en geeft tegelijkertijd kleine boeren de kans 
om opportunistisch gedrag van handelaren op de spot market te minimaliseren. Desondanks 
is een farmgate overeenkomst niet mogelijk voor alle boeren. De spot market  overeenkomst 
blijft dus een zorg voor kleinschalige boeren vanwege het hoge prijsrisico dat gepaard gaat 
met kwaliteitsmetingen. Dit type overeenkomst betekent hoge transactiekosten voor 
verkopers van bederfelijk waar of bulkgoederen. Ten tweede, de relatie tussen kleine boeren 
en inzamelende groothandelaren wordt negatief beïnvloed door de aanwezigheid van 
tussenpersonen. Dit kan leiden tot verlies in welvaart, vanwege ongewenste gevolgen van 
insluitende etnische banden. Ten derde is de relatie tussen stroomafwaartse actoren 
voornamelijk gebaseerd op vertrouwen. Deze relatie lijkt efficiënter te zijn, omdat het de 
behoefte aan formele contracten wegneemt. Deze contracten zijn gewoonlijk kostbaar om op 
te stellen, te monitoren en te handhaven. Tenslotte, hoewel farmgate en relaties gebaseerd op 
vertrouwenscontracten betere stimuli zijn om de kwaliteit voor de nationale markt te 
verbeteren, is er voor commercialisatie van boeren in meer “herkauwende” markten, zoals de 
regionale markt, een meer geïntegreerd type contractuele relatie nodig. Een voorbeeld 
hiervan is de contractuele landbouw regeling. Deze thesis geeft een analytisch kader om 
contractuele relaties in een contractueel landbouw project te analyseren door de voorkeuren 
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van de boeren te conceptualiseren als een multi-categorie discreet keuzeprobleem, waarbij de 
keuze voor een contract is gemodelleerd als een set van verschillende contract design 
attributes. Het gevolg voor agribusiness managers is dat zij deze benadering kunnen 
gebruiken om contextspecifieke contracten op te stellen. In de context van dit onderzoek 
kunnen de voorkeuren van de kleine boeren voor de verschillende contract design attributes  
verklaard worden vanuit het perspectief van risico vermijdend gedrag en een ondernemende 
instelling. Institutionele ondersteuning in de input en output markt is belangrijk in het 
versterken van de onderhandelingspositie kleine boeren, wat leidt tot concurrerende 
contractaanbiedingen.  
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